Anonymous ID: 70b336 May 22, 2019, 7:24 a.m. No.6557739   🗄️.is 🔗kun

>>6557717

Open skies is an international policy concept that calls for the liberalization of the rules and regulations of the international

aviation industry—especially commercial aviation—in order to create a free-market environment for the airline industry.

Its primary objectives are: to liberalize the rules for international aviation markets and minimize government intervention

as it applies to passenger, all-cargo, and combination air transportation as well as scheduled and charter services; and

to adjust the regime under which military and other state-based flights may be permitted.

>https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_skies

Anonymous ID: 70b336 May 22, 2019, 7:32 a.m. No.6557788   🗄️.is 🔗kun   >>7828

>>6557779

The Treaty on Open Skies entered into force on January 1, 2002, and currently has 34 party states. It establishes a program of unarmed aerial surveillance flights over the entire territory of its participants. The treaty is designed to enhance mutual understanding and confidence by giving all participants, regardless of size, a direct role in gathering information about military forces and activities of concern to them. Open Skies is one of the most wide-ranging international efforts to date promoting openness and transparency of military forces and activities.

>https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_on_Open_Skies

Anonymous ID: 70b336 May 22, 2019, 8:23 a.m. No.6558110   🗄️.is 🔗kun   >>8175

>>6557828

Investigators uncovered a lot of surprises during their analysis of the incident. They found, for example, that the crew had a lot of unnecessary classified data onboard, which was needlessly put at risk of compromise. They had, for example, entire codebooks as well as nearly a month’s worth of top-secret keying material — which the military used to secure its communications — that wasn’t going to be put in use until well after their flight mission ended.

 

The exposure wasn’t detrimental since the military changed its keys daily and within 15 hours after the spy plane landed in China, authorities had retired all of that day’s keys and replaced them with new ones. But a worldwide key the military used to authenticate GPS data had 250,000 users worldwide, and they all had to be notified before the key could be replaced — this took nearly two weeks.

 

The concern about the exposed crypto material wasn’t that China could use the keys to decrypt that day’s U.S. communications, but that it provided insight into U.S. cryptologic methods. The U.S. used “high quality randomization and strong fail-safe designs” in its keying material and crypto devices, the investigators noted. If China studied the material to incorporate similar designs into its own systems, it would make it harder for the U.S. to analyze PRC communications in the future.

 

But the excess crypto keys weren’t the only unnecessary data on the plane. The crew also had the names of intelligence personnel — U.S. and foreign partners — who weren’t on the plane, including several dozen employees of the NSA and NSGA Misawa. The data included names, addresses, social security numbers, and a description of official duties for U.S. personnel. The exposure, investigators worried, could have an adverse impact on future assignments and travel plans for affected personnel.

 

In addition to this, the crew had a manual onboard that provided a comprehensive overview of how the U.S. exploits signals and nearly two dozen U.S. Signals Intelligence Directives, or excerpts of these directives, many of which weren’t critical to the crew’s mission. Issued by the NSA director, the directives lay out policy for SIGINT activities, and some of these included detailed instructions for collecting, processing, and distributing intercepts. Three of the directives were particularly sensitive. They included special procedures for signals-recognition and reporting; specific targets of interest for signals collection in China, North Korea, the Philippines, Cambodia, Vietnam and Thailand; as well as information that China could have used to inject false data into intercepts.

 

As for materials and equipment that were critical to the crew’s mission, the plane had six carry-on computers, two of which were the most sensitive systems onboard. They contained a suite of software tools for collecting, analyzing, and processing communications intelligence, foreign instrumentation signals, and electronic intelligence signals. All of the data and software on these systems was compromised.

 

One of the systems was used for processing what are known as PROFORMA communications. These are communications between command-and-control centers and radar systems, weapon systems, surface-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft artillery, and fighter aircraft. The computer contained detailed information for processing more than two-dozen PROFORMA communications for North Korea, Russia, Vietnam, China, and U.S. allies.

 

>https://theintercept.com/2017/04/10/snowden-documents-reveal-scope-of-secrets-exposed-to-china-in-2001-spy-plane-incident/