>>7917294 (PB)

Telecoms security fag reporting for duty.

Switching off encryption between cell phone and tower, then monitoring the cell phone via FB plug-ins using a data-sharing agreement will work as a means of attack. However, this doesn't tell the whole story for mobile comms.

If comms between a cell and a handset are set to no encryption, it would be possible to listen into a call (man-in-the-middle attack (MOM)) locally. However, once you get into the cell network - i.e. comms between cellsites, the mobile core network and the internet everything is encrypted. Breaking into this traffic is not easy, as all the comms run across proprietary networks.

In order to configure an individual cell site for no encryption, you'd need to have access to the management networks and you'd need to know which cell site you wanted to target. This is on the assumption that the target phone is not roaming and switching between cells in real-time. Although Huawei do have access to the management systems for support purposes, access is still controlled and monitored by the telecoms providers.

In short, turning off encryption to individual cell sites to force a mobile phone to communicate in clear is a rubbish idea. Because phones roam and switch cell sites regularly, you'd either have to target the entire network, which is a risky proposition as you'd only get to do it once, or else take aim at an individual cell site of interest and MOM the crap out of it. There are no doubt many cell sites of interest in Washington DC, and comping these would let an attacker target senators and congressmen. The security services should be monitoring the hell out of what's going on there, as such prime targets are known to all sides.

If you want to monitor calls on a cell phone then a better way to do it is to intercept the call data pre or post encryption. At which point the use of cell towers for setting encryption levels becomes irrelevant.