In the branch of linguistics known as pragmatics, a presupposition (or PSP) is an implicit assumption about the world or background belief relating to an utterance whose truth is taken for granted in discourse. Examples of presuppositions include:

Jane no longer writes fiction.

Presupposition: Jane once wrote fiction.

Have you stopped eating meat?

Presupposition: you had once eaten meat.

Have you talked to Hans?

Presupposition: Hans exists.

A presupposition must be mutually known or assumed by the speaker and addressee for the utterance to be considered appropriate in context. It will generally remain a necessary assumption whether the utterance is placed in the form of an assertion, denial, or question, and can be associated with a specific lexical item or grammatical feature (presupposition trigger) in the utterance.

Crucially, negation of an expression does not change its presuppositions: I want to do it again and I don't want to do it again both presuppose that the subject has done it already one or more times; My wife is pregnant and My wife is not pregnant both presuppose that the subject has a wife. In this respect, presupposition is distinguished from entailment and implicature. For example, The president was assassinated entails that The president is dead, but if the expression is negated, the entailment is not necessarily true.

>>8506542

Projection of presuppositions

A presupposition of a part of an utterance is sometimes also a presupposition of the whole utterance, and sometimes not. For instance, the phrase my wife triggers the presupposition that I have a wife. The first sentence below carries that presupposition, even though the phrase occurs inside an embedded clause. In the second sentence, however, it does not. John might be mistaken about his belief that I have a wife, or he might be deliberately trying to misinform his audience, and this has an effect on the meaning of the second sentence, but, perhaps surprisingly, not on the first one.

John thinks that my wife is beautiful.

John said that my wife is beautiful.

Thus, this seems to be a property of the main verbs of the sentences, think and say, respectively. After work by Lauri Karttunen,[1] verbs that allow presuppositions to "pass up" to the whole sentence ("project") are called holes, and verbs that block such passing up, or projection of presuppositions are called plugs. Some linguistic environments are intermediate between plugs and holes: They block some presuppositions and allow others to project. These are called filters. An example of such an environment are indicative conditionals ("If-then" clauses). A conditional sentence contains an antecedent and a consequent. The antecedent is the part preceded by the word "if," and the consequent is the part that is (or could be) preceded by "then." If the consequent contains a presupposition trigger, and the triggered presupposition is explicitly stated in the antecedent of the conditional, then the presupposition is blocked. Otherwise, it is allowed to project up to the entire conditional. Here is an example:

If I have a wife, then my wife is blonde.

Here, the presupposition triggered by the expression my wife (that I have a wife) is blocked, because it is stated in the antecedent of the conditional: That sentence doesn't imply that I have a wife. In the following example, it is not stated in the antecedent, so it is allowed to project, i.e. the sentence does imply that I have a wife.

If it's already 4am, then my wife is probably angry.

Hence, conditional sentences act as filters for presuppositions that are triggered by expressions in their consequent.

A significant amount of current work in semantics and pragmatics is devoted to a proper understanding of when and how presuppositions project.

Presupposition triggers

A presupposition trigger is a lexical item or linguistic construction which is responsible for the presupposition, and thus "triggers" it.[2] The following is a selection of presuppositional triggers following Stephen C. Levinson's classic textbook on Pragmatics, which in turn draws on a list produced by Lauri Karttunen. As is customary, the presuppositional triggers themselves are italicized, and the symbol » stands for 'presupposes'.[3]

Definite descriptions

Main article: Definite description

Definite descriptions are phrases of the form "the X" where X is a noun phrase. The description is said to be proper when the phrase applies to exactly one object, and conversely, it is said to be improper when either there exist more than one potential referents, as in "the senator from Ohio", or none at all, as in "the king of France". In conventional speech, definite descriptions are implicitly assumed to be proper, hence such phrases trigger the presupposition that the referent is unique and existent.

John saw the man with two heads.

»there exists a man with two heads.

