Controversy

The first autopsy was performed on Casolaro's body at the University of Virginia on August 14, 1991. The coroner determined that blood loss was the cause of death, and that death occurred from one to four hours before the body was discovered, or roughly between 8:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m. on August 10.[1]

The day after Casolaro's body was found, Village Voice editor Dan Bischoff received an anonymous telephone call alerting him to Casolaro's death.[3] By Tuesday, August 13, Ridgeway and Vaughan write, the "rumors were flying,…and by the next day, the crazies started coming out of the woodwork. There were vague unsubstantiated rumors that the Mafia was somehow involved, and the wildest story even suggested that the undertaker was an employee of the CIA, hired to clean up after an agency assassination."[1] Even at the funeral, they write, the family felt "engulfed by mysteries." Two men reportedly approached the coffin, one of them a soldier in U.S. Army dress, who laid a medal on the lid, and saluted. No one recognized either of the men.[1]

https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/97684.pdf

Re-examination of the case

After the scandal erupted, police returned to Room 517 for a more thorough if belated search. The room had not been rented since Casolaro's body had been discovered and authorities looked for fingerprint and fiber evidence; they reexamined the windows and doors for anything suggesting a forced entry. They searched the hotel's rooftop for footprints and/or other evidence consistent with someone rappelling into a window. Their searches uncovered nothing. Roads were searched for miles. Now they were looking for Casolaro's missing briefcase, and accordion file.

The adjacent rooms to Room 517 were rented that evening—one by Mike Looney, the other by an unnamed family. No one reported hearing anything unusual either on the night of August 9 or the morning of August 10. Along with samples of Casolaro's known handwriting, the suicide note was sent to handwriting experts, and found to be his.

In January 1992, about five months after Casolaro's death, Dr. Frost of the Virginia state medical examiner's office performed another autopsy; he returned a second suicide verdict, citing blood loss as the cause of death. Dr. Frost also uncovered a few previously unknown facts. There was evidence of early stages multiple sclerosis but the degree of severity was probably minor. Toxicology analysis uncovered traces of several drugs: antidepressants, acetaminophen, and alcohol. He wrote: "There was nothing present in any way that could have incapacitated Casolaro so he would have been incapable of struggling against an assailant, let alone been sufficient to kill him."[1]

A blood-splatter expert, Dr. Henry C. Lee, was quizzed on the case by Martinsburg police. His opinion that the evidence was not inconsistent with suicide was prominently noted in press releases. However he withdrew his statement formally years later when he was informed of the bloody towels on the floor of the bathroom since no authorities had mentioned them at the time of his opinion.[citation needed]

Ron Rosenbaum, a journalist friend of Casolaro's, suggested in Vanity Fair that Casolaro may have intended his suicide to appear to be murder triggered by his research, in order to have others look into the story after his death.[2]

PROMIS, by Michael C. Ruppert

[The Following Story Appeared In The September, 2000 Special Edition Of From The Wilderness For Paid Subscribers Only. Read It Now, Free, For The First Time Ever On The Web. © Copyright 2000, 2001. All Rights Reserved. Michael C. Ruppert And From The Wilderness Publications. See the FTW Homepage For Reprint Policy] http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/pandora/052401_promis.html

"Reprinted with permission, Michael C. Ruppert and From The Wilderness Publications, www.copvcia.com, P.O. Box 6061-350, Sherman Oaks, CA, 91413. 818-788-8791. FTW is published monthly, annual subscriptions are $50 per year."

Order Michael C. Ruppert’s new book “Crossing the Rubicon: The Decline of the American Empire at the End of the Age of Oil, 700+ pages, 1,000+ references, only $15.99 plus shipping!!! http://www.fromthewilderness.com/store/index.shtml

"U.S. journalist Mike Ruppert, a former Los Angeles police officer who now runs a Web site that seeks to expose CIA covert operations, said he met with RCMP investigator McDade on Aug. 3 in L.A. Ruppert said the RCMP officer was anxious to see documents he received three years ago from a shadowy Green Beret named Bill Tyre [sic] detailing the sale of rigged Promis software to Canada." - The Toronto Star, September 4, 2000.

Only the legends of Excalibur, the sword of invincible power, and the Holy Grail, the chalice from which Christ took his wine at the Last Supper begin to approach the mysterious aura that have evolved in the world of secret intelligence around a computer software program named Promis. Created in the 1970s by former National Security Agency (NSA) programmer and engineer Bill Hamilton, now President of Washington, D.C.'s Inslaw Corporation, PROMIS (Prosecutor's Management Information System) crossed a threshold in the evolution of computer programming. Working from either huge mainframe computer systems or smaller networks powered by the progenitors of today's PCs, PROMIS, from its first "test drive" a quarter century ago, was able to do one thing that no other program had ever been able to do. It was able to simultaneously read and integrate any number of different computer programs or data bases simultaneously, regardless of the language in which the original programs had been written or the operating system or platforms on which that data base was then currently installed.

In the mid 1970s, at least as far as computer programs were concerned, the "universal translator" of Star Trek had become a reality. And the realm of Star Trek is exactly where most of the major media would have the general public place the Promis story in their world views. But given the fact that the government of Canada has just spent millions of dollars investigating whether or not a special version of Promis, equipped with a so-called "back door" has compromised its national security, one must concede that perhaps the myths surrounding Promis and what has happened to it need to be re-evaluated. Myths, by definition, cannot be solved, but facts can be understood and integrated. Only a very few people realize how big the Promis story really is.

It is difficult to relegate Promis to the world of myth and fantasy when so many tangible things, like the recently acknowledged RCMP investigation make it real. Canadians are not known for being wildly emotional types given to sprees. And one must also include the previous findings of Congressional oversight committees and no less than six obvious dead bodies ranging from investigative journalist Danny Casolaro in 1991, to a government employee named Alan Standorf, to British Publisher and lifelong Israeli agent Robert Maxwell also in 1991, to retired Army CID investigator Bill McCoy in 1997, to a father and son named Abernathy in a small northern California town named Hercules. The fact that commercial versions of Promis are now available for sale directly from Inslaw belies the fact that some major papers and news organizations instantly and laughably use the epithet conspiracy theorist to stigmatize anyone who discusses it. Fear may be the major obstacle or ingredient in the myth surrounding modified and "enhanced" versions of Promis that keeps researchers from fully pursuing leads rising in its wake. I was validated in this theory on September 23rd in a conversation with FTW Contributing Editor Peter Dale Scott, Ph.D. Scott, a Professor Emeritus at UC Berkeley and noted author. Peter, upon hearing of the details of my involvement, frankly told me that Promis frightened him. Casolaro, who was found dead in a West Virginia motel room in 1991, had Scott's name (Scott is also a Canadian) in a list of people to contact about his Promis findings. He never got that far.

A close examination of the Promis saga actually leads to more than a dozen deaths which may well be why so many people avoid it. And many of those deaths share in common a pattern where, within 48 hours of death, bodies are cremated, residences are sanitized and all files disappear. This was certainly the case with my friend Bill McCoy, a legendary retired Army CID investigator who was also the principal investigator for Hamilton in his quest to recover what may be hundreds of millions in lost royalties and to reunite him with the evolved progeny of his brain child. Those progeny now have names like SMART (Self Managing Artificial Reasoning Technology) and TECH. I will never forget hearing of McCoy's death and his immediate cremation and then trying to reconcile that with the number of times he had told me, while sitting in his Fairfax Virginia home, that he wanted to be buried next to his beloved wife in spite of the fact that he was a Taoist.

I have tried to avoid becoming involved in Promis even though I have been in possession of documents and information about the case for more than six years. Reluctantly, as I realized that recent developments gave me a moral imperative to write, I gathered all of my scattered computer files connecting the case into one place. When assembled they totaled more than seven megabytes and that did not include maybe 500 printed pages of separate files.

In researching this story I found a starkly recurring theme. It appeared first in a recent statement I tape recorded from probably one of the three best informed open sources on the story in the world, William Tyree. I also came across the same theme, almost verbatim, in a research paper that I discovered while following leads from other sources.

Tyree is no stranger to FTW. A former US Army Green Beret, framed in 1979, he has been serving a life sentence for the murder of his wife Elaine outside of Fort Devens Massachusetts, then home of the 10th Special Forces Group. I have written of him in no less than six prior issues of FTW. He has, from his prison cell in Walpole Massachusetts, been a central if little known figure in the Promis case for many years, like a monk mysteriously possessed of information that no one else could obtain. If the story is ever fully told his role may be even more significant than anyone has ever supposed.

The First Rip Off

Reagan confidant and overseer for domestic affairs from 1981 to 1985 Ed Meese loved Promis software. According to lawsuits and appeals filed by Hamilton, as well as the records of Congressional hearings, the FBI and dozens of news stories, the legend of Promis began in 1981-2. After a series of demonstrations showing how well Promis could integrate the computers of dozens of US attorneys offices around the country, the Department of Justice (DoJ) ordered an application of the software under a tightly controlled and limited license. From there, however, Meese, along with cronies D. Lowell Jensen (also no stranger to FTW's pages) and Earl Brian allegedly engaged in a conspiracy to steal the software, modify it to include a "trap door" that would allow those who knew of it to access the program in other computers, and then sell it overseas to foreign intelligence agencies. Hamilton began to smell a rat when agencies from other countries, like Canada, started asking him for support services in French when he had never made sales to Canada.

The Promis-managed data could be anything from financial records of banking institutions to compilations of various records used to track the movement of terrorists. That made the program a natural for Israel which, according to Hamilton and many other sources, was one of the first countries to acquire the bootlegged software from Meese and Company. As voluminously described by Inslaw attorney, the late Elliot Richardson, the Israeli Mossad under the direction of Rafi Eitan, allegedly modified the software yet again and sold it throughout the Middle East. It was Eitan, the legendary Mossad captor of Adolph Eichmann, according to Hamilton, who had masqueraded as an Israeli prosecutor to enter Inslaw's DC offices years earlier and obtain a first hand demonstration of what the Promis could do.

Not too many Arab nations would trust a friendly Mossad agent selling computer programs. So the Mossad provided their modified Promis to flamboyant British publishing magnate Robert Maxwell, a WWII Jewish resistance fighter who had assumed the Anglo name and British citizenship after the war. It was Maxwell, capable of travelling the world and with enormous marketing resources, who became the sales agent for Promis and then sold it to, among others, the Canadian government. Maxwell drowned mysteriously in late 1991, not long after investigative reporter Danny Casolaro was "suicided" in West Virginia. Maxwell may not have been the only one to send Promis north.

>>6274244

last bit of article

In the meantime, after winning some successes, including a resounding Congressional finding that he had been cheated, Bill Hamilton hit his own buzz saw in a series of moves by the Reagan and Bush Justice Departments and rigged court decisions intended to bankrupt him and force him out of business. He survived and fought on. In the meantime hundreds of millions of dollars in royalties and sales fees were going into the wrong pockets. And, as was later revealed from a number of directions, this initial tampering with the software was far from the only game in town. Both the CIA, through GE Aerospace in Herndon Virginia (GAO Contract #82F624620), the FBI and elements of the NSA were tinkering with Promis, not just to modify it with a trap door, but to enhance it with artificial intelligence or AI. It's worth it to note that GE Aerospace was subsequently purchased by Martin-Marietta which then merged to become Lockheed-Martin the largest defense and aerospace contractor in the world. This will become important later on.

Confidential documents obtained by FTW indicate that much of the AI development was done at the Los Alamos National Laboratory and Sandia Labs using research from other US universities, including Harvard, Cal-Tech and the University of California. And it was not just Reagan Republicans who got their hands on it either. As we'll see shortly, Promis came to life years before the election of Ronald Reagan. It was also, according to Bill Tyree, an essential element in the espionage conducted by Jonathan Pollard against not only the US government but the Washington embassies of many nations targeted by Israel's Mossad.

The Last Circle

For more than a year and half, members of the National Security Section of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) have been travelling through the US, often in the company of a savvy female homicide detective from the small California town of Hercules named Sue Todd. Even now questions linger as to what the Canadians were really after. But there is absolutely no question that while surreptitiously in the U.S. the Mounties spent more time with author and investigative reporter Cheri Seymour than with anyone else. And for good reason.

Seymour, under the pen name of Carol Marshall is the author of a meticulously researched e-book entitled The Last Circle located at http://www.lycaeum.org/books/ books/last_circle/. So meticulously researched and documented is the book that FTW's researcher "The Goddess" has fact checked it and found it flawless. Same with Bill Hamilton and the Mounties, who have also told me of its precision. Anyone seeking to understand the Promis story must include this book as a part of their overall research.

I first met Cheri in person this spring after she had contacted me via the Internet. I traveled to her home, some three hours outside of Los Angeles and viewed acres of documentation for a saga that started with drug related murders and police corruption around methamphetamine production in northern California in the 1980s. That investigation later connected to politicians like Tony Coelho and major corporations like MCA and eventually led to a shadowy scientist named Michael Riconosciuto. Familiar names like Ted Gunderson and relatively unknown names like Robert Booth Nichols weave throughout this detailed epic that takes us to the Cabazon Indian Reservation in the California Desert and into the deepest recesses of the 1980s Reagan/Bush security apparatus.

Gunderson, a retired FBI Special Agent in Charge (SAC) from Los Angeles, and Nichols, a mysterious Los Angeles man, exposed through court documents obtained by Seymour as being a career CIA operative, connected with scientist/programmer, Riconosciuto in a sinister, yet now very well documented phase of Promis' development. In affidavits Riconosciuto claimed that one of the tasks he performed at the Cabazon reservation was to install a back door in the version of Promis that was sold to Canada. In August of this year the RCMP investigators told both Seymour and me that they had traveled to the reservation several times and had confirmed many details of Seymour's research. They had also interviewed Riconosciuto on more than one occasion. As with everyone else I have ever met who has spoken with him, both the Mounties and Seymour kept a reserved distance from him and always "counted their fingers after every hand shake."

By using treaties between the U.S. Government and Native American peoples that recognize Native American reservations as sovereign nations, the CIA has long and frequently avoided statutory prohibitions against operating inside the United States. The financial rewards for tribal nations have been significant and the extra security afforded by tribal police in remote areas has been a real blessing for covert operatives. The Last Circle describes in detail how Promis software was modified by Riconosciuto to allegedly include the back door "eavesdropping" capability but also enhanced with one form of AI and subsequently applied to the development of new weapons systems including "ethnospecific" biowarfare compounds capable of attacking specific races. Riconosciuto, now serving time in a Federal prison in Pennsylvania has a cell a very short distance from fellow espionage inmates Edwin Wilson and Jonathan Pollard. While his tale is critical to understanding what has happened to Promis, the fact remains that Riconosciuto has been out of the loop and in legal trouble for eight years. He has been in a maximum security prison for at least six. What was surprising was that in 1998 he contacted homicide detective Sue Todd in Hercules and told her that the murder of a father and son, execution style, was connected to the Promis story. One connection was obvious. Hercules is a "company town" connected to a weapons manufacturer described in Seymour's book that also connects to the Cabazon Indian Reservation.

The Three Bills

I lived in Washington, D.C. from August 1994 until late October of 1995. It was during that time that I was a semi-regular visitor at the Fairfax, Virginia home of Bill McCoy, a loveable sixty-something giant, always adorned with a beret who complained ruthlessly about what had happened to the United States since "The Damned Yankee Army" had taken over. Writers were "scribblers." People who thought they knew something about covert operations without ever having seen one were "spooky-groupies." "Mac," as we called him, had his investigative fingers in almost everything but he was most involved with Promis. McCoy was a retired Chief Warrant Officer from the U.S. Army's Criminal Investigation Division. He had broken some of the biggest cases in Army history. It was Mac who first introduced me to both Bill Tyree and to Bill Hamilton in 1994. I recall scratching my head as I would be sitting at Mac's dinner table when a call would come in from Hamilton asking if there was any new information from Tyree. "Not yet, " McCoy would answer, "I'll call as soon as I get something."

"How," I asked, "could a guy in a maximum security prison like Walpole State Penitentiary in Massachusetts be getting information of such quality that someone like Hamilton would be calling urgently to see what had come in?" "That," answered McCoy was the work of someone known only as "The Sergeant Major," and alternately as "His Eminence" who fed the information to Tyree, who in turn fed it to McCoy, who then passed it on to Hamilton. Sometimes however, Tyree and Hamilton communicated directly. To this day the identity of the Sergeant Major remains a mystery and the puzzle piece most pursued by the RCMP when they visited me in August, 2000.

It was also not by coincidence then that, in the same winter of 94-95, McCoy revealed to me that he was using former Green Berets to conduct physical surveillance of the Washington, D.C. offices of Microsoft in connection with the Promis case. FTW has, within the last month, received information indicating that piracy of Microsoft products at the GE Aerospace Herndon facility were likely tied to larger objectives, possibly the total compromise of any Windows based product. It is not by chance that most of the military and all of the intelligence agencies in the U.S. now operate on Macintosh systems.

In late 1996 Tyree mailed me a detailed set of diagrams and a lengthy narrative explaining the exact hows and whys of the murder of Danny Casolaro and an overall view of the Promis saga that is not only consistent with what is described by Seymour in The Last Circle but also provides many new details. Asked about Mike Riconosciuto for this story Tyree would say only that, "He's very good at what he does. There are very, very few who can touch him, maybe 200 in the whole world. Riconosciuto's in a class all by himself." Those documents, as later described to me by RCMP Investigator Sean McDade, proved to be "Awesome and right on the money."

The essence of those documents was that, not only had the Republicans under Meese exploited the software, but that the Democrats had also seen its potential and moved years earlier. Nowhere was this connection more clearly exposed than in understanding the relationship between three classmates from the U.S. Naval Academy: Jimmy Carter, Stansfield Turner (Carter's CIA director), and billionaire banker and Presidential kingmaker (Carter's Annapolis roommate), Arkansas' Jackson Stephens. The Tyree diagrams laid out in detail how Promis, after improvement with AI, had allegedly been mated with the software of Jackson Stephens' firm Systematics. In the late seventies and early eighties, Systematics handled some 60-70% of all electronic banking transactions in the U.S. The goal, according to the diagrams which laid out (subsequently verified) relationships between Stephens, Worthen Bank, the Lippo Group and the drug/intelligence bank BCCI was to penetrate every banking system in the world. This "cabal" could then use Promis both to predict and to influence the movement of financial markets worldwide. Stephens, truly bipartisan in his approach to profits, has been a lifelong supporter of George Bush and he was, at the same time, the source of the $3 million loan that rescued a faltering Clinton Campaign in early 1992. There is a great photograph of Stephens with a younger George "W" Bush in the excellent BCCI history, False Profits.

