>>5468024 lb
>>5468168 lb
NOTABLE
Raisin Caine
MAJ CAINE: And then, depending if you want to talk to the Secret Service, Special Agent Ken Boshamp, too (inaudible).
DR. GROSS: Okay. And if I can do that, I'll get back to you (inaudible).
MAJ CAINE: Yeah, we (inaudible).
DR. GROSS: – telephone numbers and (inaudible) -
MAJ CAINE: Yes, sir.
DR. GROSS: like that, okay. Any other major observations or concerns or comments about this whole episode, from your perspective?
MAJ CAINE: From my perspective, from an American's perspective, this is a – this is – the whole thing is a tragedy. The fact that we were able to – to get airborne as
fast as – or as we did granted, not fast enough to stop the airplane from hitting the Pentagon or did we have the intel to - to be able to do that.
It is – it is a – it was a testament to the Guard and how well everybody did, a testament to our maintenance. They were phenomenal. I wonder where we will be in five years -
DR. GROSS: Yeah.
MAJ CAINE: - as a country. That's about it.
DR. GROSS: Okay.
MAJ CAINE: This is (inaudible) - it's a secret, these tapes.
ANONS, CAINE THING IS 9/11 FUCKERY!!!!!!!
(FOUO) Major Caine entered the Air National Guard in Feburary 1992 with duty station,
Syracuse, NY. He was trained as an F-16 pilot and served in that capacity until July 1998. He
joined the DC Air National Guard in Summer of 1999 after training at fighter warfare school. In
late 2001 he participated in Operation Enduring Freedom and in Spring 2002 was reassigned to
Davis-Monthan AFB.
(FOUO) Caine commented that because of his Syracuse experience he had visited the Northeast
Air Defense Sector (NEADS), knew how their floor operated, and knew that they had to be
contacted on 9-11. He tried but was not successful in doing so. He is not aware if either General
Wherley or Lt Col Thompson, Caine's replacement as Supervisor of Flying, was successful in
reaching NEADS. He was told ofthe calls by Colonel Brooks to NEADS from the Air National
Guard Command Post but was unaware ofthem.
(FOUO) He believed that he recorded in his cockpit at least a part ofhis initial4+ hour sortie. If
so, Major McNulty, the upit Intel officer would have the tape in his vault. He cautioned that
more than one person used the call sign "Wild One" during the day on 9-11.
(FOUO) Caine did not remember being interviewed by Dr. Gross as part ofthe DoD history
project. He implicitly acknowledged that if his recall today was different than what was in the .
interview then the interview prevailed.
(FOUO) On 9-11 he was providing an orientation to a new officer, Major Valentine, and the
Intel NCO came into the scheduling office and said that an airplane had just hit the World Trade
Center. The Squadron had a flight ofthree, Bully, down on the Dare County range in North
Carolina, about 200 miles away. His initial concern was the safety ofthose jets. He didn't think
much ofit at first, "yeah, right, whatever" and that it wouldn't impact them much. He saw the
second airplane hit while watching CNN. He instantly knew that this was obviously an attack
and he went back to the operations desk knowing that there would be some impact on the air
traffic control system in the Washington DC area .
.k8) Previously, he had developed a relationship with the Secret Service and the field office that
managed the movement ofsenior level officials out ofAndrews. He had gotten to know "those
guys" and asked ifthere were any plans they had that he needed to know about. Personally, he
knew Special Agent Beauchamp. It is not the Presidential movement unit that controls the
movement of other YIPs or senior govellllllent officials.
(FOUO) His primary concern was the air traffic issue ofrecovering the Bully flight from North
Carolina. He talked to the tower and they had no situational awareness that helped him. He
thought that all the calls into the tower were recorded and that his call would be part of the
evidence available through tower records. He recalled that every time he called "up there" there
was a beep on the line. Andrews tower, he said, would not have been in the loop for any Secret
Service orders to scramble aircraft. In his Gross interview he had stated that the Tower told him
that they just received the scramble order. On reflection, Caine thought that it might have been
that information from Tower that prompted him to call Ken Beauchamp.
(FOUO) About 0930-0940, he called Agent Beauchamp because he thought he would have
situational awareness. He did not receive from Beauchamp nor did Caine have any situational
awareness on a plane approaching Washington DC. He told the weapons loaders at about 0945
to start unloading the weapons on the other side ofthe base. At some point in this time frame he
learned ofthe Pentagon impact from the news, no other source. The result was that the intensity
level increased even more.
https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-042-doc15.pdf
Caine pointing at General Wherley, Secret Service agent Ken Beauchamp, and VP Dick Cheney
Maybe Potus want tus to dig?
(FOUO) The Secret Service is not a laurich authority, Caine said. He validated General
Wherley's statement that the phones were busy and that he handed one of the phones–he thought
the Secret Service Joint Operations Center call–to Wherley. Wherley arrived at the operations
desk at about the time they were generating planes and the missiles were being uncrated. He is
not sure how the JOC got their phone number. Beauchamp, in the earlier call, said he would call
back, but did not. He speculated that the JOC got the number from Beauchamp. He didn't doubt
that it was Beauchamp, according to the Gross interview, who said that Andrews had to get
fighters in the air. Caine thought, but would not swear to it, that he heard the Vice President's
voice in the background. He did remember asking what the JOC was and then said, here ' s my boss [General Wherley].