>>7284505
Anon here speaks with authority, like a friend of mine I pay very close attention to.
https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/nuclear-submarine-dismantlement/
Dismantling nuclear submarines is an expensive task, costing an estimated $6 to $10 million per submarine. Yet, there is no good, cheap alternative to dismantling out-of-service submarines. Almost half of Russia's 183 officially decommissioned nuclear submarines still carry full loads of fuel. Since most Russian submarines have two reactors, this means that nearly 150 nuclear reactors must be kept operating in submarines manned by skeleton crews. If these nuclear submarines are not safely defueled and dismantled, their reactors could be damaged or sabotaged, causing widespread environmental damage.
The proliferation threat these vessels pose is global, due to the large amounts of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium—the key ingredients of nuclear weapons—contained in their spent fuel. The fresh nuclear fuel used in most Russian submarines is enriched to contain 21-45% uranium-235 (U-235); twenty-four submarines used fuel enriched to 90% U-235. A typical reactor core full of spent fuel may therefore contain dozens of kilograms of U-235, and several kilograms of plutonium-239. Without a system to ensure the safe management of partially dismantled submarines and the nuclear materials removed from them, proliferation-sensitive materials, and perhaps even nuclear fuel, could be stolen.
Another concern is that Russian submarines might be sold rather than scrapped, giving a significant boost in naval power to the recipient country. Russia could then sell proliferation-sensitive HEU fuel to the purchasing country without International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards applying, since the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) does not require such safeguards for naval fuel sales.
Obstacles to DismantlementThree major technical obstacles currently prevent greater progress in Russian submarine dismantlement efforts: (1) inadequate spent fuel storage and transport capabilities; (2) the slow work pace of existing dismantlement lines; and (3) the lack of facilities for long-term storage of highly radioactive reactor compartments. Spent fuel storage sites have not been centralized, making them more difficult to protect, and most are at or beyond capacity. Traditionally, spent submarine fuel was sent by rail to the Mayak Chemical Combine in Siberia, several thousand kilometers away from either coast. During the Soviet era, there were just five railcars capable of safely moving this fuel to Mayak. Even with four new cars, completed in 2000 with Norwegian funds, the backlog is tremendous. Moreover, technical and financial problems have severely slowed the rate of spent fuel reprocessing at Mayak.
Beyond the problem of spent fuel storage, Russia's naval shipyards face critical shortages of equipment, material, personnel, and infrastructure support. There are long lines of vessels waiting to be dismantled at the facilities, which have been receiving Western assistance. In addition, U.S. policy does not provide for the long-term maintenance of equipment provided to the yards, bringing into question the issue of whether these yards will be able to continue their work. Nerpa, a Northern Fleet shipyard, has already begun attack submarine dismantlement, but is not receiving any funding, putting the scrapping in jeopardy. In addition, many decommissioned submarines are located at shipyards without dismantlement equipment.
The lack of plans for final disposition of contaminated reactor compartments is another obstacle to dismantlement. This problem is a serious threat to the environment: Russian experts estimate that these vessels will remain seaworthy only for about 15 years, before salt water rusts through their sides and threatens to sink them. Unfortunately, these hulls will remain radioactive for hundreds of years.
Given its economic problems, Russia has relied upon foreign assistance to support its dismantlement efforts. The United States has provided the most assistance, while Japan, Norway, the European Union, and a few other countries have also contributed funds. United States assistance is provided by the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, administered by the Department of Defense, and the Nuclear Materials Security Task Force Program, run by the Department of Energy (DOE). The CTR program has a mandate to assist in the elimination of 564 launchers for submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and the dismantlement of 36 SSBNs, while DOE has pursued programs to upgrade accounting and physical protection at selected sites, provide supplemental physical protection measures for refueling ships, and consolidate fresh fuel to one central facility for each fleet.