JP 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations Oct 5 2009

[excerpt 1]

[Executive Summary xiv]

Mindset. Conducting successful COIN operations requires an adaptive and flexible mindset. Counterinsurgents must make every effort to reinforce the legitimacy of the HN government in the eyes of the people. Counterinsurgents must understand that the military instrument is only one part of a comprehensive approach for successful COIN Counterinsurgents must also understand the core grievances, drivers of conflict, and friction points between different groups. Cultural awareness facilitates accurate anticipation of the population’s perception of COIN operations. These perceptions can determine the success or failure of COIN operations.

The military contribution to countering insurgency, while vital, is not as important as political efforts for long-term success. Military efforts are especially important initially to gain security. The national strategy, military strategy, and theater strategy play key roles in determining COIN strategic context. There are three possible general strategic settings for US involvement in COIN: assisting a functioning government as part of FID, as an adjunct to US major combat operations, or US operations in an ungoverned area.

The potential global and regional scope of contemporary insurgency has added to the complexity and therefore the challenge of conducting COIN. This challenge requires a global or regional COIN strategic approach for success. A strategy of disaggregation includes the following activities: containment, isolation, disruption, and resolution of core grievances, and neutralization in detail.

There are a range of possible operational approaches to COIN. COIN should strive to move from direct to balanced and balanced to indirect. The direct approach focuses on protecting US and HN interests while attacking the insurgents. The indirect approach focuses on the actions to establish conditions (a stable and more secure environment) for others to achieve success with the help of the US.

[Executive Summary xv]

The principles of COIN are derived from the historical record and recent experience. These principles do not replace the principles of joint operations, but rather provide focus on how to successfully conduct COIN.

This understanding includes the political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, and other aspects of the OE. Counterinsurgents must pay special attention to society, culture, and insurgent advantages within the OE.

The primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government. Counterinsurgents achieve this objective by undertaking appropriate actions and striving for a balanced application of both military and nonmilitary means as dictated by the situation.

Unity of effort must be present at every echelon of a COIN operation. Otherwise, well-intentioned but uncoordinated actions can cancel each other or provide vulnerabilities for insurgents to exploit.

At the beginning of a COIN operation, military actions may appear predominant as security forces conduct operations to secure the populace and kill or capture insurgents. However, political objectives must guide the military’s approach. Commanders must consider how operations contribute to strengthening the HN government’s legitimacy and achieving US goals—the latter is especially important if there is no HN.

Effective COIN is shaped by timely, specific, and reliable intelligence, gathered and analyzed at all levels and disseminated throughout the force. Reporting by units, members of the country team, and information derived from interactions with civilian agencies is often of equal or greater importance than reporting by specialized intelligence assets.

While it may be required to kill or capture insurgents, it is more effective in the long run to separate an insurgency from the population and its resources, thus letting it die. Confrontational military action, in exclusion is counterproductive in most cases; it risks generating popular resentment, creating martyrs that motivate new recruits, and producing cycles of revenge.

(continued)

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JP 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations Oct 5 2009

[Executive Summary xvi]

To establish legitimacy, commanders transition security activities from military operations to law enforcement as quickly as feasible. When insurgents are seen as criminals, they often lose public support.

Insurgencies are protracted by nature, and history demonstrates that they often last for years or even decades. Thus, COIN normally demands considerable expenditures of time and resources, especially if they must be conducted simultaneously with conventional operations in a protracted war combining traditional and IW.

To limit discontent and build support, the HN government and any counterinsurgents assisting it create and maintain a realistic set of expectations among the populace, friendly military forces, and the international community. Information operations (IO), particularly PSYOP and the related activities of public affairs (PA) and civil-military operations (CMO), are key tools to accomplish this.

Even precise and tailored force must be executed legitimately and with consideration for consequent effects. An operation that kills five insurgents is counterproductive if collateral damage leads to the recruitment of fifty more insurgents.

An effective counterinsurgent force is a learning organization. Insurgents constantly shift between military and political phases and tactics. Every unit needs to be able to make observations, draw and apply lessons, and assess results.

Successful COIN is normally conducted with decentralized execution based upon centralized vision and orders that include clear and concise rules for the use of force and rules of engagement.

