Anonymous ID: 94dfa3 Dec. 23, 2019, 7:27 a.m. No.7598772   🗄️.is 🔗kun   >>8885 >>9037 >>9114 >>9155

>>7598567

lb/pb, newf

 

https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/91-740.ZO.html

''WALTER L. NIXON, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES et al.

on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit

[January 13, 1993]

 

Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.'''

….. In the case before us, there is no separate provision of the Constitution which could be defeated by allowing the Senate final authority to determine the meaning of the word "try" in the Impeachment Trial Clause. We agree with Nixon that courts possess power to review either legislative or executive action that transgresses identifiable textual limits. As we have made clear, "whether the action of [either the Legislative or Executive Branch] exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution." Baker v. Carr, supra, at 211; accord, Powell, supra, at 521. But we conclude, after exercising that delicate responsibility, that the word "try" in the Impeachment Clause does not provide an identifiable textual limit on the authority which is committed to the Senate.

 

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is

 

Affirmed.