Factive verbs

See also: Epistemology § Truth

In Western epistemology, there is a tradition originating with Plato of defining knowledge as justified true belief. On this definition, for someone to know X, it is required that X be true. A linguistic question thus arises regarding the usage of such phrases: does a person who states "John knows X" implicitly claim the truth of X? Steven Pinker explored this question in a popular science format in a 2007 book on language and cognition, using a widely publicized example from a speech by a U.S. president.[4] A 2003 speech by George W. Bush included the line, "British Intelligence has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa."[5] Over the next few years, it became apparent that this intelligence lead was incorrect. But the way the speech was phrased, using a factive verb, implicitly framed the lead as truth rather than hypothesis. There is however a strong alternative view that factivity thesis, the proposition that relational predicates having to do with knowledge, such as knows, learn, remembers, and realized, presuppose the factual truth of their object, is incorrect.[6]

Martha regrets drinking John's home brew.

Presupposition: Martha did in fact drink John's home brew.

Frankenstein was aware that Dracula was there.

Presupposition: Dracula was in fact there.

John realized that he was in debt.

Presupposition: John was in fact in debt.

It was odd how proud he was.

Presupposition: He was in fact proud.

Some further factive predicates: know; be sorry that; be proud that; be indifferent that; be glad that; be sad that.

Implicative verbs

John managed to open the door.

»John tried to open the door.

John forgot to lock the door.

»John ought to have locked, or intended to lock, the door.

Some further implicative predicates: X happened to V»X didn't plan or intend to V; X avoided Ving»X was expected to, or usually did, or ought to V, etc.

Change of state or continuation of state verbs

With these presupposition triggers, the current unfolding situation is considered presupposed information.[7]

John stopped teasing his wife.

»John had been teasing his wife.

Joan began teasing her husband.

»Joan hadn't been teasing her husband.

Some further change of state verbs: start; finish; carry on; cease; take (as in X took Y from Z » Y was at/in/with Z); leave; enter; come; go; arrive; etc.

Iteratives

These types of triggers presuppose the existence of a previous state of affairs.[7]

The flying saucer came again.

»The flying saucer came before.

You can't get gobstoppers anymore.

»You once could get gobstoppers.

Carter returned to power.

»Carter held power before.

Further iteratives: another time; to come back; restore; repeat; for the nth time.

Temporal clauses

The situation explained in a clause that begins with a temporal clause constructor is typically considered backgrounded information.[7]

Before Strawson was even born, Frege noticed presuppositions.

»Strawson was born.

While Chomsky was revolutionizing linguistics, the rest of social science was asleep.

»Chomsky was revolutionizing linguistics.

Since Churchill died, we've lacked a leader.

»Churchill died.

Further temporal clause constructors: after; during; whenever; as (as in As John was getting up, he slipped).

Cleft sentences

Cleft sentence structures highlight particular aspects of a sentence and consider the surrounding information to be backgrounded knowledge. These sentences are typically not spoken to strangers, but rather to addressees who are aware of the ongoing situation.[7]

Cleft construction: It was Henry that kissed Rosie.

»Someone kissed Rosie.

Pseudo-cleft construction: What John lost was his wallet.

»John lost something.

Comparisons and contrasts

Comparisons and contrasts may be marked by stress (or by other prosodic means), by particles like "too", or by comparatives constructions.

Marianne called Adolph a male chauvinist, and then HE insulted HER.

»For Marianne to call Adolph a male chauvinist would be to insult him.

Carol is a better linguist than Barbara.

»Barbara is a linguist.

Counterfactual conditionals

If the notice had only said 'mine-field' in Welsh as well as in English, we would never have lost poor Llewellyn.

»The notice didn't say 'mine-field' in Welsh.

Questions

Questions often presuppose what the assertive part of the question presupposes, but interrogative parts might introduce further presuppositions. There are three different types of questions: yes/no questions, alternative questions and WH-questions.

Is there a professor of linguistics at MIT?

»Either there is a professor of linguistics at MIT or there isn't.

Is Newcastle in England or in Australia?

»Newcastle is in England or Newcastle is in Australia.

Who is the professor of linguistics at MIT?

»Someone is the professor of linguistics at MIT.

Possessive case

John's children are very noisy.

»John has children.