US forces committed to supporting COIN are there to assist a HN government. The long-term goal is to leave a government able to stand by itself, which is also normally the goal even if the US begins COIN in an area that does not have a HN government. US forces and agencies can help, but HN elements must accept responsibilities to achieve real victory.

[Executive Summary xvii]

Unified action includes a “whole-of-government” or “comprehensive approach” that employs all instruments of national power. Achieving unity of effort is challenging in COIN due to the normally complex OE and its many potential actors—friendly, neutral, and adversarial. The military contribution to COIN must be coordinated with the activities of US Government (USG) interagency partners, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), regional organizations, the operations of multinational forces, and activities of various HN agencies to be successful. The joint military contribution is essential to provide security that enables other COIN efforts. Joint forces contribute to unified action through unity of command and a solid command and control architecture that integrates strategic, operational, and tactical COIN.

When a HN is dealing with an insurgency and the US supports the HN, COIN is one aspect of a larger FID mission. Internal defense and development (IDAD) is the HN’s plan that US FID supports; the HN does not support the US FID plan. The purpose of the IDAD strategy is to promote HN growth and its ability to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

Civil-military integration mechanisms fall into two general areas: those that are located outside of the theater and those that are located in theater.

Civil-military mechanisms in the US include the National Security Council and policy operations groups.

Civil-military integration mechanisms in theater may include: joint interagency coordination group, US country team, advance civilian team, executive steering group, regional authority, civil-military coordination board, joint civil-military operations task force, national-level governmental assistance teams, provincial reconstruction teams, civil-military operations centers, and joint interagency task force.

Unity of command should extend to all military forces engaged in COIN—US, HN, and other multinational

(continued)

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JP 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations Oct 5 2009

[Executive Summary xviii]

forces. No single command structure meets the needs of every multinational command but one absolute remains constant; political considerations will heavily influence the ultimate shape of the command structure. Regardless of the command structure, coalitions and alliances require a significant liaison structure, and liaisons are even more important in COIN in order to coordinate many disparate and highly politically sensitive efforts.

[excerpt 2]

[Executive Summary xx]

Public opinion, perceptions, media, public information, and rumors influence how the populace perceives the HN legitimacy. PA shapes the information environment through public information activities and facilitates media access to preempt, neutralize, or counter adversary disinformation efforts.

Embedded media representatives experience the joint force perspective of operations in the COIN environment. Commanders may hold periodic press conferences to explain operations and provide transparency to the people most affected by COIN efforts. However, counterinsurgents must strive to avoid the perception of attempting to manipulate the population or media. Even the slightest appearance of impropriety can undermine the credibility of the COIN force and HN legitimacy.

While detainees can be vital sources of information, how counterinsurgents treat captured insurgents has immense potential impact on insurgent morale, retention, and recruitment. Humane and just treatment may afford counterinsurgents many short-term opportunities as well as potentially damaging insurgent recruitment. Abuse may foster resentment and hatred; offering the enemy an opportunity for propaganda and assist potential insurgent recruitment and support.

National defense and internal security are the traditional cornerstones of state sovereignty. Security is essential to legitimate governance and participation, effective rule of

[Executive Summary xxi]

law, and sustained economic development. Security sector reform (SSR) aims to provide an effective and legitimate public service that is transparent, accountable to civilian authority, and responsive to the needs of the public. SSR must be part of any COIN plan, including the IDAD strategy, from the outset.

The objective of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process is to contribute to security and stability in post-conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin. Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control, and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives, and light and heavy weapons of former insurgents and the population. Demobilization is the process of transitioning a conflict or wartime military establishment and defense-based civilian economy to a peacetime configuration while maintaining national security and economic vitality. Demobilization for COIN normally involves the controlled discharge of active combatants from paramilitary groups, militias, and insurgent forces that have stopped fighting. Reintegration is the process through which former combatants, belligerents, and dislocated civilians receive amnesty, reenter civil society, gain sustainable employment, and become contributing members of the local population.

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Title and date JP 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations Oct 5 2009 and Executive summary w/page numbers. So you are correct is not the Jan 2009 guide of the Q post and looked at details. It is a followup operations manual.

Bread 10556 >>8245162

https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_24-2009.pdf [249 pg pdf] Counterinsurgency Operations Oct 5 2009