In the fall of 1997, Bill McCoy, having recently gone off of his heart medication was found dead in his favorite chair. In the days and weeks before he had been advised by Tyree that a Pakistani hit man, on an Israeli contract had been in the states seeking to fulfill a hit on McCoy. There had been other hints that someone closer to McCoy might do the job. Tyree recently told FTW that just before his death, he had given McCoy information on "Elbit" flash memory chips, allegedly designed at Kir Yat-Gat south of Tel Aviv. The unique feature of the Elbit chips was that they worked on ambient electricity in a computer. In other words, they worked when the computer was turned off. When combined with another newly developed chip, the "Petrie," which was capable of storing up to six months worth of key strokes, it was now possible to burst transmit all of a computer's activity in the middle of the night to a nearby receiver - say in a passing truck or even a low flying SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) satellite. According to Tyree this was the methodology used by Jonathan Pollard and the Israeli Mossad to compromise many foreign embassies in Washington.

Within 48 hours of his death Bill McCoy had been cremated and in less than four days all of Mac's furniture, records and personal belongings had been removed from his home by his son, a full Colonel in the Army. The house had been sanitized and repainted and, aside from the Zen garden in the back yard, there was no trace that McCoy had ever lived there.

Harvard and HUD

Former Assistant Secretary of Housing, Catherine Austin Fitts has had about as much ink in FTW as anyone else. A feisty, innovative thinker she has seen raging success as a Managing Director of the Wall Street investment bank Dillon Read and she has been "nuked" into near poverty after devising software strategies seeking to optimize financial data and returns for the US taxpayer. While acting as a HUD consultant in 1996, selling defaulted HUD Mortgages into the private market through her own investment bank, Hamilton Securities (no relation), she achieved unheard of taxpayer returns of around 90 cents on the dollar. In doing so she ran afoul of an entrenched Washington financial power structure feeding uncompetitively at the HUD trough.

Last month we described how Fitts devised a data optimization method using hand coding by residents of a HUD Housing project in Washington to produce Promis-like results. She successfully "mapped" the flow of HUD money and was about to create proprietary software that would make the job easier. That software would have integrated billions of pieces of disorganized HUD financial data. Suddenly, in August 1996, DoJ and HUD InspectorÕs General investigations started that seized her computers and resulted in a four-year blatantly illegal campaign to crush everything she stood for. No charges were ever brought, Fitts, her money and her data are still viciously separated.

One of the empires Fitts threatened was that of the Harvard Endowment. The Harvard Endowment is not really a benevolent university fund but an aggressive investment predator with $19 billion in assets, some from HUD subsidized housing. Harvard also has a number of other investments in high tech defense operations and had a big hand in investing George W BushÕs lackluster firm Harken Energy. "W" has a Harvard MBA. FittsÕ chief nemesis at Harvard, Herbert "Pug" Winokur, head of Capricorn Investments, and member of the board of the Harvard Endowment is also a PhD mathematician from Harvard where the mathematical breakthroughs that gave rise to Artificial Intelligence using block-modeling research were discovered. In the 60s Winokur had done social science research for the Department of Defense on causes of inner city unrest in the wake of the 1967 Detroit riots.

The pioneering research at Harvard that allegedly gave rise to the Artificial Intelligence installed in Promis later moved north. According to a Harvard website (www.analytichtech.com/mb119/chap2e.htm) "Much of the effort of the Harvard group - no longer based solely at Harvard - was centered on the International Network for Social Network Analysis (INSNA) at Toronto…". Things grew more suspicious as FittsÕ research disclosed that Winokur, through Capricorn Investments, had a decisive role in the 1980s management of the intelligence/government outsourcing mega-firm DynCorp, of Reston, VA. Winokur served as DynCorp CEO from 1989 to 1997. DynCorp handles everything for Uncle Sam from aircraft maintenance, to sheep-dipping of combat troops into private assault forces in Colombia, to the financial management of HUD records, to the maintenance of computer security at government facilities. One of DynCorpÕs most interesting contracts is with the DoJ for the financial management of assets seized in the drug war. DynCorp also counts among its shareholders former CIA Director James Woolsey. Pug Winokur made DynCorp what it is today and he still sits on the board.

>>In juxtaposition, Harvard and HUD differ in one striking respect according to Fitts. The Harvard Endowment has enjoyed wildly uncharacteristic above market tax-free returns for the last decade, (33% in 1999), while HUD, in the same year, was compelled to do a "manual adjustments" to reconcile a $59 billion shortfall between its accounts and the U.S. Treasury account. [This is not a typographical error]. Where did all that money go? $59 billion in an election year is a staggering amount of money. Why is no one screaming? HUD's explanation is that it was loading a new accounting system that did not work and then did not bother to balance its checkbook for over a year.

I was not surprised when Bill Hamilton confirmed to both Fitts and to me that WinokurÕs DynCorp had played a role in the evolution of Promis in the 1980s. One other surprise was to come out of FittsÕ investigations that had months earlier led her to conclude that she was up against Promis-related interests. On the very day that DoJ and HUD shut her down she was discussing software development with a Canadian firm that is at the heart of the Canadian space program, Geomatics. The term Geomatics applies to a related group of sciences - all involving satellite imagery - used to develop geographic information systems, global positioning systems and remote sensing from space that can actually determine the locations of natural resources such as oil, precious metals and other commodities.

Apparently centered in Canada, the Geomatics industry offers consulting services throughout the world in English, German, Russian, French, Arabic, Spanish and Chinese. Geomatics technology, launched aboard Canadian satellites via US, European or Japanese boosters can help developing or industrialized nations inventory and manage all of their natural resources. There are also several Geomatics related companies in the U.S. including one not far from the Johnson Space center in Houston.

This situation is custom made for enhanced Promis software with back-door technology. What better way to map and inventory all of the worldÕs resources than by making each client nation pay for the work. By providing the client nation Promis-based software it would then be possible to compile a global data base of every marketable natural resource. And it would not be necessary to even touch the resources because commodities and futures markets exist for all of them. An AI enhanced, Promis-based program would then be the perfect set up to make billions of dollars in profits by watching and manipulating the worldÕs political climate to trade in, letÕs say Tungsten futures. Such a worldwide database would be even more valuable if there were, for example, a sudden surge in the price of gold or platinum.

Bill Hamilton readily agreed that this was an ideal situation for the application of Promis technology. In furthering our research on Geomatics we discovered that almost everywhere Geomatics technology went we also found Lockheed-Martin.

Enter The Mounties

>>6274383Thanks to a strong push in my direction from Cheri Seymour, the Mounties and Hercules PD Homicide Detective Sue Todd arrived at my door on August 3rd. They had already consumed most of the FTW web site and were well familiar with my writings. I had let them know, through Cheri, that I did have information on Promis from Bill Tyree and that I would be happy to share it. Before getting into details we all went out for lunch at a nearby Chinese restaurant.

In setting basic outlines for our conversations that day I indicated that, as a journalist, I viewed our discussions as off-the-record. I took no notes and did not tape record any of the discussion. I am recounting the events now only after corresponding with McDade and advising him of my intention to write. He responded and did not object. I took the same position with Detective Todd. I warned the Mounties and Todd at the outset that a sudden termination of their investigations was likely and that they would all become expendable. It happened to me once.

Over lunch the Mounties were quite candid about the fact that the RCMP had Promis software and that it even went by the name Promis. I think they may have also mentioned the name PIRS which is an acknowledged system in the RCMP network. They stated that they had been given their version of Promis by the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS).

CSIS was an intelligence breakaway from the Mounties in 1984, intended to be a pure [sic] intelligence agency. It was created largely with the expertise and assistance of the CIA. All of us understood two things about that arrangement and we discussed them openly. First, there was a question as to whether or not any intelligence service created by the CIA could be completely loyal to its native country. Secondly, it was also understood that there was a rivalry between the two agencies similar to the one that existed between the FBI and the CIA, or in a larger context, the Clinton gang and the Bush gang in the US. The chief concern of the Mounties, clearly, was to ascertain whether or not their version of Promis was one that was compromised. McDade also described in detail how he knew that supposedly secure RCMP communications equipment had been compromised by the NSA. The Mounties acknowledged regular meetings with Cheri Seymour but evinced none of the interest she said that they had previously shown in the Mossad. With me their single-minded focus was Bill Tyree and where and how he obtained his information.

Sue Todd, confirmed for me suspicions that there was an unspoken alliance between the RCMP investigators and the FBI. She said that during the course of her three years of efforts to solve the double murder in Hercules, she had routinely visited FBI offices and enjoyed access to FBI files relative to both the Promis investigation and anything connected to her victims. That information was obviously being shared with the Mounties and that implied the blessings of the FBI. In short, a domestic law enforcement officer was sharing information with agents of a foreign government. In some cases that could provoke espionage charges but in this case it was apparently sanctioned. The Hercules murder victims had no apparent connection to Promis software in any way except for the fact that Riconosciuto had possessed knowledge about the murders which he had provided to Todd from prison. The Hercules Armament Corporation, featured in The Last Circle, was an obvious link. I also noted that the father in Todd's case had been a computer engineer with passions for both geological research and hypnosis and no other visible connections to the Promis story.

>>6274387As we copied Tyree's papers and went through other materials the next day I was aware that the Canadians expressed special interest in Jackson Stephens and anything having to do with the manipulation of financial markets. They asked for copies of news reports I had showing that General Wesley Clark, the recently retired NATO Commander, has just gone to work for Stephens, Inc. in Little Rock Arkansas. I also provided documents showing that Stephens' financial firm Alltel, heir to Systematics, was moving heavily into the mortgage market. As the Mounties repeatedly pressed for information on the identity of the Sergeant Major I referred them to Tyree directly through his attorney Ray Kohlman and to Tyree's closest friend, the daughter of CIA bagman and paymaster Albert Carone, Dee Ferdinand. [For more on Carone visit the FTW web site].

McDade did eventually contact Ferdinand by phone and shortly thereafter one of the most bizarre twists in the whole story took place.

About a week after meeting the Mounties I heard back from Sean that the Tyree documents and flow charts from 1996 had been right on the money. A special recurring theme in those documents that meshes with Seymour's research is the fact that modified versions of Promis software with both artificial intelligence and trap doors were being smuggled out of Los Alamos nuclear labs in containers labeled as radioactive waste. According to Tyree and other sources, after an Indian reservation, the safest place in the world that no one will ever break into is a nuclear waste dump. This also applies to containers in transit between countries. The radioactive warning label guarantees unmolested movement of virtually anything. Promis software is apparently no exception.

Bill Casey and Al Carone from the Grave

Albert Vincent Carone has also been covered exhaustively in FTW, both in the newsletter and on the web site. A retired NYPD Detective, also a made-member of the Genovese crime family, Carone spent his entire working career as a CIA operative. (FTW has special reports on both Bill Tyree and Al Carone available from the web site or at the end of this newsletter). For more than 25 years before his mysterious death in 1990, Al Carone served as a bagman and liaison between George Bush, CIA Director Bill Casey, Oliver North, Richard Nixon and many other prominent figures including Robert Vesco, Manuel Noriega and Ferdinand Marcos. The Carone-Tyree connection, covered in detail in the Sept. 1998 issue (Vol. I, No.7) goes back to operations in the mid 1970s when Tyree, serving with the Special Forces, engaged in CIA directed missions for which Carone was the paymaster.

Carone's death from "chemical toxicity of unknown etiology" in 1990 resulted in the sanitizing of all of his military and NYPD records as well as the theft and disappearance of nearly ten million dollars in bank accounts, insurance policies and investments. Virtually overnight, almost every record of Carone disappeared leaving his daughter and her family nearly bankrupt under the burden of tens of thousands of dollars in medical bills. In 1996, Carone's daughter, Dee Ferdinand, discovered that Tyree and Carone had known each other and that Tyree could prove instrumental in helping to restore Carone's lost fortune. Ferdinand filed suit in U.S. District Court this spring seeking to recover pensions, insurance policies and benefits in a case which has no known connection to Promis. I have known Ferdinand and her family for more than seven years. Never once has she mentioned a connection between her father and Promis although she was well familiar with the case from Tyree and conversations with Bill Hamilton. I had referred the Mounties to her because of my belief that she could possibly help identify Tyree's source, the Sergeant Major.

>>6274392

On August 10th, exactly one week after the Mounties came to see me, the DoJ mailed Ferdinand a response to her suit seeking dismissal. Included in the paperwork was a bizarre document, now in FTW's possession, that, by the account of both Ferdinand and her lawyer, had absolutely nothing to do with her case. The document in question was a March 29, 1986 Declaration from CIA Director William Casey, a close friend of the Carone family. Paragraph 6 of that document (prepared for another case) stated, "Two of the documents responsive to Plaintiffs' Request No 1, specifically the one-page letter dated 28 March 1979 and a one-page letter dated 8 January 1980, have been released in the same excised form as they were previously released by the Government of Canada. I independently and formally assert the state secrets privilege for the information excised from these two documents."

Dee Ferdinand called me immediately. The letter had nothing to do with her suit. It mentioned Canada. Canada was not even mentioned in her suit. What was going on?" she asked. "It's blackmail," I answered. "CIA, which is monitoring everything the Canadians do, everything I do, everything you do, knows that I will tell the Mounties of these letters." McDade didn't grasp the concept at first. He was a straight-ahead street cop. But I had been through something similar when serving as the press spokesman for the Perot Presidential campaign in 1992. I explained it to Sean, "Sean, you and I are just the messengers. But I guarantee that at some level of your government the CIA's reference to these letters will scare people to death. It is a reminder that CIA has them."

A week later McDade told me that the dates were indeed significant - very significant. That's all he would say.

FTW has what may be a possible explanation for the dates in question. The President and CIA Director on these dates the letters were written were Jimmy Carter and Stansfield Turner. Aside from the then recent Russian invasion of Afghanistan, a saga in which the Canadian government played a minor role, the largest drama on the world scene was the overthrow of the Shah of Iran in January 1979, the rise of the Ayatollah Khomeini and the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Teheran later that year. The Canadian government and the CIA worked very closely in Iran, the Canadian Embassy even housing some CIA personnel who had escaped the crowds of students. But that kind of assistance is not something to hide. Another explanation was needed to explain shock waves in Ottawa.

Recently, a source using a code name known to FTW has surfaced with information relating to Promis. In his communiqués he describes the use of Promis software by the Bush family to loot the secret bank accounts of Manuel Noriega and Ferdinand Marcos. Promis is able to do this because funds can be transferred out of accounts without a trace. Remember the trap door? The rule of thumb here is that crooks, especially CIA sponsored crooks, don't usually go to the cops when somebody steals their stolen money. From my personal experience in the era, and direct exposure to two members of the Iranian Royal family, both before and after the overthrow, I am acutely aware that the Shah, then perhaps the richest man in the world, was actually targeted by the CIA. His downfall was no accident. Once worth more than $20 billion, the Shah ended his life a refugee in Egypt. Many of his billions disappeared and the family was very upset about it.

Could the financial power of Promis have been turned loose first through Canada when Carter was President in the US? The Shah did a lot of banking in Canada. We may never know the answer. But if the downfalls of wealthy US supported dictators Noriega and Marcos are any indication the answer is likely, yes. And the Shah was wealthier than both of them put together. Where'd all that money go?

>>6274399Headlines

On August 25th the Toronto Star broke what was to become a series of stories by Valerie Lawson and Allan Thompson. The cat was out of the bag. Various figures known to have direct connections to Riconosciuto had been virtually dogging the Mounties' every move as they traveled in the US. One even contacted me just days after the Mounties left LA. It was a story that could not be kept under wraps forever. Most of the Star story was accurate. It was going to be difficult for the RCMP to move quietly now. A Reuters story the same day closed with the following paragraphs, "CanadaÕs national counterintelligence agency said in a June report that friendly nations were making concerted efforts to steal sensitive technology and information.

"The Canadian Security Intelligence Service said outsiders were particularly interested in aerospace, biotechnology, chemicals, communications, information technology, mining and metallurgy, nuclear energy, oil and gas, and the environment." That was Geomatics, at the heart of Canada's space program, Canada's flagship space technology. I checked the Star story. There had been no mention of high tech or space related issues. What did Reuters know? In mid September, after receiving confidential source documents related to the case telling me that one version of Promis, modified in Canada was handled through the Canadian firm I.P. Sharp, I got an answer. A quick search on the web revealed that Sharp, a well documented component of the case, had been bought by a Reuters company in the early 90s. Hamilton later told me that he had heard that Reuters possibly had the Promis software. That would explain how they knew about the aerospace connection.

Michael Dobbs of The Washington Post called and asked what I knew. I confirmed that I had met with the Mounties but didn't know much else other than giving them the Tyree flow charts. The Post was never going to tell the truth. Their business was keeping secrets, not revealing them. The Mounties had made waves.

On August 28 the phone rang and it was a collect call from Tyree. "Get a tape recorder and turn it on," he said. Over the course of the next half an hour Tyree, obviously reading from detailed and copious notes, named individuals and companies dealing with Promis software and its progeny. The tape was specific down to naming specific engineers in military and private corporations doing Promis research. Tyree described specific Congressional committees that had been infiltrated with "enhanced" Promis. Tyree described how Promis progeny, having inspired four new computer languages had made possible the positioning of satellites so far out in space that they were untouchable. At the same time the progeny had improved video quality to the point where the same satellite could focus on a single human hair. The ultimate big picture.

Promis progeny had also evolved to the point where neural pads could be attached to plugs in the back of the human head and thought could be translated into electrical impulses that would be equally capable of flying a plane or wire transferring money. Names like Sandia, Cal-Tech, Micron, Tech University of Graz, Oded Leventer and Massimo Grimaldi rolled from his lips as he tore through the pages of notes. Data, such as satellite reconnaissance, could also now be downloaded from a satellite directly into a human brain. The evolution of the artificial intelligence had progressed to a point where animal behavior and thought were being decoded. Mechanical humans were being tested. Animals were being controlled by computer.

Billy saved Canada for last.

"Here's how we fuck Canada," he started. He was laughing as he facetiously described what was coming as some sort of bizarre payback for the War of 1812. Then, placing the evolutions of Promis in context with the Canadian story Tyree asked a question as to why one would really now need to go to all the trouble of monitoring all of a foreign country's intelligence operations. "There's an easier way to get what I want," he said. "I access their banks. I access their banks and I know who does what and who's getting ready to do what," he said. He described how Canada had been provided with modified Promis software which Canada then modified, or thought they had modified, again to eliminate the trap door. That software turned loose in the financial and scientific communities then became Canada's means of believing that they were securing the trap door information from the entities to whom they provided their versions of Promis. But, unknown, to the Canadians the Elbit chips in the systems bypassed the trap doors and permitted the transmission of data when everyone thought the computers were turned off and secure. Tyree did not explain how the chips physically got into the Canadian computers.

