Gov. Pritzker’s EO: Masks and guns – the rest of the story
By Kirk Allen on April 28, 2020 • ( Leave a comment )
Illinois (ECWd) –
In our previous article on the Governor’s most recent proposed Executive Order that requires the wearing of masks, we intentionally raised what we believe would be unintended consequences to gun owners in Illinois. While we are confident anyone charged under the deadly weapons portion of the criminal code for wearing a mask as ordered by the Governor would have a valid defense, our point is confirmed by all those who insisted no such charge would stand in court. Sadly, those same people missed the point.
If a person is put into a position they have to defend their right, it means their rights have already been violated. People should not face the burden of defending their rights due to ignorance by a select few law enforcement officers or rouge prosecutors.
For those that doubt such officers exist and there is no way any officer would try to arrest a gun owner for wearing a mask, this video points to an officer requiring a person to leave a Wood River, Illinois, store just for wearing a mask. What right did he have to ask a shopper to leave a store for wearing a mask? None, but it happened and we want people to know what their rights are and how to protect those rights when this type of officer crosses the line and tries to arrest a gun owner for wearing a mask. That video was shared in this article covering police bias.
The following legal analysis is provided to explain the matters we raised, and was provided by an Illinois attorney. If any person is faced with the situation we raised, this is the key information you should know as to provide a defense. We say again if you have to raise this defense, the authorities have already gone too far. While we all wish our police would ascertain if there is a criminal intent before arresting a person, it is clear, it is the court that must look at the case to ascertain if there is criminal intent. Stay tuned for a perfect example on this point in a future article from a bogus arrest in Bloomington, Illinois.
Dear Mr. Allen:
You point to competing mandates between duly elected law and the Governor’s executive order. You are correct that he is mandating orders contrary to his powers. Nevertheless, I wish to point out a few things to educate misguided policemen. Marshall Law has not been declared and the Governor is not an ultimate power, nor is he a king. The law recognizes two important concepts. The first of which is the law of criminal intent. The second area the law recognizes is “necessity”. Moreover, there is a fundamental constitutional question in this regard.
Criminal Intent.
It is well established that criminal intent is necessary for a crime to be committed. See McKenzie v Montana, 449 US 1050 (1980). No intent no crime. However, this is somewhat of fiction in traditional applications because the statutes rarely conflict with each other. This may be the first point in time that a direct conflict between an executive order and a criminal statute exists. Nevertheless, I posit, how does anyone have criminal intent in following the law to wear a mask? They don’t. The governor is obligated to respect the rights of citizens in asserting any act of his office and he is constitutionally obligated to respect the constitutional rights of citizens. Is following the executive order intended to strip a person from exercising a constitutional right? I suggest that the Governor’s mandates of executive order are intended to maintain the status quo as opposed to make an act that otherwise would not be criminal, criminal. However, the fact remains, those on the street enforcing laws are not lawyers and often make huge mistakes when exercising their authority.
The fiction of criminal intent is encapsulated in the concept that the criminal statute sets for sufficient elements to establish a crime. Early on in our state, the Supreme Court stated:
“It may be granted that it is a legislative recognition of the fact that in the commission of the offense created there must be a criminal intent, or that negligence which is its equivalent; but such recognition is nothing more than the recognition of the principle of the common law, which, as we have already seen, is also embodied and declared in the Criminal Code in the words that in the commission of a criminal offense there must be a union or joint operation of act and intention, or criminal negligence. MEADOWCROFT v. PEOPLE, 163 Ill. 56, 71-72, 1896 Ill. LEXIS 1729, *18 (1896).
More:
https://edgarcountywatchdogs.com/2020/04/gov-pritzkers-eo-masks-and-guns-the-rest-of-the-story/