Anonymous ID: 477c68 March 4, 2018, 12:55 p.m. No.550313   🗄️.is 🔗kun   >>0392

>>549972

In Talley v. California (1960),[91] the Court struck down a Los Angeles city ordinance that made it a crime to distribute anonymous pamphlets. Justice Hugo Black wrote in the majority opinion: "There can be no doubt that such an identification requirement would tend to restrict freedom to distribute information and thereby freedom of expression . . . . Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an important role in the progress of mankind."

 

I believe the Internet is just a pamphlet vehicle and can't be censored based on this SC freedom of speech judgement alone.

Anonymous ID: 477c68 March 4, 2018, 1:06 p.m. No.550392   🗄️.is 🔗kun

>>550313

>>549972

 

Additionally, under free speech, I would think blogs, FB, Twat, Newspapers, etc. etc., where people post their thoughts, or ideas can not be censored by these vehicles, without being subject to a lawsuit. As it says here:

 

The Free Press Clause protects the right of individuals to express themselves through publication and dissemination of information, ideas and opinions without interference, constraint or prosecution by the government.[202][203] This right was described in Branzburg v. Hayes as "a fundamental personal right" that is not confined to newspapers and periodicals.[204] In Lovell v. City of Griffin (1938),[205] Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes defined "press" as "every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion".[206] This right has been extended to media including newspapers, books, plays, movies, and video games.[207] While it is an open question whether people who blog or use social media are journalists entitled to protection by media shield laws,[208] they are protected equally by the Free Speech Clause and the Free Press Clause, because both clauses do not distinguish between media businesses and nonprofessional speakers.[202][203][209][210] This is further shown by the Supreme Court consistently refusing to recognize the First Amendment as providing greater protection to the institutional media than to other speakers.[211][212][213] For example, in a case involving campaign finance laws the Court rejected the "suggestion that communication by corporate members of the institutional press is entitled to greater constitutional protection than the same communication by" non-institutional-press businesses.