Accommodation of presuppositions

A presupposition of a sentence must normally be part of the common ground of the utterance context (the shared knowledge of the interlocutors) in order for the sentence to be felicitous. Sometimes, however, sentences may carry presuppositions that are not part of the common ground and nevertheless be felicitous. For example, I can, upon being introduced to someone, out of the blue explain that my wife is a dentist, this without my addressee having ever heard, or having any reason to believe that I have a wife. In order to be able to interpret my utterance, the addressee must assume that I have a wife. This process of an addressee assuming that a presupposition is true, even in the absence of explicit information that it is, is usually called presupposition accommodation. We have just seen that presupposition triggers like my wife (definite descriptions) allow for such accommodation. In "Presupposition and Anaphora: Remarks on the Formulation of the Projection Problem",[8] the philosopher Saul Kripke noted that some presupposition triggers do not seem to permit such accommodation. An example of that is the presupposition trigger too. This word triggers the presupposition that, roughly, something parallel to what is stated has happened. For example, if pronounced with emphasis on John, the following sentence triggers the presupposition that somebody other than John had dinner in New York last night.

John had dinner in New York last night, too.

But that presupposition, as stated, is completely trivial, given what we know about New York. Several million people had dinner in New York last night, and that in itself doesn't satisfy the presupposition of the sentence. What is needed for the sentence to be felicitous is really that somebody relevant to the interlocutors had dinner in New York last night, and that this has been mentioned in the previous discourse, or that this information can be recovered from it. Presupposition triggers that disallow accommodation are called anaphoric presupposition triggers.

To describe a presupposition in the context of propositional calculus and truth-bearers, Belnap defines "A sentence is a presupposition of a question if the truth of the sentence is a necessary condition of the question's having some true answer." Then referring to the semantic theory of truth, interpretations are used to formulate a presupposition: "Every interpretation which makes the question truly answerable is an interpretation which makes the presupposed sentence true as well."

A sentence that expresses a presupposition in a question may be characterized as follows: the question has some true answer if and only if the sentence is true.

One form of misleading discourse involves presupposing and implying something without stating it explicitly, by phrasing it as a question. For example, the question "Does Mr. Jones have a brother in the army?" does not claim that he does, but implies that there must be at least some indication that he does, or the question would not need to be asked.[2] The person asking the question is thus protected from accusations of making false claims, but still manages to make the implication in the form of a hidden compound question. The fallacy is not in the question itself, but rather in the listener's assumption that the question would not have been asked without some evidence to support the supposition.

In order to have the desired effect, the question must imply something uncommon enough not to be asked without some evidence to the fact. For example, the question "Does Mr. Jones have a brother?" would not cause the listener to think there must be some evidence that he does, since this form of general question is frequently asked with no foreknowledge of the answer.

Complex question fallacy

Further information: Loaded question

The complex question fallacy, or many questions fallacy, is context dependent; a presupposition by itself doesn't have to be a fallacy. It is committed when someone asks a question that presupposes something that has not been proven or accepted by all the people involved.[1][3][4][5][6] For example, "Is Mary wearing a blue or a red dress?" is fallacious because it artificially restricts the possible responses to a blue or red dress. If the person being questioned wouldn't necessarily consent to those constraints, the question is fallacious.[1][4][5][6]

Hence we can distinguish between:

legitimately complex question (not a fallacy): A question that assumes something that the hearer would readily agree to. For example, "Who is the monarch of the United Kingdom?" assumes that there is a place called the United Kingdom and that it has a monarch, both true.

illegitimately complex question: On the other hand, "Who is the King of France?" would commit the complex question fallacy because while it assumes there is a place called France (true), it also assumes France currently has a king (false). But since answering this question does not seem to incriminate or otherwise embarrass the speaker, it is complex but not really a loaded question.[7]

When a complex question contains controversial presuppositions (often with loaded language—having an unspoken and often emotive implication), it is known as a loaded question.[3][4][6] For example, a classic loaded question, containing incriminating assumptions that the questioned persons seem to admit to if they answer the questions instead of challenging them, is "Have you stopped beating your wife?" If the person questioned answers, "Yes", then that implies that he has previously beaten his wife. A loaded question may be asked to trick the respondent into admitting something that the questioner believes to be true, and which may in fact be true. So the previous question is "loaded", whether or not the respondent has actually beaten his wife–and if the respondent answers anything other than "yes" or "no" in an attempt to deny having beaten his wife, the questioner can accuse him of "trying to dodge the question". The very same question may be loaded in one context, but not in the other. For example, the previous question would not be loaded were it asked during a trial in which the defendant has already admitted having beaten his wife.[4]

