dChan
Anonymous ID: 4740fc July 21, 2019, 8:26 p.m. No.7127860   🗄️.is 🔗kun   >>8050 >>8426

>>7127804

Bear Stearns, JPMorgan Chase, and Maiden Lane LLC

 

Background

In March 2008, The Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. (Bear Stearns) was one of the largest securities firms in the country, with reported total consolidated assets of nearly $400 billion. Bear Stearns engaged in a broad range of activities, including investment banking, securities and derivatives trading and clearing, brokerage services, and originating and securitizing commercial and residential mortgage loans. Financial conditions for the firm deteriorated markedly between mid-January and mid-March 2008. On March 13, 2008, Bear Stearns notified the Federal Reserve that it expected that it would not have enough funding or liquid assets to meet its financial obligations the following day and would not be able to find a private-sector source of alternative financing.

 

The imminent insolvency of Bear Stearns, the large presence of Bear Stearns in several important financial markets (including, in particular, the markets for repo-style transactions, over-the-counter derivative and foreign exchange transactions, mortgage-backed securities, and securities clearing services), and the potential for contagion to similarly situated firms raised significant concern that the stability of financial markets would be seriously disrupted if Bear Stearns were suddenly unable to meet its obligations to counterparties, and the extension of credit allowed for an orderly resolution of the firm.

 

Bridge Loan

To address the immediate liquidity needs of Bear Stearns and forestall the potential systemic disruptions that a default or bankruptcy of the company would have caused in the already stressed credit markets, on Friday, March 14, 2008, the Federal Reserve Board authorized the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) to extend credit to Bear Stearns through JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (JPMC Bank). The purpose of this bridge loan was to ensure that Bear Stearns would meet its obligations as they came due that day, allowing for time during the weekend for Bear Stearns to explore options with other financial institutions that might enable it to avoid bankruptcy and for policymakers to continue to seek ways to contain the risk to financial markets in the event no private-sector solution proved possible. The loan to Bear Stearns was in the amount of $12.9 billion and was secured by assets of Bear Stearns with a value of $13.8 billion. The rate of interest on this loan was the rate for primary credit. The FRBNY received no warrantsor any other potential equity of either JPMC Bank or Bear Stearns in exchange for the loan, and the loan was made without recourse to JPMC Bank. On the morning of Monday, March 17, the $12.9 billion was repaid in full to the FRBNY with interest of nearly $4 million.

 

The bridge loan was extended under the authority of Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, which permitted the Board, in unusual and exigent circumstances, to authorize Reserve Banks to extend credit to individuals, partnerships, and corporations.

 

Maiden Lane LLC

Despite the receipt by Bear Stearns of Federal Reserve funding through a bridge loan on March 14, 2008, market pressures on Bear Stearns worsened that day and during the weekend. Bear Stearns likely would have been unable to avoid bankruptcy on Monday, March 17, without either very large injections of liquidity from the Federal Reserve or an acquisition by a stronger firm. JPMorgan Chase and Co. (JPMC) emerged as the only viable bidder for Bear Stearns, and on Sunday, March 16, Bear Stearns accepted an offer to merge with JPMC.

 

However, JPMC was concerned about its ability to absorb a portion of Bear Stearn's mortgage trading portfolio, given the uncertainty about the scale of potential losses facing the financial system at the time and strained credit markets.

 

To facilitate a prompt acquisition of Bear Stearns by JPMC, the FRBNY created a limited liability company, Maiden Lane LLC, to acquire that set of assets of Bear Stearns. The FRBNY extended credit to the LLC, which would then manage those assets through time to maximize the repayment of credit extended to the LLC and to minimize disruption to financial markets. Maiden Lane LLC purchased approximately $30 billion in assets from Bear Stearns with a loan of approximately $29 billion from the FRBNY.

https://www.federalreserve.gov/regreform/reform-bearstearns.htm

 

Maiden Lane II and III (AIG)

https://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Maiden_Lane_II_and_III_(AIG)

Anonymous ID: 4740fc July 21, 2019, 8:57 p.m. No.7128121   🗄️.is 🔗kun

>>7128033

It certainly had enough volume to do it on that date. And at it's absolute high since IPO. Circle with red bar

Been much dumpage on big volume on that through out it's life

 

https://stockcharts.com/h-sc/ui

Anonymous ID: 4740fc July 21, 2019, 9:13 p.m. No.7128249   🗄️.is 🔗kun   >>8328

>>7127839

His record sucks…and this is with insider information?? The longest one in brunswick at 44 days. He entered it just prior to Q3 closing (September 11th no less) and his exit was one day before Q3 earnings release.

It shit the bed HARD on that release.

No question Insider information

Cap#2

https://stockcharts.com/h-sc/ui

Anonymous ID: 4740fc July 21, 2019, 9:25 p.m. No.7128328   🗄️.is 🔗kun

>>7128249

his patterns on all the others on that list are just a few days at most. He hold one for that long and it dumps the day after. Fits the profile of an average trader at best because most of his trades are when the insider's at each company know the results. Just prior to qtr closing and the amounts he pushed around he should have done much better for the status the industry afforded him as a financial 'wizard' and deal-maker.