>>6274403"This," Tyree said "is how you cripple everything Canada does that you don't like. And if you want proof I offer you the fact that we toppled the government of Australia in 1980." "[Prime Minister] Gough Whitlam and Nugan Hand [Bank]," I answered. Tyree affirmed. The Labor Government of Whitlam had been suddenly unseated after making nationalistic noise and questioning the role of US intelligence agencies in Australian affairs.

The issue of a coming feud between the dollar and the Euro came up. I suggested that rapidly vanishing support in South America and Europe both were threatening the military operations of "Plan Colombia" and the economic boost it would give the US economy. Tyree jumped in, "If I can put Canada in line and show the Eurodollar, the 'Eurotrash' what I have already done to my neighbor, whom I value to some degree - remember, these are not nice people - these are financial thugs at their worst. So what they are going to do is sit down discreetly and say, 'Look, this is what we did to Canada. Now, would you like us to do this to the European market as well?' Mike, they're not going to think twice about itÉ A weapon is only good if someone knows what its capability is. Prior to using the atomic bomb it was irrelevant." He continued, "They refer to it as the Nagasaki Syndrome."

After describing in some detail how the financial powers-that-be had gutted American manufacturing productivity through globalization he described a strategy intended to halt any move by the Euro to overshadow the dollar or even compete with it. It was pure economic hostage taking and Canada would be the object lesson. Then, chillingly, he described something familiar to any military strategist. The penetration and looting of HUD was the test bed, the proving ground, the "White Sands" of the Promis economic Atom bomb. Once the CIA and the economic powers-that-be had proven that, over a period of years, they could infiltrate and loot $59 billion dollars from HUD, they knew that they could do it anywhere. Said Tyree, "Then they knew they had what it took to go abroad and create mayhemÉ It was planned twenty years ago."

It took several days to reach Sean McDade who had been on vacation. I played the Tyree tape for him over an open phone line into RCMP headquarters. He asked me to make a physical copy right away and send it to him. After he had had time to listen to it he cautioned me against sending it anywhere else. I told him that as long as his investigation was active that I would do nothing more than make the standard copies I make of any sensitive documents as a precaution. I could tell that the tape had rattled him. Though I had known from the start that the large and energetic Mountie, whom I believed to be a dedicated an honest man, would never be allowed to ride his case out to the end, I still had hopes. But in my heart I knew that Tyree was right. In all the years he had been feeding me information I had never known him to be wrong and, apparently, neither had Bill Hamilton. I did not send a copy of the tape to Hamilton because I knew how difficult and potentially dangerous McDade's job was going to be now that the press had exposed him. Having been a cop in dangerous political, CIA infested waters I knew what it was like to not know who you could trust.

If keeping the tape quiet would give the Mounties and edge I would do it - but only as long as they had a case.

Sudden Death

Then it was over.

>>6274409

On September 16th the Toronto Star announced that the RCMP had suddenly closed its Promis investigation with the flat disclaimer that it did not have and never did have any version of Bill Hamilton's software. That was as shocking a statement as it was absurd. "The only way that you can identify Promis," said a perplexed Bill Hamilton, "is to compare the code. Sean McDade said that he was not an engineer and couldn't read code so how did he know?" Hamilton was as emphatic as I was that McDade had said that RCMP had Promis. So was Cheri Seymour. I offered a fleeting hope that the Mounties were playing a game, saying that they had terminated the investigation to shake some of the incessant probing that had been taking place around McDade's every move.

I was finally convinced when McDade e-mailed me and said that it was his view that the Mounties did not have any version of Promis and that he had no objections if I decided to write a story. I then agreed with Seymour that, whether they had said so or not, both the Mounties and Sue Todd had left enough visible footprints that it was their intention for us to go public. It might be the only protection they had.

As I had predicted from the start, they had come too close to bigger issues and been shut down ruthlessly. I called Sue Todd who lamented that she was marking her three year homicide investigation, "Closed by the press." Even though she was convincing I had the feeling that she was playing back a rehearsed script. I told her that I was not satisfied with the statements that there was no Promis in the RCMP. I recalled our lunchtime conversation of August 3rd. She agreed with me that the RCMP mission was to determine whether or not RCMP Promis was a stolen or compromised version. She knew that they had it. So did I. I e-mailed McDade one last time saying that I was going to write it like I remembered it. He never got back to me.

Bill Hamilton added one last twist when he told me in a conversation that the Mounties claimed to have developed their software on their own. That, he said, was nonsense because the Mounties did not have that kind of sophistication or ability. He thought that the RCMP program had been specially prepared FBI. That would explain the role of retired FBI agent Ted Gunderson. Though I didn't tell him at the time I knew that he had obtained that information from Bill Tyree. And Bill Tyree and his provider, the Sergeant Major, are two people that Bill Hamilton and I both have learned to respect.

Diplomacy

Just three days after the Toronto Star announced the abrupt termination of the RCMP investigation the Canada based International Network on Disarmament and Globalization (INDG) posted an electronic bulletin on a speech by former Canadian Ambassador to the US. In an address the night before, less than 48 hours after the termination of the RCMP investigation, Derek Burney, current President of CAE, a Canadian firm manufacturing flight simulators, criticized the U.S. aerospace industry for being overly-protectionist under the guise of national security. In addressing the Aerospace Industries Association of Canada, according to large stories that appeared in CP (Canadian Press) and Toronto's Globe and Mail, Burney was characterized as sounding unusually tough in his criticism of American policy that was freezing Canadian firms out of aerospace contracts. Both stories were ambivalent in that they alternately made Burney sound critical of the U.S. while championing Canadian interests and at the same time weak as he noted that Mexico stood poised under NAFTA to replace Canada as the U.S.'s number one trading partner.

The CP story made two telling observations. It quoted Burney as saying that Canada needed to do more to "preserve and enhance its access to the American market." Then it closed it's story on Burney's speech, advocating a compromise agreement between the US and Canada, by saying that Burney's position "risks being perceived here at home as a sellout or worse."

>>6274419The CP story made two telling observations. It quoted Burney as saying that Canada needed to do more to "preserve and enhance its access to the American market." Then it closed it's story on Burney's speech, advocating a compromise agreement between the US and Canada, by saying that Burney's position "risks being perceived here at home as a sellout or worse."

A close examination of Burney's remarks, published in the INDG bulletin revealed something more like an obsequious surrender rather than a mere sellout. While there were a few tough-talking paragraphs that saved Canadian face, the essence of the speech was that Burney believed that American defense firms, the largest of which is Lockheed-Martin, were poised to transfer the bulk of their contracts to companies in Mexico. Citing Canada's dependence upon access to American avionics and "databases," Burney painted a picture that seemingly left Canada over a barrel. Without access to American technology the Canadian aerospace industry could not function.

Buried deep in the text of Burney's speech we found the following paragraph which is, we believe, the best place to end this story.

"That does not mean that we have to agree with everything Washington does or says or do things exactly as the Americans do. On the contrary, one of the advantages of being a good neighbor and close ally is that we can speak freely and forthrightly to the Americans - provided we have a solid case and are seeking to influence their position and not simply capture a quick headline. And, never forget, it is always more effective to be frank in private. Otherwise your motive can be somewhat suspect."

Bin Laden's Magic Carpet - Secret U.S. PROMIS Software

FBI/Justice Claims of Discontinued Use Leave Questions Unanswered

Britain and Germany in the Lurch?

Did bin Laden Use It To Break White House Codes And Threaten

Air Force One?

by Michael C. Ruppert

[© Copyright 2001, Michael C. Ruppert and From The Wilderness Publications, www.copvcia.com. All Rights Reserved. May be recopied or distributed for non-profit purposes only. May NOT be posted on any commercial or ".com" website without prior written authorization. Violations subject to legal action.]

FTW, October 26, 2001 - 1300 PDT (UPDATED Nov. 16, 2001) - An October 16 FOX News report by correspondent Carl Cameron indicating that convicted spy, former FBI Agent Robert Hanssen, had provided a highly secret computer software program called Promis to Russian organized crime figures - who in turn reportedly sold it to Osama bin Laden - may signal a potential intelligence disaster for the United States. Admissions by the FBI and Justice in the FOX story that they have discontinued use of the software are most certainly a legal disaster for a government that has been engaged in a 16-year battle with the software's creator, William Hamilton, CEO of the Inslaw Corporation. Over those 16 years, in response to lawsuits filed by Hamilton charging that the government had stolen the software from Inslaw, the FBI, the CIA and the Department of Justice have denied, in court and under oath, ever using the software.

Bin Laden's reported possession of Promis software was clearly reported in a June 15, 2001 story by Washington Times reporter Jerry Seper. That story went unnoticed by the major media. In it Seper wrote, "The software delivered to the Russian handlers and later sent to bin Laden, according to sources, is believed to be an upgraded version of a program known as Promis - developed in the 1980s by a Washington firm, Inslaw, Inc., to give attorneys the ability to keep tabs on their caseloads. It would give bin Laden the ability to monitor U.S. efforts to track him down, federal law-enforcement officials say. It also gives him access to databases on specific targets of his choosing and the ability to monitor electronic-banking transactions, easing money-laundering operations for himself or others, according to sources."

In a series of excellent stories by The Times, and as confirmed by parts of the FOX broadcast, it appears that Hanssen, who was arrested in February, in order to escape the death penalty this summer, agreed to provide the FBI and other intelligence agencies with a full accounting of his sale of Promis overseas. Reports state that almost until the moment of his capture, Hanssen was charged with "repairing" and upgrading versions of the software used by Britain and Germany.

On October 17, two different spokespersons at the FBI's Office of Public Affairs told FTW, "The FBI has discontinued use of the Promis software." The spokespersons declined to give their names.

On October 24, Department of Justice spokesperson Loren Pfeifle declined to answer any questions about where, when or how Promis had been used and would say only, "I can only confirm that the DoJ has discontinued use of the program."

>>6274422INSLAW had two limited contracts to provide Promis to Justice in 1982 and 1983. Neither application had anything to do with tracking terrorist activities. Hamilton's suits charged that Reagan Administration officials, including Edwin Meese, pirated the software, modified it for intelligence and financial uses and made millions by selling it to the governments of Israel, Canada, Great Britain, Germany and other friendly nations. After the installation of a CIA-created "back door" into the program, Israel, using its lifelong Mossad agent Robert Maxwell, reportedly sold the software to "unfriendly" nations and then secretly retrieved priceless intelligence data.

The statements of FBI and Justice sources in the FOX story on October 16 have made Hamilton's case. They also give but the barest hint of the security breaches that may now be helping the most wanted man in the world. Bin Laden's reported possession of Promis may also explain the alleged threatening messages that were received by President Bush while aboard Air Force One on September 11th.

A mild uproar erupted in the days after the WTC attacks when Presidential aide Carl Rove indicated that threatening calls had been placed to Air Force One just hours after the attacks while President Bush was onboard. Some journalists excoriated Rove for suggested that bin Laden might have a mole in the White House who could have given him the secure codes to reach the aircraft in flight.

Bin Laden's possession of Promis would provide a possible explanation. According to Hamilton, under the right circumstances, Promis could have enabled the threatening calls to be made. "I have no way of knowing whether any Promis-related base has dial-up access to Air Force One. But if that happens, and if you have Promis, it's a straightforward thing to do. But one would still need to have access to the targeting computer.

"There is a central locator system to track members of the National Command Authority 24/7. If that is a database created with Promis and if anyone had access you could do it."

Such a penetration using Promis might also explain why Vice President Dick Cheney was hurriedly whisked out of sight and reportedly taken to a secure underground facility, where he reportedly works to this day. Cheney's prolonged absences from the public eye would also be explained by such a breach of security.

Numerous news stories, books and investigative reports, including a September 2000 story in FTW (Vol. III, No.7), spanning nearly two decades, have established that Promis holds unique abilities to track terrorists. The software has also, according to numerous sources including Hamilton, been modified with artificial intelligence and developed in parallel for the world's banking systems to track money movements, stock trades and other financial dealings. Systematics - since purchased by Alltel - an Arkansas financial and technical firm headed by billionaire Jackson Stephens, has often been reported as the primary developer of Promis for financial intelligence use. Systematics through its various evolutions had been a primary supplier of software used in inter-bank and international money transfers for many years. Attorneys who have been connected to Systematics and Promis include Webster Hubbell, Hillary Clinton and the late Vince Foster.

If true, and if claims by the FBI and the Department of Justice that they have "recently" discontinued the use of Promis are accurate, the likelihood than bin Laden may have compromised the systems the U.S. government and its allies use to track him is high. Additional information in the FOX broadcast indicating that Britain stopped using the software just three months ago and that Germany stopped using the software just weeks ago are equally disturbing. These are mission-critical systems requiring years of development. What has replaced them? And even if the U.S. government has replaced the software given to its allies with newer programs - several of which FTW knows to be in existence - the FOX report clearly implies that bin Laden and Associates have had ample time to get highly secret intelligence data from both Britain and Germany. Those systems might, in turn, have compromised U.S. systems. The WTC attacks had - by all reckoning - been in the works for years, and bin Laden would certainly have known that the U.S. would be looking for him afterwards.

WHAT IS PROMIS AND WHAT DOES IT DO?

PROMIS stands for Prosecutor's Management Information System.

>>6274428

In the late 1970s the legal system of the United States Department of Justice (DoJ) was comprised of more than thirty semi-autonomous regional U.S. Attorneys (USA) offices. Each had a computer system to track case management for prosecutions, investigations, and civil litigations. The problem was that they used as many as seven different programming languages. This made the transmission and sharing of information between offices virtually impossible. The computers in the USA's office in San Francisco could not read files sent from the USA in New York.

The genius of Hamilton and Inslaw was to create a software program that could access files in any number of databases and programming languages and translate and then unify them into one consistent file. Promis was the Rosetta stone of computer languages.

Inslaw won a $10 million, three-year contract in March 1982 to install a 16-bit architecture version of Promis, which the government had the right to use but not the right to modify without paying license fees to Inslaw, on government computers in the 22 largest U.S. Attorneys' Offices. In April 1983, the second year of the three-year contract, the government modified Inslaw's contract in order to obtain delivery of a 32-bit architecture version of Promis, which the government could not even use without paying license fees. In modifying the contract, the government promised to pay license fees if it decided to substitute the 32-bit version for the 16-bit version. In May 1983, the month following Inslaw's delivery of the 32-bit version of Promis, the government reneged on its contractual agreement to pay license fees and simultaneously began to find fault with Inslaw's implementation services as justification for withholding services payments.

The Justice Department thereafter withheld $1.77 million in services payments forcing Inslaw to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in February 1985.

In January 1988, following several weeks of trial in 1987, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court issued fully litigated findings of fact that the Justice Department "took, converted, stole" the 32-bit version of Promis "through trickery, fraud and deceit," implemented the 32-bit version of Promis in the 44 largest U.S. Attorneys Offices, and then tried to force INSLAW out of business in order to incapacitate INSLAW from litigating the Justice Department's theft of Promis. The Bankruptcy Court imposed a compulsory license on the 44 largest U.S. Attorneys Offices for the perpetual use of the 32-bit version of Promis and issued a permanent injunction against any further dissemination of Promis by the government except under license from Inslaw.

Subsequent appeals by the government saw the original rulings overturned on legal, not factual, grounds. Legal actions in the case continue to this day.

Hamilton told FTW that none of the uses described above had anything to do with any licensing agreements for the software's use to track terrorists, intelligence matters or worldwide financial transactions.

The paper tracking of the refinements in Promis after the legal dispute erupted between INSLAW and the Reagan administration, verifies that at least one version of Promis was given to Martin Marietta, now Lockheed-Martin, which is now the nation's second largest defense contractor. Until late 2000, Lynne Cheney, the wife of Vice President Dick Cheney sat on Lockheed's board of directors. Research conducted by many investigative journalists has indicated that Promis has spread widely throughout the defense contractor network. FTW has received multiple reports of Promis use by companies and institutions like DynCorp, Raytheon, Boeing, SAIC and the Harvard Endowment as well as by government agencies such as the Financial Criminal Enforcement Network (FINCEN) and the U.S. Treasury.

>>6274433

Here's how powerful the software is.

Approximately two weeks after the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the History Channel aired a documentary entitled "The History of Terrorism." In that documentary, a law enforcement officer described some of the methods used to track terrorist movements. He stated that "computers" were able to track such things as credit card purchases, entry and exits visas, telephone and utility usage etc. It was implied that these diverse data base files could be integrated into one unified table. He gave an example that through the use of such a system it would be possible to determine that if a suspected terrorist entered the country and was going to hide out, that by monitoring the water and electrical consumption of all possible suspects in a given cell, it would be possible to determine where the terrorist was hiding out by seeing whose utility use increased. Conversely, it would be possible to determine if a terrorist was on the move if his utility consumption declined or his local shopping patterns were interrupted. Aren't those "club" cards from your supermarket handy?

This is but the barest glimpse of what Promis can do. Mated with artificial intelligence it is capable of analyzing not only an individual's, but also a community's entire life, in real time. It is also capable of issuing warnings when irregularities appear and of predicting future movements based upon past behavior.

In the financial arena Promis is even more formidable. Not only is it capable of predicting movements in financial markets and tracking trades in real time. It has been reported, on a number of occasions, to have been used, via the "back door" to enter secret bank accounts, including accounts in Switzerland and then remove the money in those accounts without being traced. Court documents filed in the various INSLAW trials include documentation of this ability as well as affidavits and declarations from Israeli intelligence officers and assets.

The one essential weakness of Promis is that it must be physically installed on a targeted computer for it to be effective. Hence, if Osama bin Laden is able to penetrate a U.S. Government system it must mean that Promis is there.

FTW has previously reported that the CIA uses Promis to track stock trades in real time. Thus, as described in FTW stories on insider trading directly connected to the September 11 attacks, the Agency had the ability to determine that immediate impending attacks were planned against both American and United Air Lines. The Israeli Herzliyya Institute for Counterterrorism was able to publish a detailed accounting of the trades within days of the attacks and their report underscores the connection between counterterrorist efforts and the monitoring of financial markets. [See FTW

>>6274440

Vol. IV, No 7 - Oct. 15, 2001] Suspicions of CIA advance knowledge of the attacks were heightened when FTW disclosed that the current Executive Director of the CIA, A.B. "Buzzy" Krongard was, until 1998, the CEO of A.B. Brown, the company which handled many of the suspicious trades.

All of these abilities were a given when this writer met with members of the RCMP National Security Investigation Section in the summer of 2000. Our meetings were reported in the Toronto Star and are described in the previously referenced issue of FTW. A key question that lingered after the meetings with the RCMP was how many versions of the software had the CIA and the U.S. government given out and might they not have been also using a back door against "friendly" nations for economic motives to give advantage to U.S. companies. It was not a question that the RCMP dismissed as unlikely.