Similar questions and fallacies

A similar fallacy is the double-barreled question. It is committed when someone asks a question that touches upon more than one issue, yet allows only for one answer.[8][9][10]

This fallacy can be also confused with petitio principii (begging the question),[11] which offers a premise no more plausible than, and often just a restatement of, the conclusion.[12]

Closely connected with [petitio principii] is the fallacy of the Complex Question. By a complex question, in the broadest meaning of that term, is meant one that suggests its own answer. Any question, for instance, that forces us to select, and assert in our answer to it, one of the elements of the question itself, while some other possibility is really open, is complex in the sense in which that term is here employed. If, for example, one were to ask whether you were going to New York or London, or if your favourite colour were red or blue, or if you had given up a particular bad habit, he would be guilty of the fallacy of the complex question, if, in each case, the alternatives, as a matter of fact, were more numerous than, or were in any way different from, those stated in the question. Any leading question which complicates an issue by over simplification is fallacious for the same reason… In the petitio principii an assumption with respect to the subject-matter of an argument functions as a premise, in the complex question it is a similar assumption that shuts out some of the material possibilities of a situation and confines an issue within too narrow limits. As in the former case, so here, the only way of meeting the difficulty is to raise the previous question, that is, to call the assumption which lies back of the fallacy into question.[13]

— Arthur Ernest Davies, "Fallacies" in A Text-Book of Logic

In classical rhetoric and logic, begging the question is an informal fallacy that occurs when an argument's premises assume the truth of the conclusion, instead of supporting it. It is a type of circular reasoning: an argument that requires that the desired conclusion be true. This often occurs in an indirect way such that the fallacy's presence is hidden, or at least not easily apparent.[1]

In modern vernacular usage, however, begging the question is often used to mean "raising the question" or "suggesting the question".[2][3] Sometimes it is confused with "dodging the question", an attempt to avoid it.[4]

The phrase begging the question originated in the 16th century as a mistranslation of the Latin petitio principii, which actually translates to "assuming the initial point".[4]

comment /Trump/ X

comment /http/ X

comment /Ellen/ X

comment /Hanks/ X

comment /Finkle/ X

comment /WWG/ X

comment /Q/ X

comment /Dani/ X

comment /Oprah/ X

comment /POTUS/ X

comment /Covfefe/ X

comment /triot/ X

comment /CIA/ X

comment /GOD/ X

comment /MSM/ X

rub your jew noodles on it

>>8506787

>jew noodles

jew noddle goals

Self-refuting ideas or self-defeating ideas are ideas or statements whose falsehood is a logical consequence of the act or situation of holding them to be true. Many ideas are called self-refuting by their detractors, and such accusations are therefore almost always controversial, with defenders stating that the idea is being misunderstood or that the argument is invalid. For these reasons, none of the ideas below are unambiguously or incontrovertibly self-refuting. These ideas are often used as axioms, which are definitions taken to be true (tautological assumptions), and cannot be used to test themselves, for doing so would lead to only two consequences: consistency (circular reasoning) or exception (self-contradiction). It is important to know that the conclusion of an argument that is self-refuting is not necessarily false, since it could be supported by another, more valid, argument.

Begging or assuming the point at issue consists (to take the expression in its widest sense) [of] failing to demonstrate the required proposition. But there are several other ways in which this may happen; for example, if the argument has not taken syllogistic form at all, he may argue from premises which are less known or equally unknown, or he may establish the antecedent by means of its consequents; for demonstration proceeds from what is more certain and is prior. Now begging the question is none of these. […] If, however, the relation of B to C is such that they are identical, or that they are clearly convertible, or that one applies to the other, then he is begging the point at issue…. [B]egging the question is proving what is not self-evident by means of itself…either because predicates which are identical belong to the same subject, or because the same predicate belongs to subjects which are identical.

