That's correct. However, recall that Rogers shut them out in 2016 AFTER THE DATA HAD BEEN AUTHORIZED BY OUTSIDE FBI CONTRACTORS WITHOUT A WARRANT.
FISA/Russia was attempted coverup of UNAUTHORIZED SPYING POLITICAL OF MULTIPLE (Cruz, Carson, Trump) OPPONENTS. Think Watergate times a million.
Why wouldn't FISC do anything in 2018? Access previously closed. Investigations ongoing and TRAPS SET (re: Perjure) See: House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on May 23, 2017:
Mr. Gowdy: “Do you know if the bureau ever relied on the Steele dossier as any — as part of any court filings, applications, petitions, pleadings?”
Mr. Brennan: “I have no awareness.”
FISC/Rogers timeline:
Rogers shut out unauthoirzed access and informed Trump, who then moved transion ops out of Trump Tower.
Rogers presented his findings directly to the FISA court’s presiding judge, Rosemary Collyer, informing her of ongoing FISA abuses by the FBI and NSD just three days after Collyer personally signed the Carter Page FISA warrant. Collyer and Rogers would work together for the next six months, addressing the issues that Rogers had uncovered. These efforts are disclosed in Collyer’s April 2017 ruling.
Following the Dec. 9, 2019 issuance of the IG report, Horowitz also announced an ongoing audit of the FBI’s actions in relation to the FISA application process:
“Additionally, in light of the significant concerns we identified, the OIG announced this week that we were initiating an audit that will further examine the FBI’s compliance with the Wood’s procedures in FISA applications that target U.S. persons, not only in counter-intelligence investigations, but also importantly in counter-terrorism investigations,” Horowitz said in his testimony.
Rogers shut down all “about query” activity on Oct. 21, 2016. “About queries” are particularly worrisome, since they occur when the target is neither the sender nor the recipient of the collected communication; rather, the target’s “query,” such as an email address, is being passed between two other communicants.
Collyer focused much of her April 2017 criticisms on the FBI and noted that she appeared to have material reservations regarding the FBI’s compliance and ongoing actions, despite her ruling (P. 87):
“The Court is nonetheless concerned about the FBI’s apparent disregard of minimization rules and whether the FBI may be engaging in similar disclosures of raw Section 702 information that have not been reported.”
Collyer’s April 2017 ruling was precipitated by a series of events that began on March 9, 2016, when a discovery was made that outside contractors for the FBI had been accessing raw FISA data since at least 2015. This led to immediate action by NSA Director Rogers, who directed the NSA’s Office of Compliance to conduct a “fundamental baseline review of compliance associated with 702” at some point in early April 2016 (Senate testimony & pages 83–84 of court ruling).
On April 18, 2016, Rogers moved aggressively in response to the disclosures. He abruptly shut down all FBI outside-contractor access. At this point, both the FBI and the DOJ’s NSD became aware of Rogers’s compliance review. They may have known earlier, but they were certainly aware after outside-contractor access was halted.