Anonymous ID: fc76b9 Feb. 24, 2020, 9:49 p.m. No.8241109   🗄️.is 🔗kun   >>1131

http://www.nbcnews.com/id/37847841/ns/us_news-military/t/stanley-mcchrystal-runaway-general/

 

From the start, McChrystal was determined to place his personal stamp on Afghanistan, to use it as a laboratory for a controversial military strategy known as counterinsurgency. COIN, as the theory is known, is the new gospel of the Pentagon brass, a doctrine that attempts to square the military's preference for high-tech violence with the demands of fighting protracted wars in failed states. COIN calls for sending huge numbers of ground troops to not only destroy the enemy, but to live among the civilian population and slowly rebuild, or build from scratch, another nation's government – a process that even its staunchest advocates admit requires years, if not decades, to achieve. The theory essentially rebrands the military, expanding its authority (and its funding) to encompass the diplomatic and political sides of warfare: Think the Green Berets as an armed Peace Corps. In 2006, after Gen. David Petraeus beta-tested the theory during his "surge" in Iraq, it quickly gained a hardcore following of think-tankers, journalists, military officers and civilian officials. Nicknamed "COINdinistas" for their cultish zeal, this influential cadre believed the doctrine would be the perfect solution for Afghanistan.

Anonymous ID: fc76b9 Feb. 24, 2020, 10:02 p.m. No.8241224   🗄️.is 🔗kun   >>1352 >>1505 >>1679 >>1770

https://www.theblaze.com/contributions/the-pentagons-insurgents-david-petraeus-and-the-rise-and-fall-of-the-coindinistas

 

These soldiers led an insurgency of their own against the Pentagon bureaucracy. They championed the adoption of a counterinsurgency doctrine, frequently referred to by the acronym “COIN,” and hence became known as “COINdinistas.” Kaplan draws vivid portraits of the colorful characters that comprised this intellectual and bureaucratic rebellion where the battlefields would be the hallways of the Pentagon, the classrooms at the U.S. Army’s Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth or the plush upholstered offices of the White House. Three of the more significant characters Kaplan outlines include John Nagl, H.R. McMaster and David Kilcullen.

H.R. McMaster, a brash and outspoken Army officer, had boldly published a book early in his career titled Dereliction of Duty which bluntly criticized the Joint Chiefs of Staff for failing to oppose President Johnson’s conduct of the Vietnam War. When McMaster’s promotion to brigadier general was threatened by the old guard, the COIN network came together to rejigger the protocol for the promotion board ensuring that McMaster and other COIN supporters were elevated. (“If McMaster weren’t such a smart-ass, he would have been promoted a long time ago,” groused Army Chief of Staff General George Casey.)