— Aristotle, Hugh Tredennick (trans.) Prior Analytics

Closely connected with begging the question is the fallacy of circular reasoning (circulus in probando), a fallacy in which the reasoner begins with the conclusion.[20] The individual components of a circular argument can be logically valid because if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true, and does not lack relevance. However, circular reasoning is not persuasive because a listener who doubts the conclusion also doubts the premise that leads to it.[21]

Begging the question is similar to the complex question (also known as trick question or fallacy of many questions): a question that, to be valid, requires the truth of another question that has not been established. For example, "Which color dress is Mary wearing?" may be fallacious because it presupposes that Mary is wearing a dress. Unless it has previously been established that her outfit is a dress, the question is fallacious because she could be wearing pants instead.[22][23]

Another related fallacy is ignoratio elenchi or irrelevant conclusion: an argument that fails to address the issue in question, but appears to do so. An example might be a situation where A and B are debating whether the law permits A to do something. If A attempts to support his position with an argument that the law ought to allow him to do the thing in question, then he is guilty of ignoratio elenchi.[24]

Directly self-denying statements

The Epimenides paradox is a statement of the form "this statement is false". Such statements troubled philosophers, especially when there was a serious attempt to formalize the foundations of logic. Bertrand Russell developed his "Theory of Types" to formalize a set of rules that would prevent such statements (more formally Russell's paradox) being made in symbolic logic.[1] This work has led to the modern formulation of axiomatic set theory. While Russell's formalization did not contain such paradoxes, Kurt Gödel showed that it must contain independent statements. Any logical system that is rich enough to contain elementary arithmetic contains at least one proposition whose interpretation is this proposition is unprovable (from within the logical system concerned), and hence no such system can be both complete and consistent.

Indirectly self-denying statements or "fallacy of the stolen concept"

Objectivists define the fallacy of the stolen concept: the act of using a concept while ignoring, contradicting or denying the validity of the concepts on which it logically and genetically depends. An example of the stolen concept fallacy is anarchist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon's statement, "All property is theft".

While discussing the hierarchical nature of knowledge, Nathaniel Branden states, "Theft" is a concept that logically and genetically depends on the antecedent concept of "rightfully owned property"—and refers to the act of taking that property without the owner's consent. If no property is rightfully owned, that is, if nothing is property, there can be no such concept as "theft." Thus, the statement "All property is theft" has an internal contradiction: to use the concept "theft" while denying the validity of the concept of "property," is to use "theft" as a concept to which one has no logical right—that is, as a stolen concept.[2]

Others have said the statement is fallacious only on a superficial reading of Proudhon, devoid of context. Proudhon used the term "property" with reference to claimed ownership in land, factories, etc. He believed such claims were illegitimate, and thus a form of theft from the commons.[3] Proudhon explicitly states that the phrase "property is theft" is analogous to the phrase "slavery is murder". According to Proudhon, the slave, though biologically alive, is clearly in a sense "murdered". The "theft" in his terminology does not refer to ownership any more than the "murder" refers directly to physiological death, but rather both are meant as terms to represent a denial of specific rights.[4] Others point out that the difference between the two examples is that "slavery is murder", unlike "property is theft", does not make a statement that denies the validity of one of the concepts it utilizes. Proudhon does not actually say all property is theft—he is referring to a very specific kind of property rights. Proudhon favored another kind, which he called possession, based on occupancy and use, a sort of usufruct rights idea. In What is Property? he therefore says with the apparent contradiction "property is theft" to denote one sort he feels is this, "property is liberty", referring to the kind he favored, and "property is impossible" to make it clear any sort of property rights cannot be absolute. Separate concepts are therefore laid out in a way that can be confusing, especially if one is not familiar with them.

In logic

Self-refutation plays an important role in some inconsistency tolerant logics (e.g. paraconsistent logics and direct logic[5]) that lack proof by contradiction. For example, the negation of a proposition can be proved by showing that the proposition implies its own negation. Likewise, it can be inferred that a proposition cannot be proved by (1) showing that a proof would imply the negation of the proposition or by (2) showing a proof would imply that the negation of the proposition can be proved.

>>8506924

mimics need something to imitate

A polysyllogism (also called multi-premise syllogism, sorites, climax, or gradatio) is a string of any number of propositions forming together a sequence of syllogisms such that the conclusion of each syllogism, together with the next proposition, is a premise for the next, and so on. Each constituent syllogism is called a prosyllogism except the very last, because the conclusion of the last syllogism is not a premise for another syllogism.

