Turkey’s Strategy Is Pushing It Into A Corner
The situation in Idlib has long been shaped by the balance of talks between Russia and Turkey, and to a lesser extent Iran.
The bifurcation point was the Sochi Agreement of 2018, when Russia and Iran recognized Turkey’s right to control the situation in Idlib until the end of the war, up to the formation of the Constitutional Committee and presidential elections, while Ankara agreed to accept Syrian President Bashar al-Assad if he wins the elections.
Turkey had to do three things for that to happen: separate the actual terrorists from the “moderate opposition” and remove all heavy weapons from the area, unblock the Hama-Aleppo and Latakia-Aleppo routes (while the surrounding area remained in control of militants) and ensure that the de-escalation zone is actually effective, in conjunction with the Russian military.
Turkey didn’t carry out any of its obligations, irrespective if it could or it couldn’t.
As the Syrian Arab Army cleared other territories of Syria, the situation in Idlib did not fundamentally change.
A year after Sochi, part of the rural Idlib was taken from the militants. Erdogan did not understand which way the wind was blowing, he had a tactic and he adhered to it.
The Syrian government constantly demanded that Russia give the go-ahead for the offensive, and in the end, it got it, and the operation in Idlib began.
A situation arose, in which Turkey could come to the negotiation table for a post-war Syria without Idlib. This, in the long run would weaken the negotiating position of Turkey and its ability to influence the formation of post-war Syria.
Ankara began issuing complaints to Moscow and point out that the Syrian Arab Army is surrounding its observation posts and violates the Sochi agreement.
Moscow pointed out that Turkey did nothing for 1.5 years to fulfill the main points of the Sochi agreement, and thus, Assad’s government is in his own right.
And while Erdogan was stirring up drama and spreading propaganda in media, the Syrian government, with the support of Russia and Iran, took part of the negotiation asset from Erdogan, thereby changing the potential balance of negotiations on post-war Syria.
Because, it is in the Syrian government’s interest to have as little possible territory outside of its control when the war ends, since that would mean making as few concessions as possible.
By February, Turkey’s strategic loss was obvious, the front of the militants fell apart, dozens of cities began to be liberated, and due to the position of Russia and Iran, any logical moves within the framework of the Turkish Idlib strategy ended.
If Turkey continued to operate as it did before, the Syrian Arab Army would simply surround all Turkish observation posts and within a few months would go to the border with Turkey along the entire border of the Idlib province.
Therefore, tactics and an attempt to stir up the water through threats, supplying ATGMs and MANPADS to militants, attempts to put pressure on the Kremlin and flirting with the United States with the accompanying rhetoric in the media were employed.
https://southfront.org/turkeys-ineffective-strategy-is-pushing-it-into-a-corner/