dChan
Anonymous ID: 0b9d6e April 27, 2020, 7:47 p.m. No.8943691   🗄️.is 🔗kun   >>3728 >>3779

Is Biosecurity really secure? Gain of Function research OK or no?

 

Gain of function (GOF) studies on dangerous pathogens funding was paused in 2014 by US Govt (HHS/NIH) but restarted in December 2017 after meetings of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity created new guidelines to allegedly address concerns.

 

  • Researchers in BSL3 or BSL4 laboratories in many universities & govt facilities apply for these govt grants under the auspices of “biosecurity” and wanted the funding restarted.

 

  • National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) is a board of “experts” formed under NIH who voted for the “pause” in GOF initiated in 2014. Between 2014 and 2017 various meetings with select NSABB members and other “experts” were held to determine the necessary new oversight to restart the research.

https://osp.od.nih.gov/biotechnology/national-science-advisory-board-for-biosecurity-nsabb/

https://osp.od.nih.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/NSABB_Final_Report_Recommendations_Evaluation_Oversight_Proposed_Gain_of_Function_Research.pdf

 

  • The inial pause occurred after a number of accidents and dangerous research with influenza virus had been reported and a group of experts Physicians and Researchers called “The Cambridge Working Group” authored a consensus statement on Potential Pandemic Pathogens and the risks involved.

Many well known and highly regarded individuals signed this statement.

Concensus statement & signers here. http://www.cambridgeworkinggroup.org/

 

  • The decision to restart the funding and halt the pause was made during a teleconference of the board members but no details on who was present and voted.

Notice of removal of funding pause:

https://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-17-071.html

Relevant articles

https://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473-3099(18)30006-9/fulltext

https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-017-08837-7

 

  • The Chair and more than half the NSABB voting members changed between 2015 and 2020. The new Chair is the Associate Dean of Global One Health at Texas A&M and a previous Commander at USAMRIID, Ft Detrick and also a member of the “Bipartisan” Commission on Biodefense.

https://onehealth.tamu.edu/texas-am-appoints-dr-gerald-parker-as-associate-dean-of-global-one-health/

https://gulflink.health.mil/an_iii/an_iii_refs/n48en071/index.html

https://biodefensecommission.org/teams/gerald-w-parker-jr-dvm-phd/

 

ADDITIONAL LINKS & INFO

Gain of Function pause Statement 2014

https://osp.od.nih.gov/wp-content/uploads/Gain-ofFunction_Funding_Pause_Statement_May_2015.pdf (Statement dated Oct 2014 added to the docs of the May 2015 meeting)

 

NSABB:

https://osp.od.nih.gov/biotechnology/national-science-advisory-board-for-biosecurity-nsabb/

meetings

2015 voting members

https://osp.od.nih.gov/wp-content/uploads/NSABB_Meeting_Minutes-May_2015.pdf

 

2017 meeting teleconference with full board – no list of voting members only the agenda posted.

Agenda and article in Nature about the change

https://osp.od.nih.gov/wp-content/uploads/NSABB_May_2017_Meeting_Agenda.pdf

 

2020 voting members

https://osp.od.nih.gov/biotechnology/national-science-advisory-board-for-biosecurity-nsabb/

 

COMMENT: It is clear millions if not billions of dollars are spent on this type of research, so the “pause” was until a way to restart funding could be created. The NSABB recommendations to improve safety are not IMHO very impressive, but rather a way to justify restarting the programs.

 

Perhaps the real question is whether BSL4 laboratories and the deadly agents they work with are truly needed and are the associated risks justified?