Anonymous ID: 823cb6 April 1, 2019, 6:32 p.m. No.6011441   🗄️.is 🔗kun

>>6010503

 

What did Kavanaugh really write today? Read it for yourself

 

The following is taken from pages 37 and 38 of https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/17-8151_1qm2.pdf

 

Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019)

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 17–8151

RUSSELL BUCKLEW, PETITIONER v. ANNE L. PRECYTHE, DIRECTOR, MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

[April 1, 2019]

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, concurring.

 

When an inmate raises an as-applied constitutional

challenge to a particular method of execution—that is, a

challenge to a method of execution that is constitutional in

general but that the inmate says is very likely to cause

him severe pain—one question is whether the inmate

must identify an available alternative method of execution

that would significantly reduce the risk of severe pain.

Applying our recent decisions in Glossip v. Gross, 576

U. S. ___ (2015), and Baze v. Rees, 553 U. S. 35 (2008)

(plurality opinion), the Court’s answer to that question is

yes. Under those precedents, I agree with the Court’s

holding and join the Court’s opinion.

I write to underscore the Court’s additional holding that

the alternative method of execution need not be authorized under current state law—a legal issue that had been

uncertain before today’s decision. See Arthur v. Dunn, 580

U. S. , –___ (2017) (slip op., at 9–11) (SOTOMAYOR,

J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Importantly, all

nine Justices today agree on that point. Ante, at 19; post,

at 14 (BREYER, J., dissenting).

As the Court notes, it follows from that additional holding that the burden of the alternative-method requirement

“can be overstated.” Ante, at 19. Indeed, the Court states: “[W]e see little likelihood that an inmate facing a

serious risk of pain will be unable to identify an available

alternative.” Ante, at 20.

In other words, an inmate who contends that a particular method of execution is very likely to cause him severe

pain should ordinarily be able to plead some alternative

method of execution that would significantly reduce the

risk of severe pain. At oral argument in this Court, the

State suggested that the firing squad would be such an

available alternative, if adequately pleaded. Tr. of Oral

Arg. 63–64 (“He can plead firing squad. . . . Of course, if he

had . . . pleaded firing squad, it’s possible that Missouri

could have executed him by firing squad”). JUSTICE

SOTOMAYOR has likewise explained that the firing squad

is an alternative method of execution that generally causes

an immediate and certain death, with close to zero risk

of a botched execution. See Arthur, 580 U. S., at

(slip op., at 17–18). I do not here prejudge the question

whether the firing squad, or any other alternative method

of execution, would be a feasible and readily implemented

alternative for every State. See McGehee v. Hutchinson,

854 F. 3d 488, 493–494 (CA8 2017). Rather, I simply

emphasize the Court’s statement that “we see little likelihood that an inmate facing a serious risk of pain will be

unable to identify an available alternative.” Ante, at 20.