Anadiplosis (/ænədɪˈploʊsɪs/ AN-ə-di-PLOH-sis; Greek: ἀναδίπλωσις, anadíplōsis, "a doubling, folding up") is the repetition of the last word of a preceding clause.[1] The word is used at the end of a sentence and then used again at the beginning of the next sentence.[2]

>>8507034

>Anadiplosis (/ænədɪˈploʊsɪs/ AN-ə-di-PLOH-sis; Greek: ἀναδίπλωσις, anadíplōsis, "a doubling, folding up") is the repetition of the last word of a preceding clause.[1] The word is used at the end of a sentence and then used again at the beginning of the next sentence.[2]

Examples

Noust in the grass / grass in the wind / wind on the lark / lark for the sun / Sun through the sea / sea in the heart / heart in its noust / nothing is lost —John Glenday, Noust

"Fear leads to anger. Anger leads to hate. Hate leads to suffering." —Yoda.

"For Lycidas is dead, dead ere his prime, Young Lycidas and hath not left his peer." —John Milton, Lycidas

"Queeg: 'Aboard my ship, excellent performance is standard. Standard performance is sub-standard. Sub-standard performance is not permitted to exist.'" —Herman Wouk, The Caine Mutiny.

"Mine be thy love, and thy love's use their treasure." —Shakespeare, Sonnet 20.

"Having power makes [totalitarian leadership] isolated; isolation breeds insecurity; insecurity breeds suspicion and fear; suspicion and fear breed violence." —Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Permanent Purge: Politics in Soviet Totalitarianism

"What I present here is what I remember of the letter, and what I remember of the letter I remember verbatim (including that awful French)." —Vladimir Nabokov, Lolita

"The years to come seemed waste of breath, / A waste of breath the years behind" - William Butler Yeats "An Irish Airman Foresees His Death"

“Your beliefs become your thoughts, your thoughts become your words, your words become your actions, your actions become your habits, your habits become your values, your values become your destiny.

Epanalepsis (from the Greek ἐπανάληψις, epanálēpsis "repetition, resumption, taking up again"[1]) is the repetition of the initial part of a clause or sentence at the end of that same clause or sentence.[2] The beginning and the end of a sentence are two positions of emphasis, so special attention is placed on the phrase by repeating it in both places. Nested double-epanalepses are antimetaboles.

In rhetoric, antimetabole (/æntɪməˈtæbəliː/ AN-ti-mə-TAB-ə-lee) is the repetition of words in successive clauses, but in transposed order; for example, "I know what I like, and I like what I know". It is related to, and sometimes considered a special case of, chiasmus. Antimetabole has an ABBA configuration as seen in the following example from Mark 2:27: “the sabbath [A] was made for humankind [B], and not humankind [B] for the sabbath [A].” [1]

An antimetabole is also said to be a little too predictive because it is easy to reverse the key term, but it can pose questions that one usually would not think of if the phrase were just asked or said the initial way.[2]

Examples of chiasmus and its subtype antimetabole

Chiasmus balances words or phrases with similar, though not identical, meanings:

But O, what damned minutes tells he o'er

Who dotes, yet doubts; suspects, yet strongly loves.

—Shakespeare, Othello 3.3

"Dotes" and "strongly loves" share the same meaning and bracket as "doubts" and "suspects".

Additional examples of chiasmus:

By day the frolic, and the dance by night. — Samuel Johnson, The Vanity of Human Wishes (1794)[3]

Despised, if ugly; if she's fair, betrayed. — Mary Leapor, "Essay on Woman" (1751)[4]

For comparison, the following is considered antimetabole, in which the reversal in structure involves the same words:

Pleasure's a sin, and sometimes sin's a pleasure. — Lord Byron, in Don Juan, (1824)[5]

Here is the structure of antimetabole presented in table form:

Fair is foul, and foul is fair — Shakespeare, Macbeth 1.