In another mind boggling development, on November 10 The Calgary Sun reported: U.S. police said many of the suspected al-Qaida terrorists were nabbed through the use of a state-of-the-art computer software program called Promis The system interfaces with any database and can provide information on credit card, banking, pension, tax, criminal and immigration records. Police can input an alleged terrorist name or credit card and the software will provide details of the person's movements through purchases or phone records." After so many years of denials these public confirmations that Promis is widely in use must come as a relief to Hamilton who now can walk into court and reopen his case. But they also indicate that newer generations of software have likely replaced the legendary program that has been connected with so much death, intrigue and mystery.

The FOX story reported that Osama bin Laden once boasted that his youth "knew the wrinkles of the world's financial markets like the back of their hands and that his money would never be frozen." He may be right. And an administration so lost in covering up criminal conduct - no less than the conduct of the ones which preceded it – while trying to fight a war at the same time – might find itself doubly wounded by the software of Bill Hamilton and Inslaw.

Suggested Reading:

• The Washington Times - Search Archives for "Promis"

• Insight Magazine - a four part series by investigative reporter Kelly O'Meara located at http://www.insightmag.com/archive/200101307.shtml. If the link is broken, do an archive search from their main web page at www.insightmagazine.com.

>>6274445 "The Last Circle" - An online e-book by Carol Marshall located at http://www.lycaeum.org/books/books/last_circle/.

• "Trail of The Octopus" - by Lester Coleman, 1993, Bloomsbury Publishing, London. This book is almost impossible to find and FTW is unable to direct readers to a good source for obtaining it.

• The Inslaw Affair - http://www.webcom.com/~pinknoiz/covert/inslaw.html. Includes Congressional testimony supporting Inslaw and a record of court proceedings.

• FTW: Vol. IV, No 7 - Oct. 15, 2001 -

http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/pandora/052401_promis.html

__

FROM: Garby Leon

Columbia Pictures

Culver City, CA

July 14, 1993

TO: The Honorable Janet Reno

Attorney General of the United States

Department of Justice - Room 4400

Tenth and Constitution Ave N.E.

Washington, DC 20530

Dear Madame Attorney General,

I am writing because I feel the death of Paul Wilcher deserves your most serious attention, and should be investigated by your most trusted officials in the Department of Justice.

Paul Wilcher, like Danny Casolaro, was investigating possible government involvement in a variety of questionable activities, including the controversial October Surprise allegations and the INSLAW case,

his researches leading him into areas that Casolaro had covered earlier. In his quest Wilcher made himself known in and around Capitol Hill as a persistent gadfly, trying to spur inquiries into possible

government malfeasance in several areas. He had contacts with, among others, Lee Hamilton, William Webster, Elliot Richardson and Ross Perot.

By late May, Wilcher said his information had gone beyond Casolaro's and he felt this made him a da"danger signal.U In three weeks, he was dead.

I feel that the two deaths, Casolaro's and Wilcher's, offer disturbing parallels, outlined below.

On the 23rd of June, 1993, the body of Paul Wilcher was discovered in his Washington DC apartment. This is not a certainty, since to my knowledge no evidentially identification–no fingerprint or dental

x- ray matching– was made before the body's reported cremation two weeks ago.

>>6274452Present at the scene after Wilcher's death was noted White House correspondent Sarah McClendon, who knew Wilcher well and who had alerted authorities that he was missing. McClendon was unable to

identify the body as Wilcher after viewing the remains.

McClendon has been told that preliminary autopsy results have found "no natural cause of death, and no other cause of death to explain Wilcher's demise. Given that Wilcher, in his 40s, was in apparent

good health, this seems fairly astonishing.

A much larger issue is also implied here: if critics of our government are found dead in their bathrooms from obscure causes, and the government itself doesn't take steps to find out why, then our freedoms

themselves are threatened–as well as the activities that protect those freedoms.

If individual investigation and criticism of government activities is chilled or intimidated into silence, then democracy loses its most important protection.

To put it another way, if Danny Casolaro's death was a message of some kind, then Wilcher's death is an even grimmer message–it suggests that Casolaro's death was not a fluke. Anyone inspired to follow

Casolaro or Wilcher's path now has a strong added reason to fear doing so.

And a real investigation into Wilcher's death might not be an academic exercise. One person who is extremely close to and knowledgeable about the Casolaro case has said in private that the mystery of

Casolaro's death could be resolved by a Grand Jury investigation, with sworn testimony, subpoena power, etc. This suggests Paul Wilcher's death may not have to remain a mystery either.

Paul Wilcher was an acquaintance of mine. He was not a perfect person; he made mistakes like anyone else but he was also, at times, a man of unusual energy and altruism. A seminary student who

considered becoming a priest, he later became an attorney is his efforts to accomplish some good in this world.

Overall, I fell he was a good man. He didn't deserve to die.

Personally, I don't believe he died of natural causes.

In the following pages are brief remarks regarding A) disturbing parallels between the Casolaro and Wilcher cases; B) Police, FBI and CIA presence at the scene; C) other information about Wilcher's

death; and D) possible further forensic investigation.

Mme. Attorney General, I feel the death of Paul Wilcher offers too many questions and inconsistencies to be ignored. I am writing because I feel this matter deserves your most serious attention,and hope

this letter will bring some action on your part to answer some of the many, very troubling questions raised by Paul Wilcher's death.

Sincerely,

Garby Leon

(PhD, Harvard University)

DISTURBING PARALLELS BETWEEN THE WILCHER AND CASOLARO CASES:

Both were investigating possible government involvement in illegal activities.

Each was acting on his own, with dogged persistence, over a long time period.

Both Casolaro and Wilcher expressed fears, shortly before their deaths, that their lives were in danger because their investigations had led into sensitive territory. Casolaro was known to have received direct

>>6274461phone call threats, and told his brother shortly before he died, "If something happens to me, it won't be an accident."

As stated, Wilcher told at least one other person at the end of May that he feared he'd become a "danger signal" because his information on government malfeasance had gone beyond Casolaro's. In three

weeks he was dead.

Both decedents' bodies were found in bathrooms, in bizarre circumstances (Casolaro a supposed suicide though forensic evidence cast substantial doubt on this; Wilcher, a man in good health, propped up

on a toilet but showing no discernible cause of death).

In both cases, the scene of death was sealed off and made inaccessible, then cleaned, preventing any further official or independent investigation (the motel room where Casolaro was found was industrially

cleaned the next day; Wilcher's apartment was sealed off and no one was allowed to enter; it was also cleaned the next day. I am unaware of any subsequent, serious investigation or crime report released to

the public in either case).

In both cases, personal records, documents, computer files and/or other information belonging to the decedents are apparently not officially accounted for. Casolaro's briefcase and personal records were not

found at the scene of his death. While Wilcher's family reportedly has taken possession of some personal belongings, the location of Wilcher's complete files, the result of years of hard work, is not

publicly known.

In both cases, rapid alterations were made to the corpse making further forensic study difficult or impossible. Casolaro was embalmed shortly after death without family consent; Wilcher was cremated, as

remarked above, without fingerprint or other evidential identification of the body, and without complete forensic examination to determine cause of death.

In both cases, forensic evidence relating to the corpses is scant.

In neither case was any kind of inquest held, no official testimony taken under oath, nor was any thoroughgoing official investigation undertaken (at least publicly). Nor has any official report been released

in either case.

POLICE, FBI & CIA PRESENCE AT THE SCENE, JUNE 23, 1993:

According to Mr. MASON O. LIDELL JR. (637 Third St. NE, Apt. B-03, DC 20002) superintendent of Wilcher's building, a Lieutenant and a Sergeant from the D. C. Police (with the help of firemen to

force the door) entered Wilcher's apartment at about 11:30 AM on June 23rd. Three detectives from DC Police entered and found Wilcher's computer was turned on. When they read what was on the

computer screen, they summoned the FBI. There is no further information on what the screen actually said.

After entering the apartment and getting a brief glance at the body and the apartment, Lidell was ordered to leave. The apartment was sealed off for the rest of the day, except for official personnel. The body

was removed at about 12:30 according to Lidell (who didn't witness this), though he did mention that when he entered the apartment later, there was blood on the floor and on the commode which wasn't

present earlier. He was told that this was because of measures taken to move the body.

At about 4:30 in the afternoon FBI Agents arrived. Sarah McClendon was also present, though not allowed in the apartment itself. She says two groups of four FBI Agents - eight FBI Agents in all - arrived

and asked questions. McClendon checked their identification, which seemed convincing. According to Lidell at least three FBI Agents entered the apartment during the 4:30 to 7:30 time period.

Then, according to Lidell, one man appeared and said he was CIA (without offering identification). He joined the FBI agents in the Wilcher apartment during the 4:30 to 7:30 time period. More people

>>6274466

could have entered during this time Lidell says "he returned to his own apartment and didn't keep track."

Lidell says that an NBC camera crew was prevented from entering the apartment. Aside from firemen, medical personnel to remove the body and the above Government agents, no one was allowed in the

apartment for the entire day - no reporters, friends, media crews, etc. This raises a question: why no other observers, since police okayed cleaning of the apartment the very next day?

Ms. McClendon phoned the FBI to ask about the presence of FBI Agents; later MR. JAMES V. DESARNO JR., Assistant Special Agent in Charge from the D. C. Metropolitan Office, arrived. Mr.

Desarno also asked questions, but strongly denied that the FBI was interested in or involved in the case. "We are not interested in this case," he told McClendon, Lidell and others repeatedly.

This seems curious. If Wilcher was a "nobody" why the official presence and vehement expression of non-involvement "ironic" with so many agents present? How could Desarno know the FBI would or

wouldn't be involved without an investigation or known cause of death? Why all the secrecy and denial? Why the presence of the CIA?

OTHER INFORMATION ABOUT WILCHER'S DEATH

Only a few slight pieces of information have filtered down about public officials and others involved in the Wilcher matter:

Two FBI Agents present at the scene were JAMES V. DESARNO, as remarked, and CRAIG OLSON, both of the D. C. Metropolitan Office: 1900 Half Street SW, Washington DC 20535. (202)

252-7801, both at same address and office.

The DC police officer in charge of investigating the Wilcher death is named BRIAN HENRY, (202) 727-4347.

Coroner for the government is a DR. KIM, who performed the autopsy, the results of which have not been released.

Building superintendent MASON LIDELL (202-543-2751) was questioned by Desarno and others, and has kindly provided information in this letter.

One friend of Wilcher's phoned apartment 302 in Wilcher's building (across from his) and got a taped answer message on the telephone intercom. The message said (paraphrasing) "This is a government

telephone line, no longer in service" or words to that effect. Phone records, occupancy etc. from this address should be investigated.

POSSIBLE FURTHER FORENSIC INVESTIGATION:

Given the inconclusive autopsy results, further testing of the forensic evidence would seem to be crucial. Wilcher's body fluids, sent by the D. C. Medical Examiner to the Armed Forces Institute of

Pathology at Walter Reed Hospital, haven't yielded any clue as to cause of death. Apparently coroner Dr. Kim is still in possession of Wilcher's heart.

Sarah McClendon is petitioning Dr. JOYE CARTER of the D. C. Medical Examiner's office to submit this forensic evidence for further study. Dr. Carter hasn't moved with alacrity to permit or facilitate

this.

McClendon would like to submit the evidence to a DR. MASON, one of the top forensic toxicologists in the U. S. (Dr. Mason: 2300 Stratford Ave, Willow Grove, Pennsylvania, 215 657-4900). Dr.

Mason feels it is extremely significant that no cause of death has been found, a rarity in his experience.

*

Perhaps, Mme. Attorney General, you can aid in investigating this and other crucial aspects of Paul Wilcher's death. Thank you for any consideration in response to this request

Garby Leon.

>>6274472

THE INSLAW AFFAIR

SEPTEMBER 10, 1992.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole

House on the

State of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. BROOKS, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted

the following

INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

together with

DISSENTING AND SEPARATE DISSENTING VIEWS

BASED ON A STUDY BY THE FULL COMMITTEE

On August 11, 1992, the Committee on the Judiciary

approved and adopted a report entitled, '"The INSLAW Affair." The chairman was directed to transmit a copy to the Speaker of the House.

I. SUMMARY

The Department of Justice has long recognized the need for a standardized management information system to assist law enforcement offices across the country in the recordkeeping and tracking of criminal cases. During the 1970's, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) funded the development by INSLAW1 of a computer software system called the Prosecutor's Management Information System or PROMIS. This system was designed to meet the criminal prosecutor workloads of large urban jurisdictions; and by 1980, several large U.S. attorneys offices were using the PROMIS software. At this time, INSLAW (formerly called the Institute for Law and Social Research) was a nonprofit corporation funded almost entirely through Government grants and contracts. When President Carter terminated the LEAA, INSLAW converted the company to a for- profit corporation in 1981 to commercially market PROMIS. The new corporation made several significant improvements to the original PROMIS software and the resulting product came to be known as INSLAW's proprietary Enhanced PROMIS. The original PROMIS was funded entirely with Government funds and was in the public domain. In March 1982, the Justice Department awarded INSLAW, Inc., a $10 million, 3-year contract to implement the public domain version of PROMIS at 94 U.S. attorneys' offices across the country and U.S. Territories. While the PROMIS software could have gone a long way toward correcting the Department's longstanding need for a standardized case management system, the contract between INSLAW and Justice quickly became embroiled in bitterness and controversy which has lasted for almost a decade. The conflict centers on the question of whether INSLAW has ownership of its privately funded "Enhanced PROMIS." This software was eventually installed at numerous U.S. attorneys' offices after a 1983 modification to the contract. While Justice officials at the time recognized INSLAW's proprietary rights to any privately funded enhancements to the original public domain version of PROMIS, the Department later claimed that it had unlimited rights to all software supplied under the contract. (See section of report entitled, "The Department Misappropriated INSLAW Software.'")

INSLAW attempted to resolve the matter several times but was largely met with indifference or hostility by Department officials. Eventually, the Department canceled part of the contract and, by February 1985, had withheld at least $1.6 million in payments. As a result, the company was driven to the brink of insolvency and was threatened with dissolution under chapter 7 of the bankruptcy laws. Department officials have steadfastly claimed the INSLAW controversy is merely a contract dispute which has been blown out of proportion by the media. INSLAW's owners, William and Nancy Hamilton, however, have persisted in their belief that the Department's actions were Part of a high level conspiracy within Justice to steal the Enhanced PROMIS software.

>>6274477A. INSLAW ALLEGATIONS

Based on their knowledge and belief, the Hamiltons have alleged that high level officials in the Department of Justice conspired to steal the Enhanced PROMIS software system. As an element of this theft, these officials, who included former Attorney General Edwin Meese and Deputy Attorney General Lowell Jensen, forced INSLAW into bankruptcy by intentionally creating a sham contract dispute over the terms and conditions of the contract which led to the withholding of payments due INSLAW by the Department. The Hamiltons maintain that, after driving the company into bankruptcy, Justice officials attempted to force the conversion of INSLAW's bankruptcy status from Chapter 11: Reorganization to Chapter 7: Liquidation. They assert that such a change in bankruptcy status would have resulted in the forced sale of INSLAW'S assets, including Enhanced PROMIS to a rival computer company called Hadron, Inc., which, at the time, was attempting to conduct a hostile buyout of INSLAW. Hadron, Inc., was controlled by the Biotech Capital Corporation, under the control of Dr. Earl Brian, who was president and chairman of the corporation. The Hamiltons assert that even though the attempt to change the status of INSLAW's bankruptcy was unsuccessful, the Enhanced PROMIS software system was eventually provided to Dr. Brian by individuals from the Department with the knowledge and concurrence of then Attorney General Meese who had previously worked with Dr. Brian in the cabinet of California Governor Ronald Reagan and later at the Reagan White House. According to the Hamiltons, the ultimate goal of the conspiracy was to position Hadron and the other companies owned or controlled by Dr. Brian to take advantage of the nearly 3 billion dollars, worth of automated data processing upgrade contracts planned to be awarded by the Department of Justice during the 1980's.

Information obtained by the Hamiltons through sworn affidavits of several individuals, including Ari Ben- Menashe, a former Israeli Mossad officer, and Michael Riconosciuto, an individual who claims to have ties to the intelligence community, indicated that an element of this ongoing criminal enterprise by Mr. Meese, Dr. Brian and others included the modification of the Enhanced PROMIS software by individuals associated with the world of covert intelligence operations. The Hamiltons claim the modification of Enhanced PROMIS was an essential element of the enterprise, because the software was subsequently distributed by Dr. Brian to intelligence agencies internationally with a "back door" software routine, so that U.S. intelligence agencies could covertly break into the system when needed. The Hamiltons also presented information indicating that PROMIS had been distributed to several Federal agencies, including the FBI, CIA, and DEA.

B. COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION

Due to the complexity and breadth of the INSLAW allegations against the Department of Justice, the committee's investigation focused on two principal questions: (1) Did high level Department officials convert, steal or otherwise misappropriate INSLAW's PROMIS software and attempt to put the company out of business; and, (2) did high level Department of Justice officials, including Attorney General Edwin Meese and then Deputy Attorney General Lowell Jensen, and others conspire to sell, transfer, or in any way distribute INSLAW's Enhanced PROMIS to other Federal agencies and foreign governments?

>>6274485

1. DID THE DEPARTMENT CONVERT, STEAL OR MISAPPROPRIATE THE PROMIS SOFTWARE?

With regard to the first question, there appears to be strong evidence, as indicated by the findings in two Federal court proceedings as well as by the committee investigation, that the Department of Justice "acted willfully and fraudulently"2 and "took, con- verted and stole"3 INSLAW's Enhanced PROMIS by "trickery, fraud and deceit."4 It appears that these actions against INSLAW were implemented through the project manager from the beginning of the contract and under the direction of high level Justice Department officials.

Just 1 month after the contract was signed, Mr. C. Madison "Brick" Brewer, the PROMIS project manager, raised the possibility of canceling the INSLAW contract. During an April 14, 1982, meeting of the PROMIS Project Team, Mr. Brewer, and others discussed terminating the contract with INSLAW for convenience of the Government. Mr. Brewer did not recall the details of the meeting but said that if this recommendation was made, it was made "in jest."5 Based on notes taken at this meeting by Justice officials, Bankruptcy Court Judge George Bason found that Mr. Brewer's recommendation to terminate the INSLAW contract, "Sconstituted a smoking gun that clearly evidences Brewer's intense bias against INSLAW, his single-minded intent to drive INSLAW out of businessS."6 By his own admission, Mr. Brewer became upset when INSLAW claimed that it had made enhancements to the public domain version of PROMIS using private funds. In his view, under the contract all versions of PROMIS were the Government's property. It is clear from the record that Mr. Brewer and Mr. Videnieks (the PROMIS contracting officer), supported by high level Justice officials continued to confront INSLAW at every turn. As Senior District Court Judge Bryant stated in his ruling on the case: '"There was unending contention about payments under this contract and the rights of the respective

parties."

