Will Russian cruise missiles hide in the USA in plain sight? Numerous connections to all the usual enemies (foreign and domestic) - Uranium One, Rosatom, CFIUS, CF, Hussein, etc. Do we need the existing threat at Port Canaveral, Florida much less a new second one at Wilmington, Delaware? Crucial vote on the deal will take place 6 Apr 2018 that could put our military and commercial shipping (and CONUS) at additional risk from containerized cruise missiles with a range up to 400 kilometers. These shipping containers could be transported all over the continent.

https:// www.lifezette.com/polizette/the-uranium-one-deal-is-a-clear-and-present-danger-to-america/

The Iraqi Jafar family (deeply connected to Saddam Hussein's nuclear program) own a company, Gulftainer, that operates a container terminal lease at Port Canaveral, FL. Gulftainer is in a joint venture with the Russian company that exports a weapon system of cruise missiles housed in innocent-looking shipping containers.

"The Jafars and their company Gulftainer are quickly closing in on a second U.S. port. Gulftainer and the Jafars are in the final stages of taking over operational control of Delaware’s Port of Wilmington, near Philadelphia. Diamond State Port Corporation will meet at 9 a.m. on Friday, April 6, [2018] at Wilmington’s Chase Center on the Riverfront to vote on the deal. Gulftainer hid its secretly negotiated Port Canaveral deal from the American people until the day [the] deal was simultaneously announced and signed. Similarly, Gulftainer hid its pending deal with the Port of Wilmington until Thursday, March 22, 2018, when members of the U.S. Senate and Congress was leaving Washington D.C. for a two-week recess. Gulftainer has been lobbying Delaware’s state assembly."

"The Jafars, through several Crescent Group subsidiaries, entered into multiple joint ventures and other deals with Russian state-owned enterprises, all connected to Russia’s military industrial complex. … The Inter RAO UES and Rosneft Russian business deals connect Gulftainer to Uranium One. Russian executives move between Inter RAO UES, Uranium One, and Rosatom as though through a revolving door. … The Jafars’ deal with Rostec/Rosoboronexport, a 2010 joint venture named Gulftainer Russian Technologies, elevates U.S. national security risks. Gulftainer entered a joint venture with Russia’s state-owned weapons conglomerate Rostec, the sole shareholder of Rosoboronexport. Rostec/Rosoboronexport exports Russia’s Trojan Horse Club-K Container Cruise Missile Launch System. At first glance, the Club-K appears to be a standard intermodal cargo container. Upon remote satellite activation, Club-K 'containers' instantly transform into deadly advanced weapons systems capable of launching surprise attacks of Russian Kalibr cruise missiles armed with nuclear, EMP, chemical, and conventional warheads. Russia’s Trojan Horse Club-K ‘containers’ can arrive undetected throughout America via semi-truck, rail car, ship, or riverine, quietly lying in wait until satellites transmit electronic launch orders from space. The Jafar’s Gulftainer container terminal at Port Canaveral is a potential entry point for Russian Club-K 'containers.' EMP expert Dr. Peter Pry told the Washington Examiner, 'Iran has also purchased Russia's Club-K missile system … The Club-K, if armed with a nuclear warhead, could be used to execute an EMP attack.' The Club-K 'is able to wipe out an aircraft carrier up to 400 kilometers away,' warns MG Paul E. Vallely, U.S. Army (Ret.)."

>>893607

Continued from 893607:

Following info sauced from https:// www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/9-Nov-17-The-Perfect-Storm.pdf :

"In the case of the Port Canaveral deal, this [CFIUS] process failed, allowing Gulftainer with all its alarming national security red flags to get inside the wire at Port Canaveral without the required national security reviews. Possibly contributing to the CFIUS failure was the influence of CFIUS staff chairperson, Aimen Nabi Mir, a Pakistani immigrant from Kashmir with family connections to the Pakistani intelligence service and also the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood, for which he served twice as president of the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) youth wing. Mir, who joined CFIUS with no apparent national security experience, was previously an immigration attorney at Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP (Wilmer Hale), representing people from the Middle East seeking asylum in the U.S. Former FBI director Robert Mueller was a partner at Hale and Dorr during the 1990s and a partner at Wilmer Hale from 2014 until 2017. Mueller resigned from Wilmer Hale after he was appointed special counsel to lead the ‘Russia Investigation.’ Perhaps also contributing to that failure is the fact that Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper 'disbanded' the CFIUS DNI advisory group at some point 'before Uranium One,' according to an October 18, 2017 tweet by James Rickards, former advisor to the CFIUS Support Group of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).”

More background on Aimen Mir and CFIUS at https:// bigleaguepolitics.com/exclusive-obama-appointed-islamic-society-official-approve-russian-uranium-sale-gulftainer-port-deal/ :

"Aimen Mir was the CFIUS Staff Chairperson from 2009 until 2014. During Mir’s five years in the staff chairperson’s seat, CFIUS approved Russia’s 2010 purchase of Uranium One, effectively handing Vladimir Putin control of 20 percent of America’s uranium. Also during Mir’s term, the Treasury Department refused to conduct two legally-required CFIUS investigations of Port Canaveral’s 2014 container terminal lease concession to the UAE’s Gulftainer. . … Mir’s LinkedIn profile and post-Trump administration inauguration posts show he’s still at the Treasury Department, now as a career civil servant [as of the Oct 25, 2017 date of the article]."