No wonder the FBI didn’t indict Clinton because none of them consider the security breach that serious. Because many FBI forward secret docs to the personal emails. These are the people charged with National Security!
INVESTIGATIVE SUMMARY 10/10/2018
Findings of Misconduct by Three FBI Employees and One FBI Task Force Officer for Violating DOJ and FBI Computer Rules of Behavior and FBI Policy by Forwarding a United Kingdom Intelligence Report Regarding the Manchester Arena Bombing and Other Sensitive or Restricted Emails
The Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) initiated this investigation upon the receipt of information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that an article published in The New York Times (NYT) on May 24, 2017 contained unclassified information that was sensitive, non-public, and derived from a United Kingdom (UK) intelligence report (UK Intelligence Report) regarding the Manchester Arena bombing on May 22, 2017. The FBI referral, and the UK Intelligence Report itself, indicated that a UK government agency had disseminated the report by e-mail to numerous other U.S. federal agencies, as well as to many foreign law enforcement agencies.
The OIG determined that the FBI initially further disseminated the UK Intelligence Report to over 1,000 unique recipients, including to offices at FBI headquarters, Joint Terrorism Task Force members, and other federal agency partners…
However, the OIG substantiated the following violations of DOJ and FBI computer rules of behavior and FBI policy by the following four individuals in connection with their handling of the UK Intelligence Report:
• Two FBI personnel intentionally forwarded the e-mail containing the UK Intelligence Report to their personal, non-government e-mail accounts;
o One of these two FBI employees, during the one year period before the Manchester report was leaked, had improperly forwarded to the employee’s personal e-mail account approximately 550 other FBI e-mails with header information indicating the content was sensitive, or restricted for official use;
o The second of these two FBI employees, during the one year period before the Manchester report was leaked, had forwarded one other FBI e-mail containing operationally sensitive information to the employee’s personal e-mail account;
o The OIG conducted a consensual review of the personal e-mail accounts maintained on the personal mobile devices of these two individuals. The OIG did not find evidence that either forwarded the UK Intelligence Report to the NYT, or anyone else.
• A task force officer assigned to the FBI forwarded the UK Intelligence Report to a foreign law enforcement partner without obtaining FBI permission to do so, and transmitted the report without including all of the relevant instructions restricting further distribution of the report;
o The task force officer, during the one year period before the Manchester report was leaked, forwarded 3 other FBI e-mails containing operationally sensitive information to unauthorized recipients;
• A fourth FBI employee had set an unauthorized auto-forward of the employee’s FBI e- mail to the employee’s personal e-mail account in violation of FBI policy; however, internal FBI e-mail filters prevented the delivery of the UK Intelligence Report and most other FBI e-mails from being forwarded automatically.
• All four individuals denied providing the UK Intelligence Report, or information contained in it, to the NYT.
The OIG provided its report to the FBI for appropriate action. Posted to oig.justice.gov on October 10, 2018. Summary listed on page below
https://oig.justice.gov/reports/inv-findings.htm