Over the life of the contract, INSLAW made several attempts to reach an agreement with the Department over its proprietary rights to the Enhanced PROMIS software. The Department, however, steadfastly refused to conduct any meaningful negotiations and exhibited little inclination to resolve the controversy. In the meantime, INSLAW was pushed to the brink of financial ruin because the Department withheld at least $1.6 million in critical contract payments on questionable grounds, and in February 1985 was forced to file for protection under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in order to stay economically viable. INSLAW at this time had installed PROMIS at the 20 largest U.S. attorneys' offices across the country as required by the contract.7 The Department had earlier canceled installation of PROMIS at the 74 smaller offices.

While refusing to engage in good faith negotiations with INSLAW, Mr. Brewer and Mr. Videnieks, with the approval of high level Justice Department officials, proceeded to take actions to misappropriate the Enhanced PROMIS software. These officials knew that INSLAW had installed Enhanced PROMIS at the 20 sites. Yet, without notice, and certainly without permission, the Depart- ment of Justice illegally copied INSLAW's Enhanced PROMIS software and installed it eventually at 25 additional U.S. attorneys' offices. The Department reportedly also brought another 31 U.S. attorneys, offices "on-line" to Enhanced PROMIS systems via telecommunications. INSLAW first learned of these unauthorized actions in September 1985, and notified the Department that it must remove the Enhanced PROMIS software or arrange for license agreements. When the Department refused, INSLAW subsequently filed a claim against Justice in the Federal Bankruptcy Court which eventually led to the Bankruptcy's Court's finding that the Department's actions "Swere done in bad faith, vexatiously, in wanton disregard of the law and the facts, and for oppressive reasons S to drive INSLAW out of business and to convert, by trickery, fraud and deceit, INSLAW's PROMIS software. When the case was appealed by the Department, Senior District Court Judge William Bryant concurred with the Bankruptcy Court and was very critical of the Department's handling of the case. In his ruling, at 49a, Judge Bryant stated:

>>6274491The Government accuses the bankruptcy court of looking beyond the bankruptcy proceeding to find culpability by the Government. What is strikingly apparent from the testimony and depositions of key witnesses and many documents is that INSLAW performed its contract in a hostile environment that extended from the higher echelons of the Justice Department to the officials who had the day-to-day responsibility for supervising its work. [Emphasis added.]

Recently, the posture of some Department officials has been to attempt to exonerate the Department's handling of the INSLAW matter by citing the fact that the Court of Appeals has vacated the Bankruptcy and District Courts' judgment involving illegal misconduct of the Department including violations of the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. However, the D.C. Circuit's opinion was grounded primarily on jurisdictional questions and did not address the substantive merits of the findings of fact and conclusions of law of either the Bankruptcy Court or the ruling of the U.S. District Court. Based on the facts presented in court and the committee's review of Department records, it does indeed appear that Justice officials, including Mr. Brewer and Mr. Videnieks, never intended to fully honor the proprietary rights of INSLAW or bargain in good faith with the company. The Bankruptcy Court found that:

S [The Department] engaged in an outrageous, deceitful, fraudulent game of cat and mouse, demonstrating contempt for both the law and any principle of fair dealing. [Finding No. 266 at 138.]

As the Bankruptcy and District Courts found on the merits, it is very unlikely that Mr. Brewer and Mr. Videnieks acted alone to violate the proprietary rights of INSLAW in this matter. In explaining his own actions, Mr. Brewer, the project manager, has repeatedly stated that he was not acting out any personal vendetta against INSLAW and that high level Department officials including Lowell Jensen were aware of every decision he made with regard to the contract. Mr. Brewer stated, under oath that "Sthere was somebody in the Department at a higher level, looking over the shoulder of not just me but the people who worked for meS.''8 The PROMIS Oversight Committee, headed by Deputy Attorney General Lowell Jensen, kept a close watch over the administration of the contract and was involved in every major decision. Mr. Jensen, who worked with former Attorney General Edwin Meese in the Alameda County district attorneys' offices, stated under oath that he kept the Attorney General regularly informed of all aspects of the INSLAW contract. The PROMIS Oversight Committee readily agreed with Mr. Brewer's recommendation to cancel part of INSLAW's contract for default because of the controversy regarding the installation of PROMIS in word processing systems at the 74 smaller U.S. attorneys' offices. Mr. Brewer's proposal was ultimately rejected only because a Justice contracts attorney advised the oversight committee that the Department did not have the legal authority to do so. Curiously, the recommendation to find INSLAW in default occurred shortly after INSLAW and the Department signed a modification to the contract (Mod. 12), which was supposed to end the conflict over proprietary rights.

Mr. Jensen, who is currently a Federal District Court judge in San Francisco, served at the Justice Department successively as Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division, Associate Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General between 1981 and 1986. The Bankruptcy court found that he "had a previously developed negative attitude about PROMIS and INSLAW" from the beginning (Findings No. 307-309) because he had been associated with the development of a rival case management system while he was a district attorney in California, and that this experience, at the very least, affected his judgment throughout his oversight of the contract. During a sworn statement, Judge Jensen denied being biased against INSLAW, but averred that he did not have complete recollection of the events surrounding his involvement in the contract. However, based on the committee's own investigation it is clear that Judge Jensen was not particularly interested or active in pursuing INSLAW's claims that Department officials were biased against the company and had taken action to harm the company. Perhaps most disturbing, he remembered very few details of the PROMIS Oversight Committee meetings even though he had served as its chairman and was certainly one of its most influential members. He stated that after a meeting with former Attorney General Elliot Richardson (representing INSLAW) regarding the alleged Brewer bias, he commissioned his deputy, Mr. Jay Stephens, to conduct an investigation of the bias charges. Based on this investigation, Judge Jensen said he concluded that there were no bias problems associated with the Department's handling of the INSLAW contract.

>>6274496This assertion, however, contradicted Mr. Stephens, who testified during a sworn statement that he was never asked by Judge Jensen to conduct an investigation of the Brewer bias allegations raised by Mr. Richardson and others. Mr. Stephens, recollection of the events was sharp and complete in stark contrast to Judge Jensen's. As a result, many questions remain about the accuracy and completeness of Judge Jensen's recollections and statements. As for the PROMIS Oversight Committee, committee investigators were told that detailed minutes were not kept at any of the meetings, nor was there any record of specific discussions by its members affecting the INSLAW contract. The records that were available were inordinately sparse and often did not include any background of how and why decisions were made.

To date, former Attorney General Meese denies having knowledge of any bias against INSLAW by the Department or any of its officials. He stated, under oath, that he had little, if any, involvement with the INSLAW controversy and that he recalls no specific discussion with anyone, including Department officials about INSLAW's contract with Justice regarding the use or misuse of the PROMIS software. This statement is in direct conflict with Judge Jensen's testimony, that he briefed Mr. Meese regularly on this issue and that Mr. Meese was very interested in the details of the contract and negotiations.

One of the most damaging statements received by the committee is a sworn statement made by Deputy Attorney General Arnold Burns to Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) investigators in 1988. In this statement, Mr. Burns stated that Department attorneys had already advised him (sometime in 1986) that INSLAW's claim of proprietary rights in the Enhanced PROMIS software was legitimate and that the Department had waived any rights in these enhancements. Mr. Burns was also told by Justice attorneys that the Department would probably lose the case in court on this issue. Accepting this statement, it is incredible that the Department, having made this determination, would continue to pursue its litigation of these matters. More than $1 million has been spent in litigation on this case by the Justice Department even though it knew in 1986 that it did not have a chance to win the case on merits. This clearly raises the specter that the Department actions taken against INSLAW in this matter represent an abuse of power of shameful proportions.

1. WAS THERE A HIGH LEVEL CONSPIRACY?

>>6274503The second phase of the committee's investigation concentrated on the allegations that high level officials at the Department of Justice conspired to drive INSLAW into insolvency and steal the PROMIS software so it could be used by Dr. Earl Brian, a former associate and friend of then Attorney General Edwin Meese. Dr. Brian is a businessman and entrepreneur who owns or controls several] businesses including Hadron, Inc., which has contracts with the Justice Department, CIA, and other agencies. The Hamiltons and others have asserted that Dr. Brian conspired with high level Justice officials to sell PROMIS to law enforcement and intelligence agencies worldwide.

Former Attorney General Elliot Richardson, counsel to INSLAW, has alleged that the circumstances involving the theft of the PROMIS software system constitute a possible criminal conspiracy involving Mr. Meese, Judge Jensen, Dr. Brian, and several current and former officials at the Department of Justice. Mr. Richardson maintains that the individuals involved in the theft of the Enhanced PROMIS system have violated a plethora of Federal crimi- nal statutes, including but not limited to: (1) 18 U.S.C 654 (officer or employee of the United States converting the property of another); (2) 18 U.S.C 1001 (false statements); (3)18 U.S.C 1621 (perjury); (4) 18 U.S.C 1503 (obstruction of justice); (5) 18 U.S.C 1341 (mail fraud) and (6) 18 U.S.C. 371 (conspiracy to commit criminal offenses). Mr. Richardson further contends that the violations of Federal law associated in the theft of Enhanced PROMIS, the subsequent coverup and the illegal distribution of PROMIS fulfill the requirements for prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq. (the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute).

As discussed earlier, the committee's investigation largely supports the findings of two Federal courts that the Department "took, converted, stole INSLAW'S Enhanced PROMIS by "trickery, fraud and deceit'', and that this misappropriation involved officials at the highest levels of the Department of Justice. The recent ruling by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals does nothing to vitiate those conclusions, the product of an extensive record compiled under oath by two Federal jurists. While the Department continues to attempt to explain away the INSLAW matter as a simple contract dispute, the committee's investigation has uncovered other information which plausibly could suggest a different conclusion if full access to documents and other witnesses were permitted. Several individuals have stated under oath that the Enhanced PROMIS software was stolen and distributed internationally in order to provide financial gain to Dr. Brian and to further intelligence and foreign policy objectives for the United States. While it should be acknowledged at the outset that some of the testimony comes from individuals whose past associations and enterprises are not commendable, corroborating evidence for a number of their claims made under oath has been found. It should be observed that these individuals provided testimony with the full knowledge that the Justice Department could-and would probably be strongly inclined to-prosecute them for perjury if they lied under oath. Moreover, we note that the Department is hardly in a position to negate summarily testimony offered by witnesses who have led less than an exemplary life in their choice of associations and activities. As indicated by the recent prosecution of Manuel Noriega, which involved the use of over 40 witnesses, the majority of whom were previously convicted drug traffickers, a witness, perceived credibility is not always indicative of the accuracy or usability in court of the information provided. Although the committee's investigation could not reach a definitive conclusion regarding a possible motive behind the misappropriation of the Enhanced PROMIS software, the disturbing questions raised, unexplained coincidences and peculiar events that have surfaced throughout the INSLAW case raises the need for further investigation.

One area which requires further investigation is the allegations made by Mr. Michael Riconosciuto. Mr. Riconosciuto, a shady character allegedly tied to U.S. intelligence agencies and recently convicted on drug charges, alleges that Dr. Brian and Mr. Peter Videnieks secretly delivered INSLAW's Enhanced PROMIS software to the Cabazon Indian Reservation, located in California, for "refitting" for use by intelligence agencies in the United States and abroad.9 When Dr. Brian was questioned about his alleged involvement in the INSLAW case, he denied under oath that he had ever met Mr. Riconosciuto and stated that he had never heard of the Cabazon Indian Reservation.

>>6274509C. ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

Suspicions of a Department of Justice conspiracy to steal INSLAW's PROMIS were fueled when Danny Casolaro-an investigative writer inquiring into those issues-was found dead in a hotel room in Martinsburg, WV, where he was to meet a source that he claimed was critical to his investigation. Mr. Casolaro's body was found on August 10, 1991, with his wrists slashed numerous times. Following a brief preliminary investigation by local authorities, Mr. Casolaro's death was ruled a suicide. The investigation was reopened later as a result of numerous inquiries from Mr. Casolaro's brother and others regarding the suspicious circumstances surrounding his death.

The Martinsburg Police investigation subsequently concluded in January 1992, that Mr. Casolaro's death was a suicide. Subsequently, Chairman Brooks directed committee investigators to obtain sworn statements from the FBI agent and two former Federal Organized Crime Strike Force prosecutors in Los Angeles who had information bearing on the Casolaro case. Sworn statements were obtained from former Federal prosecutors Richard Stavin and Marvin Rudnick on March 13 and 14, 1992. After initial resistance from the Bureau, a sworn statement was taken from FBI Special Agent Thomas Gates on March 25 and 26, 1992.

Special Agent Gates stated that Mr. Casolaro claimed he had found a link between the INSLAW matter, the activities taking place at the Cabazon Indian Reservation, and a Federal investigation in which Special Agent Gates had been involved regarding organized crime influence in the entertainment industry.

Special Agent Gates stated that Mr. Casolaro had several conversations with Mr. Robert Booth Nichols in the weeks preceding his death. Mr. Nichols, according to documents submitted to a Federal court by the FBI, has ties with organized crime and the world of covert intelligence operations. When he learned of Mr. Casolaro's death, Special Agent Gates contacted the Martinsburg, WV, Police Department to inform them of the information he had concerning Mr. Nichols and Mr. Casolaro. The Martinsburg Police have not commented on whether or not they eventually pursued the leads provided by Special Agent Gates.

Based on the evidence collected by the committee, it appears that the path followed by Danny Casolaro in pursuing his investigation into the INSLAW matter brought him in contact with a number of dangerous individuals associated with organized crime and the world of covert intelligence operations. The suspicious circumstances surrounding his death have led some law enforcement professionals and others to believe that his death may not have been a suicide. As long as the possibility exists that Danny Casolaro died as a result of his investigation into the INSLAW matter, it is imperative that further investigation be conducted.

>>6274511D. EVIDENCE OF POSSIBLE COVERUP AND OBSTRUCTION

One of the principal reasons the committee could not reach any definitive conclusion about INSLAW's allegations of a high criminal conspiracy at Justice was the lack of cooperation from the Department. Throughout the two INSLAW investigations, the Congress met with restrictions, delays and outright denials to requests for information and to unobstructed access to records and witnesses since 1988. The Department initially attempted to prevent the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations from conducting an investigation of the INSLAW affair. During this committee's investigation, Attorney General Thornburgh repeatedly reneged on agreements made with this committee to provide full and open access to information and witnesses. Although the day before a planned committee meeting to consider the issuance of a subpoena the Department promised full access to documents and witnesses, the committee was compelled to subpoena Attorney General Thornburgh to obtain documents needed to complete its investigation. Even then, the Department failed to provide all the documents subpoenaed, claiming that some of the documents held by the Department's chief attorney in charge of the INSLAW litigation had been misplaced or accidentally destroyed. The Department has not provided a complete accounting of the number of documents missing nor has it conducted an investigation to determine if the documents were stolen or illegally destroyed.

Questions regarding the Department's willingness and objectivity to investigate the charges of possible misconduct of Justice employees remain. That Justice officials may have too readily concluded that witnesses supporting the Department's position were credible while those who did not were ignored or retaliated against was, perhaps, most painfully demonstrated with the firing of Anthony Pasciuto, the former Deputy Director, Executive Office of the U.S. Trustees.

Mr. Pasciuto had informed the Hamiltons that soon after INSLAW filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in 1985, the Justice Department had planned to petition the court to force INSLAW into chapter 7 bankruptcy and liquidate its assets including the PROMIS software. His source for this information was Judge Cornelius Blackshear who, at the time, was the U.S. Trustee for the Southern District of New York. Judge Blackshear subsequently provided INSLAW's attorneys with a sworn statement confirming what Mr. Pasciuto had told the Hamiltons. However, following a conversation with a Justice Department attorney who was representing the Department in the INSLAW case,10 Judge Blackshear recanted his earlier sworn statement. Moreover, Judge Blackshear, under oath, could not or would not provide committee investigators with a plausible explanation of why he had recanted his earlier statements to INSLAW, Mr. Pasciuto and others regarding the Justice Department's efforts to force INSLAW out of business. He did confirm an earlier statement attributed to him that his recantation was a result of "his desire to hurt the least number of people." However, he would not elaborate on this enigmatic statement.

Similarly, Mr. Pasciuto, under strong pressure from senior Department officials, recanted his statement made to the Hamiltons regarding Judge Blackshear. It appears that Mr. Pasciuto may have been fired from his position with the Executive Office of U.S. Trustees because he had provided information to the Hamiltons and their attorneys which undercut the Department's litigating position before the Bankruptcy Court.11 This action was based on a recommendation made by the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR). In a memorandum to Deputy Attorney General Burns, dated December 18, 1987, the OPR concluded that:

In our view, but for Mr. Pasciuto's highly irresponsible actions, the department would be in a much better litigation posture than it presently finds itself. Mr. Pasciuto has wholly failed to comport himself in accordance with the standard of conduct expected of an official of his position.

Mr. Pasciuto now states he regrets having allowed himself to be coerced by the Department into recanting and has stated under oath to committee investigators that he stands by his earlier statements made to the Hamiltons that Judge Blackshear had informed him that the Department wanted to force INSLAW out of business. Certainly, Mr. Pasciuto's treatment by the Department during his participation in the INSLAW litigation raises serious questions of how far the Department will go to protect its interests while defending itself in litigation. Not unexpectedly, Mr. Pasciuto's firing had a chilling effect on other potential Department witnesses who might have otherwise cooperated with the committee in this matter. Judge Blackshear, on the other hand, was not accused of wrongdoing by the Department even though he originally provided essentially the same information as had Mr. Pasciuto.

>>6274516

Despite this series of obvious reversals, the Department, after limited investigation, has apparently satisfied itself that the sworn statements of its witnesses, including Judge Blackshear, have somehow been reconciled on key issues such that no false statements have been made by any of these individuals. This position is flatly in opposition to the Bankruptcy Court's finding that several Department officials may have perjured themselves which was never seriously investigated by the Department. In addition, there are serious conflicts and inconsistencies in sworn statements provided to the committee that have not been resolved. Equally important, the possibility that witnesses, testimony were manipulated by the Department in order to present a "united front" to the Congress and the public on the INSLAW case needs to be fully and honestly explored. The potential for a conflict of interest in the Department's carrying out such an inquiry is high, if not prudently manifest, and independent scrutiny is required.

