Anonymous ID: 7ca27e Feb. 24, 2020, 5:48 p.m. No.8238975   🗄️.is 🔗kun   >>9002

>@BardsOfWar

>New podcast.

>EP 73 - Interview with Nate Cane, FBI Whistleblower

>@cain_nate

> tells his story like never before. A true American Patriot talks about the risk he took, the war on his Family, Q and FAITH.

>Let the world learn truth.

Anonymous ID: 7ca27e Feb. 24, 2020, 5:59 p.m. No.8239169   🗄️.is 🔗kun

>>8239046

Page 33 - NGO's, Diaspora Groups (!GOOG Def: the dispersion of the Jews beyond Israel.), MEDIA

>Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO)

NGOs are private, self-governing, non-profit organizations. Their activities (a direct

function of the interests of their donors) are very diverse, but include interests such

as education, health care, environmental protection, human rights, conflict resolu

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tion and similar issues. Some NGOs are implementing partners for U.S. foreign

assistance, but these are a special case and will be discussed separately. Since their

aims are often complimentary to the COIN effort in meeting the needs of a local

33

U.S. GOVERNMENT COUNTERINSURGENCY GUIDE

• JANUARY 2009

population, they should, as far as possible, be consulted to minimize duplication

or gaps in assistance. However, in order to secure freedom of movement, includ

-

ing access to semi-permissive environments, NGOs generally strive to be inde

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pendent, politically neutral, needs-driven organizations. Consequently, they often

try to minimize contact with uniformed military personnel or other governmental

actors, seeking ‘humanitarian space’ in which to operate. In an attempt to address

this difficult dynamic, the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) has created a set of guide

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lines (referenced in Appendix C) for relations between U.S. armed forces and non-

governmental humanitarian organizations. This requirement for separation is not

absolute: despite their best efforts, NGOs will not be seen as neutral by some insur

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gents and where security is problematic, NGOs may rely on government resources

– military and otherwise—for transportation and protection. COIN planning should

take NGO activities into account, although it is unwise to rely on NGOs to provide

key elements of any plan due to their independent status.

Some NGOs may actually promote aims which conflict with or are counter to the

COIN strategy and COIN planners should take care to establish their motivations

and activities before engagement. NGOs that oppose the affected government or

actively forge links with insurgents will create security problems and risks, but they

may also provide opportunities to open channels for negotiation or mediation with

insurgents. Criticism by NGOs can be useful in drawing attention to those issues

where reform actions are necessary. Finally, as an independent and often credible

source of ‘ground truth’ about the areas in which they work, they will be an important source of information to many interested parties.

>Diaspora Groups

Exile or diaspora groups from the affected nation, whether relocated in the U.S. or

elsewhere, will sometimes attempt to influence insurgency situations. They may

sympathize with the insurgents and therefore oppose any intervention on behalf

of the affected nation, or they may offer assistance to the intervention; looking to

play a role in the planning or implementation of a COIN strategy. If they succeed in

having any influence over the situation then it is important for COIN practitioners

to have an accurate picture of their motives, capabilities and relationship with the

affected government, since these are often misunderstood or misrepresented.

>Media

Media is a key actor in a successful information strategy in any COIN campaign. The

U.S. Government is accustomed to interaction with western media groups, but there

is often a weakness in the relationship with regional media in overseas insurgency

situations. This can result in missed opportunities to influence key stakeholders