Admiral Rogers, this is to you. There's a lot of news

reporting, much of it inaccurate, that characterizes Section

702 as a means of targeting U.S. persons. We know that

targeting U.S. persons is prohibited, as it is what is termed

``reverse targeting.'' Could you explain and clarify the

reverse targeting prohibition? And what does it prevent the IC

from targeting and collecting?

Admiral Rogers. So reverse targeting is designed to

preclude our ability to bypass the law. And what do I mean by

that? The law is expressly designed to ensure that we are not

using this legal framework as a capability to target U.S.

persons. Reverse targeting is the following scenario: Say we're

interested in generating insight on U.S. person A. We know that

we can't get a Title I, we can't get a FISA warrant. So under

the idea of reverse targeting, the theory would be, well, why

don't you just target a foreign entity that that U.S. person

talks to, and then you'll get all the insights you want on the

U.S. person, but you'll have bypassed the court process, you'll

have bypassed the entire legal structure. 702 specifically

reminds us we cannot do that. We cannot use 702 as a vehicle to

bypass other laws or to target U.S. persons. Admiral Rogers Testimony. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open-hearing-fisa-legislation-0#

>>7891052

Chairman Burr. Can you–last question. Can you please

clarify for members and for the public, what's meant by

``incidental collection''?

Admiral Rogers. Incidental collection–and the statute

itself, if you read the law, the statute acknowledges that in

the execution of this framework we will encounter U.S. persons.

We call that incidental collection.

That happens under two scenarios. Number one, which is

about 90 percent of the time: We are monitoring two foreign

individuals, and those foreign entities talk about or reference

a U.S. person. The second scenario that we encounter what we

call incidental collection is we are targeting a valid foreign

individual and that valid foreign individual, a foreign

intelligence target, ends up having a conversation with a U.S.

person that's not the target of our collection. It's not why we

are monitoring it in the first place. We're interested in that

foreign target. That happens, of the times we have incidental

collection, that scenario happens about 10 percent of the time.

Chairman Burr. And were that incidental collection to

happen, do you have a procedure in place in both instances to

minimize that?

Admiral Rogers. We do. The law specifically gives a set of

processes that we have to follow. So if we do encounter a U.S.

person incidentally in the course of our collection, we ask

ourselves several questions. Number one, are we looking at

potential criminal activity? If we do that, we have a

requirement to report or to inform the Department of Justice

and the FBI, and they make the determination if it's illegal or

not. We are an intelligence organization, not a law enforcement

organization.

The second question we ask ourselves: Is there anything in

this conversation that would lead us to believe that we're

talking about harm to individuals? In that case, we do report

it. If we think we're dealing with something that is criminal

or there's harm to individuals, we report it.

Other than that, unless there is a valid intelligence

purpose, depending on the authority in a case of 702, we

specifically purge the data. We remove it. We don't put it into

our holdings. If we don't assess that there's intelligence

value and it's a U.S. person, we have to purge the data.

I wonder if as many people that cried over Hillary are going to cry of [F]? THE ENTIRE STATE DEPARTMENT was under investigation! https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/press-room/Article/1618699/nsa-stops-certain-section-702-upstream-activities/