E. JUDGE BASON'S ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE DEPARTMENT

Judge Bason testified, under oath, before the Economic and Commercial Law Subcommittee that the Department's actions against its critics may have extended into blocking his reappointment as a bankruptcy judge in 1988 because of his ruling in INSLAW's case. Judge Bason was replaced by Martin Teel, Jr., who, prior to his appointment, was a Justice Department attorney heavily involved in the Department's litigation of the INSLAW case.12 The committee was unable to substantiate Judge Bason's charges. If such undue influence did occur, it was subtle and lost in the highly private manner in which judge selection procedures are conducted. While sworn statements were not taken, the committee investigators interviewed several of the judges involved in the selection process. The judges who agreed to provide interviews all stated that they had little firsthand knowledge in which to evaluate the candidates, including the incumbent judge. As a result, the members of the Judicial Council had to rely on the findings of the Merit Selection Panel headed by Judge Norma Johnson.

The Merit Selection Panel's findings were provided to the Judicial Council by Judge Johnson whose oral presentation was instrumental in the final selection. Judge Johnson had previously worked at the Department of Justice with Stuart Schiffer, who led the Department's attempt to have the District Court remove Judge Bason from the INSLAW case. Mr. Schiffer is also the official who argued vociferously against the appointment of an independent counsel on the INSLAW case in a memorandum to Deputy Attorney General Arthur Burns. Judge Johnson also served in the D.C. Superior Court with Judge Tim Murphy from 1970 through 1980. Judge Murphy subsequently worked directly for Mr. Brewer on the PROMIS contract. The committee, however, has not at this date found any evidence that Judge Johnson had specific discussions with Mr. Schiffer or anyone else at the Department of Justice about Judge Bason, the INSLAW case or the bankruptcy judicial selection process. The committee's investigation revealed that the selection process was largely informal, undocumented and highly subjective. For example, several members of the Judicial Council indicated that one of the primary factors influencing the non-reappointment of Judge Bason, was the poor administrative condition of his court. These same members admitted that they had no firsthand knowledge of the administrative condition and based this opinion on the reports of the Merit Selection Panel and Judge Johnson. This was corroborated by the discovery of a confidential memorandum written by a member of the Merit Selection Panel which was highly critical of Judge Bason and the administrative condition of the Bankruptcy Court. While this memorandum had been seen by several judges during the selection process, committee investigators were unable to determine who authored it. The committee's investigation did not reveal any evidence to support the criticisms raised in the memorandum. Martin Bloom, Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court, indicated in his sworn statement to committee investigators that under Judge Bason, the administrative condition of the court vastly improved. These sentiments were echoed by Chief Judge Aubrey Robinson who consistently complimented Judge Bason on his efforts to improve the administrative condition of the Bankruptcy Court in his remarks to the Annual Judicial Conference.

>>6274519F. CONCLUSION

The history of the Department's behavior in the INSLAW case dramatically illustrates its (1) reflexive hostility and "circle the wagons" approach toward outside investigations; (2) inability or unwillingness to look objectively at charges of wrongdoing by high level Justice officials, particularly when the agency itself is a defendant in litigation; and, (3) belligerence toward Justice employees with views that run counter to those of the agency's upper management. The fact that the Department failed to recognize a need for an independent investigation of the INSLAW matter for more than 7 years is remarkable. Failure to do so has effectively shielded officials who may have committed wrongdoing from investigation and prosecution.

As already documented and confirmed by two Federal judges, the Department's actions in the INSLAW case have greatly harmed the company and its owners. These actions, as they pertain to the dispute with INSLAW over the misappropriation of the PROMIS software, were taken with the full knowledge and support of high level Justice officials. The harm to the company was further perpetuated by succeeding high level officials, such as former Attorney General Richard Thornburgh, who not only failed to objectively investigate the serious charges raised by the Hamiltons and their attorney, former Attorney General Elliot Richardson, but also delayed and rebuffed effective and expeditious outside investigation of the matter by Congress.

The Department of Justice is this nation's most visible guarantor of the notion that wrongdoing will be sought out and punished irrespective of the identity of the actors involved. Moreover, its mandate is to protect all private citizens from illegal activities that undermine the public trust. The Department's handling of the INSLAW case has seriously undermined its credibility and reputation in playing such a role. Congress and the executive must take immediate and forceful steps to restore public confidence and faith in our system of justice, which cannot be undermined by the very agent entrusted with enforcement of our laws and protections afforded every citizen. In view of the history surrounding the INSLAW affair and the serious implications of evidence presented by the Hamiltons, two court proceedings in the judicial branch and the committee's own investigation, there is a clear need for further investigation. The committee believes that the only way in which INSLAW's allegations can be adequately and fully investigated is by the appointment of an independent counsel.

The committee is aware that on November 13, 1991, Attorney General Barr appointed Nicholas Bua, a retired Federal judge from Chicago, as his special counsel to investigate and advise him on the INSLAW controversy. The committee eagerly awaits Judge Bua's findings; however, as long as the investigation of wrongdoing by former and current high level Justice officials remains under the ultimate control of the Department itself, there will always be serious doubt about the objectivity and thoroughness of the inquiry.

INSLAW's ANALYSIS and REBUTTAL

of the

BUA REPORT

Memorandum in Response to the

March 1993 Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua

to the Attorney General of the United States Responding to the Allegations of INSLAW, Inc.

>>6274526INTRODUCTION

The attempt by the Department of Justice (DOJ) to deal with the INSLAW case through a Special Counsel, who is required to report to the Attorney General, and a staff of DOJ attorneys raises significant public policy questions. These are apparent on the face of the Bua Report.

For example, should DOJ, as one of the parties to a civil dispute, be able to use the authority of a federal grand jury and the secrecy requirements of its proceedings to improve its own civil litigation posture? Should DOJ be using its own lawyers and investigators and a federal grand jury to investigate colleagues, superiors, and subordinates? How should the tension between the obligation to enforce the criminal laws of the United States and the legitimate need to safeguard intelligence and national security be reconciled?

The problems with the Bua Report, as set forth in INSLAW's Analysis and Rebuttal, are much more concrete than the aforementioned public policy questions. We do, however, think that the problems identified by these questions should be carefully and thoughtfully addressed as steps are being taken to bring the INSLAW case to a fair, final and publicly acceptable conclusion.

The main body of this memorandum is divided into sections addressing (1) DOJ's wrongful acquisition of an enhanced version of PROMIS to which it was not entitled and which it has continued to use without properly compensating INSLAW, (2) DOJ's attempt, by improper means, to cause the conversion of the INSLAW bankruptcy from reorganization to liquidation, and (3) the indications of a more widely ramified conspiracy involving Earl Brian and the intelligence and law enforcement agencies of the United States and foreign governments.

Each of these sections examines the basis for the conclusions reached in the Bua Report and points out errors and omissions plainly demonstrable on the basis of evidence cited in the report itself or readily available to the investigators in the records of prior investigations and judicial proceedings. The sections also identify evidentiary points as to which Judge Bua chose to believe the self-serving statements of individuals directly implicated in the theft of INSLAW's software, to disbelieve the testimony on the same points by INSLAW witnesses, and to ignore evidence supporting the findings of the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, and the House Committee on the Judiciary.

In addition to the deficiencies apparent on its face, the report reveals numerous failures to pursue testimony or documentary evidence that could have contradicted its conclusions and corroborated INSLAW's allegations. The following sections identify these failures in at least 40 situations.

Immediately after his appointment, INSLAW called to Judge Bua's attention the essentiality of assuring senior DOJ officials and other government employees who had given important information to INSLAW that they could disclose this information to him or his staff without fear of reprisal. Any person seriously attempting to uncover the truth would have gone to great lengths to find a way of overcoming these apprehensions. This was not done. Appended to this memorandum is a listing of these informants together with a brief synopsis of information they have furnished to INSLAW. The listing gives enough of an indication of who they are to make clear that they deserve to be taken seriously, but not so much as to make it possible to identify them individually. The synopses make clear at the same time that the information they could furnish strongly corroborates other evidence of the wider conspiracy.

The Bua Report denigrates the findings of the Bankruptcy Court without clearly acknowledging that those findings were affirmed and supplemented by two other entities independent of DOJ, the U.S. District Court and the House Judiciary Committee. Senior U.S. District Judge William B. Bryant, Jr., issued a 44- page opinion, in which he states in part:

>>6274532It is sufficient to state that after careful review of all of the volumes of transcripts of the hearings before the bankruptcy court, the more than 1,200 pages of briefs and supporting appendices, and all other relevant documents in the record, there is convincing, perhaps compelling support for the findings set forth by the bankruptcy court.

. . . the court has examined the bankruptcy judge's findings of fact in the light of the entire record, and finds his account of the evidence is eminently plausible; and this court is not left with any notion that a 'mistake has been committed,' Id. at 574. This conclusion is reached without regard to the deference to be accorded to the judge's opportunity to assess credibility. The cold record adequately supports his findings under any standard of review.

The section on the wrongful acquisition of PROMIS amply supports its thesis that the Bua Report focuses only on those facts that its authors deemed relevant to the conclusions they intended to reach. It calls attention to the fact that the report based some of its most important conclusions on interviews with unnamed individuals and on undisclosed documentary evidence. This section also points out the report's remarkable credulity toward professions of innocence by the very individuals heretofore identified as the principal culprits in the theft of the software. As the section observes, "To accept the self-serving, long after-the-fact and post hoc rationalizations of these individuals over their testimony at trial, which testimony clearly evidenced their propensity for lying and covering up the truth, as found by two federal courts, is ludicrous."

The section on the conversion of the INSLAW bankruptcy exposes the same pattern of justifying the DOJ version of the facts and downplaying, misinterpreting, or ignoring evidence to the contrary. This is particularly striking in the case of the report's attempt to minimize the testimony of Anthony Pasciuto, Deputy Director of the Executive Office for U.S. Trustees. In reaching for an explanation of Pasciuto's conduct, his testimony, and his subsequent recantation, the report avoids the one most logical explanation: the fear that he would not get the promotion he had long sought and the fear that he would be fired for telling the truth, as he eventually was.

Pages 28-35 of the section on the more widely ramified conspiracy pull together the numerous indications that INSLAW's PROMIS software is widely used throughout the United States Government. A thorough investigation would, at a minimum, have conducted the relatively simple and inexpensive computer-based code comparisons between PROMIS and its suspected clones in U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies, that might have shown whether or not these claims are true. The Bua investigation made no attempt to arrange such comparisons.

Relevant both to DOJ's bad faith in its dealings with INSLAW and to its involvement in a broader conspiracy is the issue of the DOJ's complicity in the denial of reappointment to George F. Bason, Jr., who presided over the Bankruptcy Court trial. The report reveals that the criticisms of Judge Bason by his predecessor, Roger Whelan, were influential in the Merit Selection Panel's deliberations about Judge Bason's suitability for reappointment. Whelan told the Panel that Judge Bason was a poor administrator. Chief Judge Aubrey Robinson of the U.S. District Court, however, told the Judiciary Committee that Judge Bason's only administrative problems were inherited from Judge Whelan and that these were soon brought under control by Judge Bason. In the Chapter 11 proceeding, Roger Whelan represented the INSLAW creditor which pressed hardest for INSLAW's liquidation and which, in so doing, appears to have acted in collusion with DOJ. The report also discloses direct communications on the INSLAW case between a DOJ attorney and the Chair of the Merit Selection Panel, communications whose existence was not revealed in the course of two Congressional investigations on the subject.

>>6274539It is noteworthy in the circumstances that Judge Bua made an eleventh-hour approach to INSLAW's lawyers in an effort to broker a $25 million settlement between INSLAW and the DOJ. The inference that Judge Bua was aware of the weaknesses in his own report is difficult to avoid.

I. DOJ WRONGFULLY OBTAINED AN ENHANCED VERSION OF PROMIS TO WHICH IT WAS NOT ENTITLED AND THEREAFTER HAS USED THAT VERSION WITHOUT PROPERLY COMPENSATING INSLAW

In assessing the validity of the so-called "tentative" factual conclusions reached in the Bua Report, one need be mindful of the following telling admission of the authors:

Our discussion here of the factual background of the 1982 contract does not purport to be exhaustive. Instead, we have attempted to focus on those facts that are relevant to the conclusions we have reached. Where it is necessary to explain specific findings or conclusions, we have undertaken a more detailed examination of certain events in subsequent sections of this report. (Emphasis added.) (Page 15)

In effect, the authors of the Bua Report determined, apparently in advance, the conclusions that they intended to reach and, thereafter, set about to "focus" on only those facts that they deemed relevant to support those conclusions, to the exclusion of the massive factual record that otherwise would, and did, lead to the very opposite conclusions found not only by two federal courts, but, in part, by the Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of Representatives and the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Affairs of the U.S. Senate.

It is remarkable that the authors of the Bua Report either ignored or rejected every conclusion reached by the federal courts and the two legislative committees that was contrary to the conclusions reached by the Bua Report, while at the same time accepting those conclusions that were supportive of the conclusions reached in the Bua Report. It is even more remarkable that the Bua Report could find, on the one hand, that DOJ neither obtained the enhanced version of PROMIS through fraud nor wrongfully distributed PROMIS while, on the other hand, Judge Bua repeatedly informed journalists covering the INSLAW case and once conveyed directly to INSLAW's attorneys that he had reached the opposite conclusion and had recommended that DOJ settle its dispute with INSLAW by the payment of $25 million to INSLAW.

The following is an attempt merely to highlight some of the most glaring errors in the factual conclusions reached in the Bua Report.

A. Negotiation of the 1982 Implementation Contract

The Bua Report found that DOJ had issued a Request for Proposals (RFP) in late 1981 that solicited proposals on a contract to: (1) implement computer-based PROMIS software in 20 "larger" United States Attorneys' Offices and (2) create and install word processing based case management software in the remaining 74 offices. There is no dispute that, at the time that the RFP was issued and the contract was awarded to INSLAW, both DOJ and INSLAW understood that DOJ intended to utilize the computer-based PROMIS only in the 20 larger offices; it clearly was understood that the remaining 74 offices would not receive this software.

>>6274544The Bua Report acknowledged that INSLAW, in responding to the RFP, specifically stated that: During the life of this project – but not as part of this project – Inslaw plans new enhancements and modifications to the basic PROMIS software and to the original version of PROMIS for U.S. Attorneys. ….[I]mprovements funded by other [i.e. non- governmental] sources and developed and accepted for inclusion in the software supported by Inslaw, will be made available to the U.S. Attorneys' offices. (Page 19)

However, the Bua Report concluded, without any factual support, that INSLAW did not clarify what it meant by "accepted for inclusion" or "will be made available." This is wrong.

First, the Bua Report ignores the fact that the quoted statement was made specifically in response to the Statement of Work, which in part required that:

All systems enhancements, modifications, and development performed pursuant to this contract shall be incorporated within the systems which have already been installed in the U.S. Attorneys' Offices…. (s 3.2.4.2) (Emphasis added.)

INSLAW was responding to this portion of the Statement of Work by advising DOJ that while INSLAW planned new enhancements, they would not be as a part of, or pursuant to, this contract. Thus, DOJ clearly was put on notice that these new enhancements would not be made available for free.

Second, there is ample testimony that both before and after the PROMIS contract was signed, INSLAW specifically advised the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys ("EOUSA") in writing that it had available for sale, at an additional cost, certain proprietary enhancements to PROMIS. INSLAW provided this information to DOJ because, by the time that DOJ issued the RFP, INSLAW had made substantial enhancements to Old PROMIS. (Hamilton, T. 105; Merrill, T. 763) These enhancements, which eventually included major new functional subsystems and substantial changes to the existing code, at a cost which INSLAW estimated to be $8.3 million, rendered Enhanced PROMIS far superior to Old PROMIS in terms of speed, flexibility, ease of use, breadth of function, and ability to be modified for particular needs. (Hamilton, T. 400; Merrill, T. 760-762; Holton, T. 1216-1219)

In its Technical Proposal responding to DOJ's PROMIS Project RFP, INSLAW informed DOJ that it had made enhancements to Old PROMIS which were proprietary, and as to which it had made a significant developmental and commercial commitment. (Answer ¶ 13; PX 12; Hamilton, T. 124-125; Gizzarelli, T. 482-483) In this regard, INSLAW specifically made a claim of proprietary rights in such enhancements. (Hamilton, T. 124)

The Bua Report suggests that DOJ did not understand that INSLAW had made this claim of proprietary rights, and that INSLAW had failed to explain in sufficient detail the basis or impact of that claim. That is not correct. In fact, in response to INSLAW's proposal, DOJ specifically requested a clarification of INSLAW'S claim of proprietary rights. (PX 13; Hamilton, T. 126; Merrill, T. 766-767) In an amendment to its Technical Proposal dated January 13, 1982, INSLAW responded to DOJ's inquiry and specifically informed DOJ that ". . . all of INSLAW's software is proprietary to it thus far." (PX 14; Hamilton, T. 127) DOJ did not respond further to INSLAW's amendment of its Technical Proposal. (Gizzarelli, T. 490; Merrill, T. 767-769) INSLAW also indicated that such programs were copyrighted and that since May 1981 it had been developing privately financed enhancements to PROMIS which were the exclusive property of INSLAW, and that DOJ had no license to use these privately-financed enhancements. (PX 14)

To illustrate this point, INSLAW, in its Technical Proposal, singled out the two-program version of the data base adjustment subsystem as an enhancement which had been developed by INSLAW using private funds. (Hamilton, T. 125; PX 14) The data base adjustment subsystem was not required to be delivered under the contract nor had it been required to be delivered under any prior DOJ contracts (Hamilton, T. 125, 2575-2578; Merrill, T. 768) By this January 13 amendment, INSLAW illustrated the concept that INSLAW had all the proprietary rights in Enhanced PROMIS (Gizzarelli, T. 493)

>>6274556Subsequent to receipt of INSLAW's response to DOJ, and prior to the execution of the contract, no one from DOJ made any further inquiry of INSLAW, or raised any questions, concerning INSLAW's right to assert its proprietary rights in Enhanced PROMIS. (Hamilton, T. 128; Merrill, T. 767-769; Gizzarelli, T. 490)

From the foregoing exchange of communications, it should be clear that any rational person acting on behalf of DOJ would understand that INSLAW was advising DOJ that the proprietary enhancements developed by INSLAW would be made available to the Department for a fee, should the Department desire to have those enhancements included within the software delivered under the contract. If there was any confusion on the part of DOJ, that confusion was not the fault of INSLAW; had DOJ any further questions concerning what was meant by the language in issue after having received the January 13 clarification, it was up to DOJ to seek answers to those questions.

