OIG THEORY
If the OIG found no intentional DOJ and FBI malfeasance in their June '18 report on 2016 FBI conduct/activity (Clinton-Trump), what's the likelihood of the same OIG finding malfeasance as it relates to DOJ/FBI FISA activity and the exact same people?
Think about it.
The 2018 report found no DOJ/FBI misconduct (only some bad judgement). There were no criminal referrals. There were recommendations for internal improvement, which Director Wray said the FBI would implement.
The June OIG report was the second OIG report of 2018 attached to the FBI (first was FBI media leaks which did result in McCabe referral). And the June report covered the totality of DOJ and FBI activity throughout 2016.
Three months prior to the June 2018 OIG final report being published, in March 2018 the third angle of the OIG review was opened. This third OIG review is specific to issues around FISA. This is the one all are awaiting.
It's important to note the Office of Inspector General FISA review/investigation of potential FISA abuses (opened March) was launched three months prior to the "Election Activity" final report in June 2016.
The time frame covered by the "Election Activity" review (OIG report 2) and the "FISA Activity" review (OIG report 3) are the same. The topics are different (FISA being more specific), but the people under review and time-frame therein are identical.
Three months after announcing the "FISA specific review", the OIG produced report 2 and stated there was no intentionally corrupt behavior the IG office could identify in the conduct of DOJ and FBI officials in 2016; only some very questionable judgement.
No criminal referrals were made as a result of the June OIG report; and by the time the "election review" report was finalized many of the reviewed FBI and DOJ officials had resigned, retired or been fired. [The remaining exits came shortly thereafter]
The question: If the OIG found no intentional corrupt activity in the June '18 report (only bad judgement); no referrals were made; and time period and people are exactly the same; how can the OIG produce a post-facto FISA review report with substantively different conclusions?
Bruce Ohr is likely still employed for the same reason the dispatch of Strzok was delayed. The OIG and INSD (inspection division) can only reach those still inside the system.
On the narrow issue of how the DOJ and FBI assembled, handled and used the FISA application, and subsequent Title-1 surveillance warrant, against the Trump campaign (and officials therein), Bruce Ohr is a key and central witness for the OIG.
Unlike the previous OIG report #2 (Election-era Issues) if the OIG can find direct and intentional "gross misconduct" (by referencing traditional and historic FISA application assembly therein), toward those officials who participated in the FISA assembly then it becomes possible the OIG report could potentially outline the FISA application resulted in serious fourth amendment civil rights violations.
And that could be a narrow opening toward legal issues for DOJ and FBI officials who participated in assembling an intentional fraudulently-based application to the FISA court.
Unfortunately, that approach is a very high bar for the OIG to reach. Again, the OIG would have to find "direct evidence" of "gross misconduct" resulting in civil rights violations. The defensive arguments would be filled w/ legal justification(s) and internal process discussion.
Unfortunately x 2, such outlined "fourth amendment" FISA abuse finding would also be adverse to the interests of a larger U.S. intelligence apparatus, and institutional participants, who rely on utilization of the FISA process and would seek to protect it.
I suspect the officials who abused the FISA court are also relying upon the necessity of the FISA process to protect themselves from too much scrutiny and sunlight.
An example of that reality is found with HPSCI Chairman Devin Nunes advocating for FISA renewal April '18.
As HPSCI Chairman @DevinNunes knew (still knows) the FISA process was abused for corrupt intent; however, he also knows it is a critical component and tool for the U.S. intelligence system and national security. Currently he is advocating for a much larger conversation about it.
All of this reflects how complex the institutional issues are.
I suspect the initial media reports on the completion of IG Horowitz's "reconciler phase", and first-draft report going to principle stakeholders, will surface sometime in April.