>NRO
>excom and the arms control satellite
>NRO staff recommended that the nssm 28 committee responsible for salt negotiation policy
>salt negotiation policy
>consider the desirability of an arms control satellite initiative to the ussr
>ussr
>such an initiative would, we believe, give acda the advantage of being able to open discuss satellite obersvation without adverse effects on the security protection surrounding the nrp
>the united states would negotiate with the soviets on the basis of an arms control satellite to be developed and operated jointly by two nations or bilaterally, like the us-ussr meteorological satellites or nationally, with each nation agreeing to build and operate its own
>in each case, the us development agency would be nasa
>by working in this manner, outsided the nrp, acda could avoid confronting the soviets (and the rest of the world) either publicly or privately with the reality of a major us intelligence collection program
>even more important, acda would also avoid domestic confrontation with congress and the american public
>if successful, the us would have achieved a measurable step toward legitimatizing satellite observation; if the discussion failed, it would do so without jeopardizing the nrp
>arms control satellite would present 'more problems than disclosure'
>'What would you do to establish verification credibility with the American public?'
>'We'll tell them we have national means of verification. If they ask what it is, we'll say we can't tell them.' 'I'm told they can't do anything to keep us from flying'.
>It seems very timely to have an excom meeting – perhaps a luncheon
>this meeting would produce the following results:
>establish important coordinated ground work in DOD, C_A, state, OST, and NASA prior to the nsam 156 ad hoc committee meeting