Not surprisingly, after thoroughly reviewing the record, Judge Bryant reached the same conclusion:

The parties negotiated for over two months, and finally entered into a contract on March 16, 1982. Prior to the execution of the contract, and for a time thereafter, there were extensive discussions about what INSLAW claimed were privately funded enhancements which were featured in PROMIS. In other words, INSLAW claimed that at the time of entering into the contract their version of PROMIS was considerably more advanced than it was at the time of the pilot project, and that it claimed proprietary rights to those features which were developed with other than government funding. (D. Ct. Mem. Op., p. 4)"1

B. INSLAW's Continuing Assertion of Proprietary Rights and DOJ's Improper Response

To the extent that there was any lingering confusion on DOJ's part regarding INSLAW's assertion of proprietary rights in the enhanced version of PROMIS, that confusion should have been removed by INSLAW's continuing assertion of those rights. Indeed, in April 1982, INSLAW formally notified DOJ of its intent to market Enhanced PROMIS as a fee-generating product to public and private sector customers. (Hamilton, T. 134-136; Merrill, T. 775) In this connection, Roderick M. Hills, an attorney for INSLAW, wrote to Associate Deputy Attorney General Stanley E. Morris, enclosing a memorandum written by Hamilton (with his counsel's assistance) describing the origin and financing of Old PROMIS, INSLAW's efforts to substantially improve the program utilizing private funds, and the need to market such privately-financed enhancements. (PX 21)

Hill's letter solicited any questions or objections that DOJ had to INSLAW's plans. (PX 21) In essence, this inquiry was intended to provide advance notice to DOJ as to INSLAW's plans and to obtain a "sign-off" letter from DOJ to respond to concerns raised by IBM which at that time was considering a joint marketing agreement with INSLAW. (Rogers, T. 422-424; Hamilton, T. 277) The purpose of the "sign-off" letter, from INSLAW's perspective, was to give INSLAW assurance that DOJ understood what INSLAW was proposing to do, that it agreed with INSLAW's legal position, and that it would take no affirmative action to disrupt or impede INSLAW's marketing efforts. (Rogers, T. 444- 445) Any questions that DOJ continued to have should have been answered by this memorandum.

The Bua Report acknowledges the above facts but fails to take into consideration that this additional effort by INSLAW clearly should have put DOJ on notice that there were additional enhancements included within the PROMIS software that were not part of the software to be delivered under the contract, absent a separate agreement regarding that software.

>>6274559There is no dispute that this plan obviously infuriated C. Madison Brewer, DOJ's PROMIS Project Manager. The Bua Report accepts the fact that Brewer vehemently took issue with the representations and conclusions set forth in the Hamilton memorandum, which Brewer referred to as "scurrilous," and further acknowledges that Brewer's opposition to the plan was presented in an improper manner. However, in a woefully inadequate effort to downplay Brewer's conduct, the Bua Report proceeds to seek to justify his opposition, while at the same time totally ignoring all of the undisputed facts that evidence his outrageous conduct directed at injuring INSLAW.

First, the Bua Report's conclusion that at least some of the positions taken by Brewer appear to have been well-founded is not only wrong, but also is a facially obvious effort to obfuscate the fact that virtually all of the substantive positions and actions taken by DOJ, at the direction of Brewer, were not well- founded. In this regard, the Bua Report credits Brewer for a grand total of two correct positions, to the exclusion of all of the incorrect positions. More particularly, the Bua Report states that Brewer was correct to object to the extent that the Hamilton memorandum claimed that all software developed after May 1981 was proprietary, since the five BJS enhancements that were under development would have been in the public domain. INSLAW did not then, nor has it ever, disputed this fact, and the memorandum did not take a contrary position. Additionally, the Bua Report credits Brewer for correctly arguing that INSLAW had received some federal funding after May 1981. Once again, while this funding may have taken place, INSLAW was not asserting any proprietary rights for software developed from government funding under contracts containing federal data rights clauses. Moreover, the specific contracts referenced in the Bua Report did not encompass any software development work; therefore, none of the proprietary enhancements was developed using government money. Thus, the only two points on which the Bua Report agrees with Brewer are non-issues, and serve only to cloud the otherwise obvious wrongful conduct undertaken by Brewer.

The Bua Report ignores the fact that at an April 14, 1982 meeting, Brewer actively considered terminating for the government's convenience the month-old PROMIS Contract in retaliation for INSLAW's letter to Morris. (Brewer, T. 1673; PX 23) In his testimony at trial, Brewer's deputy, Jack Rugh, acknowledged that such a termination at that time would have been "ludicrous." (Rugh, T. 1471; Brewer, T. 1673; PX 23) In addition, Brewer discussed reprisals against INSLAW on its several other contracts with DOJ, one of which was the BJS contract for specific PROMIS enhancement development work which was not part of the PROMIS enhancements claimed as proprietary by INSLAW. (Hamilton, T. 114; PX 24)

Another contract discussed at the April 14, 1982 meeting was awarded to INSLAW in 1981 by DOJ to perform a needs analysis and system design for PROMIS in the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia. (PX 324 [Brewer] at p. 122; Brewer, T. 1634, 1673; Hamilton, T. 141; PX 232) The authorized second phase of this contract would have been a PROMIS implementation effort by INSLAW at an estimated contract price of $600,000. (PX 324 [Brewer] at pp. 123-124; Hamilton, T. 141-142) It was noted during the April 14th meeting that DOJ was undecided about whether to proceed with the contract's second phase and that Brewer and Rugh would meet with the District of Columbia's U.S. Attorney's Office staff to decide what would be done on the contract. (PX 23) It was further noted that cancellation of the authorized second phase would adversely affect INSLAW's ability to keep its overhead rate in line with EOUSA expectations. (PX 23)

Stating that he wanted to discuss the BJS contract with INSLAW, Brewer demanded a meeting with INSLAW for April 19, 1982. (PX 24; Brewer, T. 1638)

>>6274563At the outset of the meeting on April 19, 1982, Brewer informed James Kelley, INSLAW's General Counsel, and Joyce Deroy of INSLAW that his concern on the BJS contract arose from the "scurrilous" memorandum written by Hamilton which was attached to INSLAW's April 2, 1982 notice to Morris of its plans to market Enhanced PROMIS. (PX 25; PX 26; PX 324 [Brewer] at p. 137; Brewer, T. 1671)

As of this meeting, Brewer understood from Hamilton's memorandum that INSLAW was asserting its ownership rights in Enhanced PROMIS, as well as its right to market Enhanced PROMIS. (PX 25; PX 324 [Brewer] at p. 141)

During the April 19, 1982 meeting, Brewer again referred to the Hamilton memo and launched into a very emotional, even belligerent, tirade. (PX 26; Brewer, T. 1639; Kelley, T. 1397) During this part of the discussion of the Hamilton memo, Brewer made a number of specific statements regarding the memo. (PX 324 [Brewer] at p. 143) He stated that the Hamilton memo was unnecessary because in Brewer's view DOJ had already acknowledged INSLAW's right to sell Enhanced PROMIS. (PX 324 [Brewer] at pp. 144-145) Nevertheless, and despite the obvious inconsistency, it was Brewer's further understanding, he said, that while INSLAW had the right to sell Enhanced PROMIS, DOJ had unlimited rights to such software, including the right "to give it away" to those very public and private sector entities to which INSLAW would be attempting to market PROMIS. (PX 324 [Brewer] at pp. 146-147; Brewer, T. 1683-1684) DOJ has the audacity to contend that "[it] is in no way inconsistent" for INSLAW to have "the right to sell . . . PROMIS" at the same time that DOJ has "unlimited rights" to give PROMIS away to INSLAW's intended customers. (DRPPFF 167)

Brewer also questioned INSLAW's ability to perform the PROMIS Contract and indicated that a number of people at DOJ were upset with INSLAW and that the Hamilton memo had caused all kinds of problems. (PX 26; PX 324 [Brewer] at pp. 172, 174-175) Brewer further questioned the quality and timeliness of INSLAW's work, citing the Illinois Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, the Michigan Prosecuting Attorneys' Association and others as sources of this information. (PX 26; PX 324 [Brewer] at pp. 175-176)

Finally, Brewer strongly challenged INSLAW's right to claim ownership of, and complete domain over, Enhanced PROMIS. (PX 26; PX 324 [Brewer] at p. 177)

Another matter of discussion by Brewer at the April 19, 1982 meeting was a supplemental request for payment from INSLAW in the amount of $125,000 in regard to the BJS contract (PX 324 [Brewer] at pp. 141-142; Brewer, T. 1638, 1679; Hamilton, T. 144, 200). Brewer contacted the superior of the contracting officer on the BJS contract and asked that a "preliminary notice" of default be issued on the contract2 as well as a reprimand to INSLAW for failing to comply with the "Limitation of Cost Clause." (PX 27) Subsequent to the meeting and at Brewer's insistence, INSLAW agreed to absorb this $125,000 expense into the PROMIS Contract without increasing the total cost of the PROMIS Contract and without any additional payment under the BJS Contract. (PX 324 [Brewer] at pp. 276-278; Brewer, T. 1640; Hamilton, T. 145)3

Subsequent to the April 19, 1982 meeting, Brewer met with officials of the District of Columbia U.S. Attorney's Office to recommend that they not go forward with Phase II of the contract. (PX 232; PX 237; PX 324 [Brewer] at p. 123; Brewer, T. 1674) INSLAW was not formally notified of this decision until August 25, 1982, although it had successfully completed Phase I of the D.C. U.S. Attorney's Contract on May 31, 1982. (Hamilton, T. 142; PX 37; PX 38; PX 48) This formal notice was given just 13 days after INSLAW received a letter from Deputy Attorney General Stanley Morris dated August 11, 1982, which noted that INSLAW could assert proprietary rights to any privately financed PROMIS enhancements. (Hamilton, T. 138-140, 277; Merrill, T. 775- 776; PX 36)

>>6274565Brewer played a very important role in the decision not to go forward with Phase II of the D.C. U.S. Attorney's Office contract. (PX 232; PX 237; PX 324 [Brewer] at p. 124) Brewer identified the purported basis for this decision, in part, as his understanding that INSLAW was not able to perform because of the demands being made upon INSLAW under the new three-year, PROMIS Contract (PX 324 [Brewer] at pp. 124-125; Brewer, T. 1635), notwithstanding that the latter contract had only been in effect a few months.

Based on prior discussions with DOJ officials, INSLAW had been led to believe that it would be awarded Phase II of the D.C. U.S. Attorney's Office contract and had planned upon $600,000 of revenue from Phase II for estimating its overhead rate for all of its DOJ contracts and grants. (Hamilton, T. 143-144; Merrill, T. 774) After the decision not to go forward with Phase II had been made, Brewer was informed by INSLAW's comptroller, Murray Hannon, that denial of the $600,000 Phase II contract resulted in a precipitous increase in INSLAW's overhead within a few months of the decision, as Brewer had been forewarned would happen. (PX 324 [Brewer] at p. 125)

Finally, while the Bua Report went out of its way in an attempt to exonerate Brewer, it is noteworthy that the Bua Report did not even address the unrefutable fact that DOJ failed totally to act upon, let alone consider, INSLAW's repeated assertions of bias on the part of Brewer. As Judge Bryant found:

INSLAW attributed its troubles to an acute bias on the part of Brewer, who according to it was intent on running the company out of business. INSLAW lodged many complaints of bias and made several requests of DOJ to investigate these complaints and give some relief from what it perceived to be grossly unfair treatment. DOJ made no meaningful response to these complaints, and INSLAW's fortunes did not change. (Emphasis added.) (D. Ct. Mem. Op., p. 6) C. DOJ Obtained Enhanced PROMIS through Fraud and

Deceit

The Bua Report concluded that "[t]he evidence we have compiled to date does not support a finding that DOJ employees intentionally deceived or defrauded INSLAW, or that there was a scheme to trick INSLAW into turning over its proprietary software." (Page 125) This conclusion purportedly is supported on the basis of a review of the deposition and trial testimony, documents and interviews of "many of the individuals involved," and the review of additional unspecified documentary evidence. Not surprisingly, the Bua Report does not disclose the identity of every one of the individuals interviewed or the "additional documentary evidence" reviewed. In fact, however, virtually none of the witnesses offered by INSLAW during the trial was interviewed by the authors of the Bua Report, and those who were interviewed commented at the time on the perfunctory character of the inquiry. Indeed, it is astonishing that the authors of the Bua Report could conclude, on the basis of interviews with DOJ personnel conducted over 10 years after the events in question and following an extensive trial and extraordinary post-trial publicity, that those individuals acted only in the "best legitimate interests of the government. " (Page 125) To accept the self-serving, long after-the fact and post hoc rationalizations of these individuals over their testimony at trial, which testimony clearly evidenced their propensity for lying and covering up the truth, as found by two federal courts, is ludicrous.4

>>62745701. The Advance Payment Dispute

Under the PROMIS Contract, INSLAW was entitled to receive payments in advance of the waiting period usually necessary to process an invoice. In order to qualify for the advance payment clause, INSLAW had to represent that it was not then capable of obtaining financing from banks or other traditional commercial sources. The contract also contained a provision that prohibited INSLAW from pledging its rights under the contract.

In November 1982, INSLAW informed DOJ that it had violated inadvertently a technical covenant in the contract by assigning its government invoices as collateral for a bank line of credit that it had obtained in April 1982. DOJ responded to this by threatening to terminate the advance payment clause and by demanding that INSLAW turn over a copy of its software to DOJ. The bankruptcy court found that the advance payment dispute was manufactured, without justification, as a mechanism to injure INSLAW and to require INSLAW to provide DOJ with a copy of the software that would, in turn, enable DOJ to implement the software in-house.

The Bua Report rejected the conclusion reached by the bankruptcy court. In doing so, the authors of the Bua Report seek to justify the conduct of DOJ on the basis that DOJ's action was predicated upon its belief that INSLAW had "lied" to it. They conclude that it was the misrepresentations by INSLAW concerning its ability to obtain outside financing that was the primary reason for DOJ giving notice of termination of advance payments. The authors of the Bua Report assert that, after viewing the "demeanor" of the contracting officer, they concluded that his version was believable on this point. This conclusion, however, ignores virtually all of the evidence in the record relating to this subject.

First, the record is undeniably clear that, on February 19, 1982, prior to the issuance of the contract, when INSLAW sought the so-called advance payment provision, commercial bank financing was not available. Thus, INSLAW's representation to DOJ at that time was correct and most certainly was not a lie. In April 1982, largely on the strength of the $10 million contract award, INSLAW was able to secure an additional line of credit from the Bank of Bethesda. This credit was obtained, in part, based upon the pledge of the receivables to the Bank. Thus, contrary to the assertion in the Bua Report, INSLAW was not in the process of obtaining commercial financing at the time that it represented in its formal request that it was unable to do so, and there is no conflict in the representation made in February, prior to the contract, and the subsequent effort to obtain financing in April, after the contract. The effort to obtain financing took place later, and was predicated on the award of the contract. Thus, INSLAW neither lied nor misrepresented anything to DOJ.

Notwithstanding, there is no dispute that the pledging of the receivables resulted in a technical violation of the contract. In November 1982, this technical violation was discovered by DOJ's auditor Robert Whitely and discussed by him with INSLAW. At that time, Whitely told INSLAW that he was fully satisfied with the foregoing explanation and that, since DOJ was in no way negatively impacted by the line of credit or the pledge, he would not raise any question in the current audit about this matter. Whitely fully acknowledged these facts, and particularly the fact that the government was not placed in any financial risk as a result of the technical violation. (PX 345 [Whitely] at pp. 36-38, 40-44; Whitely, T. 1673-1764; Hamilton, T. 166-167) However, when Whitely met with Videnieks and Brewer and indicated his discovery of the technical violation, they seized on the issue and maneuvered it into a controversy when none really existed. Whitely later testified at trial that he had been concerned about INSLAW's near insolvency, but could not produce any contemporaneous documentation to verify the truthfulness of such claims.

Second, despite considerable written discussions within DOJ concerning this matter, there is no record whatsoever of any DOJ employees stating their belief that INSLAW had lied to them. In fact, while Brewer and the contracting officer purportedly were concerned about a substantial deterioration in the financial condition of INSLAW, as well as other concerns that they enumerated in writing, at no time did they state their belief that INSLAW had engaged in any misrepresentations. Nor did they seek to justify their conduct on that basis during their depositions or at trial. In short, while they may have asserted this so-called "lie" argument to the authors of the Bua Report, over 10 years after the fact, they most certainly did not raise this argument at any earlier time.

>>6274573Third, the entire premise on which DOJ threatened to terminate the advance payment provision (i.e., the deteriorating financial condition of INSLAW) was found by the bankruptcy court to be a complete fabrication and a pretext for demanding access to the computer software. Not surprisingly, this wealth of evidence was totally ignored in the Bua Report.

For example, despite the expressed concerns about the financial condition of INSLAW, neither Brewer nor Videnieks could identify any evidence which led them to believe that INSLAW's financial condition had substantially deteriorated since the award of the PROMIS contract in March 1982, nor any evidence of any fraud. (PX 324 [Brewer] at pp. 232-233; 241-245; Brewer, T. 1630; Videnieks, 207-208) In fact, Brewer and Videnieks were mistaken in their assumption that INSLAW's financial condition had deteriorated during the latter half of 1982; INSLAW was much stronger in December 1982 than at the time the PROMIS contract began. (Hamilton, T. 162) In fact, during 1982, INSLAW was able to increase a previously existing line of credit of $700,000 with First American Bank to a $1.2 million line of credit from the Bank of Bethesda. (Hamilton, T. 159; Merrill, T. 799) In addition, between August and December 1982, INSLAW entered into the co-marketing agreement with IBM. (Hamilton, T. 160; Merrill, T. 799) Perhaps most important is the fact that INSLAW had obtained the PROMIS contract, and prospects were strong for successful completion of the contract. (Hamilton, T. 160-161; Sherzer, T. 958-959)

Notwithstanding the evidence to the contrary, Brewer informed Tyson, Director of EOUSA, about these same unsupported concerns. (PX 49; Hamilton, T. 156-157) In a December 9, 1982 memo to Tyson, Brewer raised the following issues:

a. The prospect of INSLAW's bankruptcy;

b. The possible need for in-house EOUSA personnel to

take over the PROMIS Project;

c. Substantial questions of fraud being raised by

INSLAW's accounting practices;

d. The need for close auditing review of INSLAW's

costs, particularly overhead and computer center

costs; and

e. The prospect of terminating the PROMIS Contract.