Both chiasmus and antimetabole can be used to reinforce antithesis.[6] In chiasmus, the clauses display inverted parallelism. Chiasmus was particularly popular in the literature of the ancient world, including Hebrew, Greek, Ancient K'iche' Maya,[7]and Latin, where it was used to articulate the balance of order within the text. For example, many long and complex chiasmi have been found in Shakespeare[8] and the Greek and Hebrew texts of the Bible.[9] It is also found throughout the Quran[10] and the Book of Mormon.[11]

YUGE SOY DUES FAGS

>>8485746

"TREE FIDDY" ~ POPE FRANCIS

>>8485725

MONSTER JUST NEEDS BOUT TREE FIDDY

>>8485694

>YEAH

<IF YOU COULD JUST GIB MONSTER TREE FIDDY

>>8485636

TREE FIDDY

>>8485616

<THAT WHOLE SIX PACK WAS BOUT TREE FIDDY

>>8485598

<RED PEOPLE

>MIGHT HAVE STUPID HATS

>>8485590

>>COMMUNISM

<RED PEOPLE

>>8485584

>>FREE BEER

>FREE BEER IS COMMUNISM

>>8485575

>>>CHEAP BEER >>>CHEAP BEER WARNING >>CHEAP BEER ALERT >MIGHT BE FREE BEER >>8485560 >>CHEAP BEER

>>CHEAP BEER WARNING >CHEAP BEER ALERT >>8485552 >CHEAP BEER WARNING >>8485540 >CHEAP BEER

>>8485507 my spirit animal would fucking eat yours

>>8485480 bigly white cock with some kid

>>8485461 keystones

>>8485449 proof han solo ruined the planet

>>8485439 BRENDA'S >>8485431 BEAVER >>8485418 NEEDS BARBER

>>8485409

>MY ARGUMENT IS

>SINCE THEY FUCKED UP ZERUBABEL

>THIS IS THE THIRD, AND NO JEWS ALLOWED

>STILL

>>8485364 . >>8485351 . >>8485336 . >LIKE DANTE'S FUDGE FACTORY . >>8485325

>HAN SOLO RUINED THE PLANET >THAT'S THE FAPPENING

>>8485307 >THIS IS LIKE DANTE'S FUDGE FACTORY . >>8485290 . >>8485279 . >>8485259 . >>8485254 . >>8485240 . >ALL SCRIPTED

>>8485223 . >>8485161 . >>8484057 . >>8483957 . >>8483848 . >>8483848 (You)

>>>WAS IT A LIFE CHANGING PEANUT BUTTER EXPERIENCE?>FOUR FRICKIN NOVELS>THEN DESOLATION OF SMAUG>ALL SCRIPTED

>>8492749

"TREE FIDDY"

>>8492732

JUST GIB MONSTER TREE FIDDY

>>8492732

REALLY REALLY YUGE TREE FIDDY

>>8492732

MONSTER JUST NEEDS BOUT TREE FIDDY

>>8485616

<THAT WHOLE SIX PACK WAS BOUT TREE FIDDY

>>8492903

>>8492889 . >>8492732 . >>8492732 . >>8492732 . >>8492732 . >>8492732 . >>8492732 . >>8492732 . >>8492749 . >>8492806 . >>8492806 . >>8492806 . >>8492806 . >>8492806 . >>8492889 . >>8492964 . >>8493001 . >>8493069 . >>8493041 . >>8493026 . >>8493001 . >>8493049 . >>8493092 . >>8493069 . >>8493041 . >>8493026 . >>8493001 . >>8493049 .

In rhetoric, symploce is a figure of speech in which a word or phrase is used successively at the beginning of two or more clauses or sentences and another word or phrase with a similar wording is used successively at the end of them. It is the combination of anaphora and epistrophe. It derives from the Greek word, meaning "interweaving".[1]"When there is talk of hatred, let us stand up and talk against it. When there is talk of violence, let us stand up and talk against it." — Bill Clinton

"Together, we will make America strong again. We will make America wealthy again. We will make America proud again. We will make America safe again. And yes, together we will make America great again." — Donald Trump

"Let England have its navigation and fleet—let Scotland have its navigation and fleet—let Wales have its navigation and fleet—let Ireland have its navigation and fleet—let those four of the constituent parts of the British empire be under four independent governments, and it is easy to perceive how soon they would each dwindle into comparative insignificance." — The Federalist No. 4

The statement and poem "First they came"