(PX 49; Hamilton, T. 156-156)

The December 9 memo also expressly detailed EOUSA's commencement of planning for carrying-on the PROMIS Contract Project in-house, using EOUSA employees ". . . in the event of trouble" and stated that DOJ had "demanded, as is our right, from INSLAW copies of all software documentation …." (PX 49) (Emphasis added.) This planning was not disclosed at any time by DOJ to INSLAW. (Hamilton, T. 165) Had this planning been disclosed to INSLAW, INSLAW would not have turned its software over to DOJ pursuant to Modification 12. (Hamilton, T. 165-166)

The December 9, 1982 Brewer memo was based on several fundamental misconceptions. First, INSLAW had not incurred $975,000 of additional bank debt, but $275,000, and the additional borrowing was necessary to defray partially $344,000 that

>>6274577DOJ

then

owed

INSLAW for its time-sharing services. (Hamilton, T. 157-158) Second, Brewer misconstrued the Advance Payments provision of the contract as a mechanism for "payment-in-advance" when it was merely a contractual procedure for DOJ's timely payment of INSLAW's vouchers for work already completed. (Hamilton, T. 158) Third, Brewer erroneously concluded that INSLAW had "reprogrammed" $100,000 in contributions to the INSLAW employee profit-sharing plan because INSLAW had not yet deposited the annual contribution, when, in fact, the deposit was not yet due and owing. (Hamilton, T. 158-159) Fourth, Brewer incorrectly concluded that the nature of INSLAW's indebtedness had become "desperate" by December 1982, when, in fact, INSLAW believed it had just obtained DOJ's " sign-off" to its rights to license its privately-financed enhancements, had established its first sales and marketing unit, and had consummated a national co-marketing arrangement with IBM for the public sector. (Hamilton, T. 159- 161) Fifth, Brewer confused a version of PROMIS developed under the Pilot contract using a COBOL compiler that the hardware manufacturer (PRIME) had subsequently discontinued, with a version developed by INSLAW's European subsidiary based on current compiler technology; as a consequence of his lack of understanding, Brewer had suggested possible fraudulent accounting practices at INSLAW. (Hamilton, T. 162-165) INSLAW's independent public accountants had, in fact, reviewed and approved the accounting transactions. (Hamilton, T. 165)

The Bua Report concludes that DOJ's actions concerning the advance payments were fully justified by the memoranda they wrote concerning the matter. According to the Bua Report, "[t]o believe that DOJ's concerns about INSLAW's financial health were actually a pretext, would require a finding that certain DOJ employees were so prescient that they created numerous internal documents, and indeed even misled their superiors, just so that they could defend themselves against a claim of theft years later." No such finding would be required. In fact, the only finding that is necessary is that Brewer, for all of the reasons found by the bankruptcy court, set about to manufacture a reason to justify obtaining the software. There is nothing unusual in employees attempting to paper the record in an effort to justify their actions and that is exactly what happened here. The evidence amply supports the bankruptcy court's findings that DOJ's justification for seeking the software and cancelling the advance payments provisions was unsupportable.

In an effort to justify the conduct of DOJ, the authors of the Bua Report go to great lengths to rebut the conclusion of the bankruptcy court that Brewer and Videnieks had no basis to believe that INSLAW was near insolvency and that Whitely's testimony in support of this argument was manufactured solely for use at trial. According to the report, "Judge Bason stated this conclusion after finding that Whitely never prepared any report, that Whitely never referred to INSLAW's potential insolvency in his deposition, and that Videnieks did not mention Whitely in his deposition." The report concluded that "all of these factual assertions appear to be just plain wrong." (Page 131-132) In fact, Judge Bason was absolutely correct and it is the authors of the Bua Report that are "just plain wrong."

>>6274580Judge Bason first found that neither Brewer nor Videnieks at their depositions could identify any evidence to demonstrate a substantial deterioration in INSLAW's financial condition, notwithstanding repeated opportunities during their depositions to provide such evidence.5 While Videnieks did suggest that he had been informed by the audit staff of the possibility of INSLAW's financial failure, this was not evidence of any deterioration in the financial condition of INSLAW. Judge Bason next found that while Whitely asserted at trial his conclusion regarding potential insolvency, Whitely did not prepare a written report or any other document which "detailed" his alleged conclusions. Judge Bason concluded, quite reasonably, that if Whitely had reached such an obviously important, if not critical, conclusion regarding the financial condition of INSLAW, it would have been documented in his work papers, which it was not. In fact, on rebuttal, INSLAW adduced the testimony of Whitely's successor, Ms. Schacht, who testified that there was no reference to such purported insolvency in the DOJ audit file nor any discussions on this subject within DOJ's auditing group. (Schacht, T. 2452) Not surprisingly, DOJ was unable to produce any such written records that supported Whitely's trial testimony, since none existed. While Whitely may have said he prepared "work papers," the facts prove otherwise. Finally, Judge Bason found that Whitely's other conclusions concerning the Irish subsidiary receivable and the capitalization of software development costs were directly contrary to the considered opinion of Arthur Young & Co., a recognized independent international auditing firm, which had given INSLAW, a "clean," unqualified audit opinion as to its financial condition, and itself was the source of INSLAW's accounting treatment of its capitalization. (Whitely, T. 1777-1779)

Obviously, Judge Bason was fully justified, based on the record before him, in concluding that the basis for the advance payment dispute was totally unjustified and manufactured. The Bua Report does nothing to refute the conclusions reached by Judge Bason, and its efforts to attack Judge Bason in this regard are pathetic.

1. DOJ's Demand for the Software

The bankruptcy court concluded that DOJ knowingly set out to obtain the version of PROMIS to which it was not entitled under the contract and which DOJ understood contained proprietary enhancements belonging to INSLAW. The district court concurred with this conclusion: Thus, the court is drawn to the same conclusion reached by the bankruptcy court; the government acted willfully and fraudulently to obtain property that it was not entitled to under the contract. (D. Ct. Opinion, p. 34)

The Bua Report stated that this conclusion required proof that DOJ set out to obtain something to which it was not entitled. Because DOJ purported initially only to seek the public domain version of the software, the Bua Report concludes that proof of DOJ's fraudulent intent is missing. The Bua Report concludes that INSLAW had failed to maintain a contract version of PROMIS and that, had they done so, there would have been no proprietary rights dispute, since INSLAW's production of such a version would have satisfied any obligation it had under the contract. This entire argument displays a fundamental misunderstanding of the contract.

>>6274583First, the contract contemplated that DOJ promptly would select the computer it wished to have installed at the 20 largest U.S. Attorneys' Offices and that INSLAW would then implement the public domain software on that hardware. This software then consisted of two separate parts: the Pilot Project version and the 5 BJS enhancements. Until DOJ selected its computer hardware, there was no reason for INSLAW to maintain a separate public domain version consisting of these then two separate and non- integrated parts. The integration of the five BJS enhancements with the Pilot Project version had to be done after DOJ selected the specific computer hardware. The Pilot Project used PRIME computers, and DOJ had not determined what brand and model of computers it would buy for the 20 largest U.S. Attorneys' Offices. For example, DOJ would not have reimbursed INSLAW to create a separate Pilot Project PLUS five BJS enhancement version for operation on a particular brand and model computer such as the VAX mid-range computer from Digital Equipment Corporation unless and until DOJ selected VAX for the 20 U.S. Attorneys' Offices. Instead, DOJ selected PRIME.

Second, contrary to the assertion in the Bua Report, INSLAW did have a version of public domain PROMIS that was frozen and bug free. The U. S . Attorneys' Offices in San Diego and Newark were each operating the Pilot Project version of PROMIS, and INSLAW was supporting that version and keeping it "bug free." The five BJS enhancements had not been created at the time of the original Pilot Project implementation. Whatever hardware DOJ selected would also be used to replace the hardware in the San Diego and Newark Pilot Project offices. Consequently, while INSLAW ultimately would have to implement the Pilot Project version, as supplemented by the BJS enhancements in each of the two Pilot Project offices as well as in the other 20 largest U.S. Attorneys' Offices, INSLAW could not reasonably have begun to add the five BJS enhancements to the bug-free Pilot Project version until DOJ made its computer hardware selection. DOJ had not made its selection of the hardware by the time DOJ demanded the time- sharing version of PROMIS.

Third, the conclusion of the Bua Report that DOJ was unaware of the fact that the version it sought contained the proprietary enhancements is wrong. It is undisputed that during the period of time before DOJ selected its hardware, it was understood that INSLAW would accommodate DOJ by allowing the larger offices access to INSLAW's computer in Maryland (not Virginia) on a time- sharing basis. It was expected that DOJ would order the hardware promptly, so that this accommodation would be short term. Since it was not possible to implement the contracted-for version until the hardware was selected, there was no reason to maintain a separate copy of that version, and DOJ certainly knew this fact.

For this temporary time-sharing accommodation to DOJ, INSLAW used its proprietary VAX version of PROMIS in which other proprietary enhancements also had been included ("the time- sharing version") There was no contractual requirement that INSLAW provide DOJ with this time-sharing software, and therefore INSLAW had, quite properly, not anticipated that DOJ would demand the underlying software which contained these proprietary enhancements. Indeed, no one connected to the contract ever contemplated the delivery to DOJ of the time-sharing version, since this version was being used merely as a short-term accommodation.

As

>>6274589DOJ

was not expected ever to take delivery of the time-sharing version, INSLAW could reasonably have planned to use its proprietary version in the time-sharing service, because this improved version would enable INSLAW to provide more responsive time-sharing services to each of the largest U.S. Attorneys' Offices.

When DOJ demanded that INSLAW turn over its PROMIS software, DOJ still had not selected either the minicomputer or the word processing hardware that would ultimately be used to run minicomputer PROMIS at the 20 larger offices and the word processor-based case tracking software at the 74 smaller offices. Thus, DOJ was not at that time prepared to implement the version of PROMIS called for under the terms of the contract and, indeed, INSLAW could not prepare the contracted-for version of PROMIS for DOJ until DOJ had decided which minicomputer hardware to procure. Therefore, when DOJ used the pretense of threatened termination of advance payments as leverage to obtain the software, it had to know that it was seeking the enhanced time-sharing version of PROMIS to which it was not entitled under the contract, and which DOJ understood contained proprietary enhancements belonging to INSLAW.

Finally, contrary to the assertion in the Bua Report, whether DOJ had knowledge that it was seeking the time-sharing version at the time it sent its initial request letter is not a critical issue, because DOJ clearly understood that it was seeking the proprietary version at the time it negotiated Modification 12. By that time, there is no dispute that DOJ was aware that the software it was demanding was the version containing the proprietary enhancements. Even the Bua Report concedes that by the time the parties were negotiating Modification 12, INSLAW had informed DOJ that the VAX version of PROMIS being provided under the time-sharing arrangements contained enhancements that INSLAW considered proprietary. (Page 136)

In fact, beginning at least as early as February 4, 1983, when DOJ and INSLAW met to discuss DOJ's threatened discontinuation of the advance payment provision, DOJ specifically was put on notice that its simultaneous demand for the underlying software would require INSLAW to turn over the proprietary version of that software. Immediately upon learning of this fact, there is no dispute that DOJ refused to resolve the advance payment issue independently of the software issue, notwithstanding that the two issues were unrelated. Indeed, as even the Bua Report acknowledged, "from at least this point on, DOJ collapsed the negotiations of the advance payment dispute into the negotiations of the software request and the proprietary rights issue." (Page 28) Thus, when DOJ used the pretense of threatened termination of advance payments as leverage to obtain the enhanced time-sharing software, it knowingly set out to obtain a version of PROMIS to which it was not entitled under the contract, and which DOJ understood contained proprietary enhancements belonging to INSLAW.

Even if DOJ started out to obtain nothing more than the contracted-for version (albeit for improper purposes), DOJ clearly was seeking the proprietary version at the time it put into effect its plan to "get the goods"6 via Modification 12. As such, the absence of evidence that DOJ knew, when it initially requested a copy of the PROMIS codes, that it would obtain something other than the contract version is irrelevant; the evidence is undisputed that it knew that it was going to receive the proprietary version when it set about to obtain that version without any intention to negotiate in good faith over its use. Thus, there is no "great weakness" in Judge Bason's conversion theory.

>>62745963. The Negotiation of Modification 12

The parties thereafter entered into negotiations to resolve both the proprietary rights and advance payment issues, ultimately resulting in the execution of Modification 12 to the contract. The Bua Report acknowledges that, without regard to whatever rights DOJ had to the software prior to Modification 12, DOJ clearly was "bargaining away" some of its rights when it agreed to enter into Modification 12, and moreover, was obligating itself to "live up" to the terms of that Modification. (Page 136-137)

Under this Modification, INSLAW agreed to turn over its proprietary software on the basis of certain explicit commitments by DOJ. First, DOJ was to bargain in good faith to identify the proprietary enhancements contained within enhanced PROMIS. Second, DOJ was to decide within a reasonable time which enhancements it wanted to use, and to the extent that it did not want to use certain of these enhancements, to direct INSLAW to remove the enhancements it did not want. Third, DOJ was to bargain in good faith with INSLAW as to the price to be paid for those enhancements it did want.

The bankruptcy court found that DOJ never intended to meet its commitments under Modification 12 and that once DOJ had received Enhanced PROMIS pursuant to Modification 12, DOJ thereafter refused to bargain in good faith with INSLAW. DOJ instead "engaged in an outrageous, deceitful, fraudulent game of cat and mouse, demonstrating contempt for both the law and any principle of fair dealing." While conceding that DOJ's conduct following execution of Modification 12 was subject to criticism and demonstrated "poor judgment," the Bua Report rejected the bankruptcy court's finding of DOJ fraud under Modification 12, based largely upon its post hoc meetings with Rugh and Videnieks:

Bankruptcy Judge Bason found that DOJ "never intended to meet its commitment" under Modification 12. We do not believe the evidence supports this finding. The weight of the evidence demonstrates that the DOJ employees involved reviewed INSLAW's submissions in good faith, and responded in ways that they subjectively believed were within the government's legitimate rights under the contract. We find no evidence of bad faith or intentional wrongdoing.

This conclusion is belied by any reasonable and objective review of the facts relating to this matter. It is also belied by the very reasoning adopted by the authors of the Bua Report. The authors conclude that DOJ had an affirmative obligation to "live up" to the procedures contained in Modification 12 and in a March 18, 1983 letter written by Videnieks which provides the foundation for Modification 12. Together, these documents clearly obligated DOJ to negotiate in good faith with INSLAW to determine which of the enhancements were proprietary and, thereafter, which of those enhancements DOJ wanted to be included in the software delivered under the contract. The Bua Report found that DOJ failed to negotiate with INSLAW regarding an acceptable methodology for determining which enhancements were proprietary. Indeed, the Bua Report concluded that DOJ refused to accept the methodology proposed by INSLAW, refused to explain the basis of that rejection, and refused to provide INSLAW with the methodology that would be acceptable to DOJ. In fact, the Bua Report concluded that "[i]t is difficult for us to see a good reason not to tell INSLAW what criticism DOJ had of INSLAW's methodology … it was in neither party's interest to have INSLAW guessing about what was the problem with the methodology." (Page 139) Yet, notwithstanding having concluded that DOJ was obligated to negotiate in good faith to live up to its commitments under the Modification, and having concluded that DOJ failed to do so for no "good reason," the Bua Report concludes that these two failures were not done in bad faith. By definition alone, they most certainly were. Moreover, when put in context, DOJ's actions clearly were a continuation of the ongoing bad faith conduct directed at INSLAW during the entirety of the contract.

>>6274598By way of background, when DOJ persisted in its attempts to tie resolution of the advance payment issue to the proprietary rights issue, INSLAW initially proposed that the parties enter into an escrow agreement pursuant to which DOJ would receive the software if, and only if, INSLAW went into bankruptcy. (PX 68; Hamilton, T. 167-168; Brewer, T. 1693-1694; Merrill, T. 791)

Although certain DOJ personnel recommended INSLAW's third- party escrow proposal, it was rejected by Brewer and Videnieks, because they could not thereby immediately obtain the software. (PX 73) Videnieks and Brewer discussed this issue on or about March 28, 1983 and decided to propose a letter response to INSLAW's government contracts counsel, Harvey Sherzer, indicating DOJ's intent "to back off [Advance payments] discontinuation and promising non-dissemination [of PROMIS software] in return for delivery of information demanded on 12/6~ (PX 73) Videnieks prepared a draft of this letter which Brewer then rewrote (PX 73). This letter was submitted to William Snider, Administrative Counsel for Procurement, who previously had indicated his preference for a bilateral agreement between the parties embodied in a contract modification. (PX 73)

A March 28 memo further recounts that Videnieks was in full agreement with Brewer about the letter, indicating quite significantly ". . . why do you need signature if you got the goods?" (PX 73; Videnieks, T. 1837-1838)

Snider quickly responded to the Brewer/Videnieks proposal on March 29, "sharply disagreeing on this approach." (Videnieks, T. 1838) At this point, Brewer "forbade" Videnieks from entering into a "Mod" of the contract. (PX 73)7 Brewer did not want a bilateral agreement if he could "get the goods" without it. (Brewer, T. 1704-1705)

On April 5, 1983 Videnieks and Brewer had a telephone conversation in which Brewer told Videnieks that he would "protect" him from "backing down" to Sherzer and Hamilton. (PX 73) After this conversation, Videnieks checked with Snider and "MH" [INSLAW's comptroller, Murray Hannon], who confirmed that a contract modification protecting INSLAW's proprietary enhancements was a precondition to INSLAW's delivery of the software. (PX 73; Brewer, T. 1208) Brewer understood that INSLAW wanted such protection and that INSLAW would remove any enhancements that DOJ did not want. (Brewer, T. 1708-1709)

DOJ's March 18, 1983 response to INSLAW's March 11 escrow agreement proposal dismissed the proposal but did offer, in consideration of "getting the goods," to agree not to disseminate or disclose the PROMIS software beyond EOUSA and the U.S. Attorney's Offices enumerated in the PROMIS contract pending resolution and negotiation of the proprietary enhancements issue "until the data rights of the parties to the contract are resolved." (PX 70; PX 71; Merrill, T. 792; Brewer, T. 1689-1690; Hamilton, T. 168) This proposal by Videnieks was basically the methodology proposed and discussed at the February 4, 1983 meeting. (Merrill, T. 792)

The March 18 letter also stated that once the "data rights" issue was resolved, DOJ would review INSLAW's proprietary enhancements to decide which (if any) enhancements DOJ desired to include in the PROMIS Contract software. (PX 70; PX 71)

Videnieks specifically stated in his March 18 letter that after the proprietary enhancements issue was resolved, DOJ:

. . . will review the effect of any enhancements which are determined to be proprietary, and then either direct INSLAW to delete those enhancements from the versions of PROMIS to be delivered under the contract or negotiate with INSLAW regarding the inclusion of those enhancements in that software. The Government would then either destroy or return the "enhanced" versions of PROMIS in exchange for the Government PROMIS software including only those enhancements that should be included in the software. If this course of action is acceptable to INSLAW there would be no need for an escrow agreement. (PX 70; PX 71; Videnieks, T. 1813-1815)