that's odd
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=797546
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=797546
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/presidential-policy-directive-signals-intelligence-activities
https://themarketswork.com/2017/12/17/the-strategic-delay-of-section-2-3-of-executive-order-12333/
On January 3, 2017, Section 2.3 of Executive Order 12333 – Procedures for the Availability or Dissemination of Raw Signals Intelligence Information by the NSA – was signed into effect.
Agencies and individuals can now ask the NSA for access to specific surveillance simply by claiming the intercepts contain relevant information that is useful to a particular mission. No privacy protection of the raw data occurs.
Under the new rules, sharing of information has been made significantly easier – and the information shared is raw and unfiltered.
Like many, I wondered at the timing of the order. What I found particularly curious was that it was so overdue.
Section 2.3 had been expected to be finalized by early to mid-2016. The order was reported as being on “the verge” of finalization in late February 2016 as reported by the NYT:
Robert S. Litt, the general counsel in the office of the Director of National Intelligence, said that the administration had developed and was fine-tuning what is now a 21-page draft set of procedures to permit the sharing.
James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, didn’t sign off on Section 2.3 until December 15, 2016. The order was finalized when Attorney General Loretta Lynch signed it on January 3, 2017.
Some restrictions within the new order may provide some answers – particularly in light of subsequently discovered events.
The language highlighted below is new and did not exist in the older 12333 regulations.
An older version of Executive order 12333 may be found here. The prior version of Section 2.3 is significantly shorter than the new Obama Order.
From the Section 2.3 order.
On page 9 of the viewable document and page 6 of the actual document numbering:
(U) Section III – Protections for Raw SIGINT:
B. (U) General Protections:
-
(U) Political Process in the United States:
[Any IC element that obtains access to raw SIGINT under these Procedures will] Not engage in any intelligence activity authorized by these Procedures, including disseminations to the White House, for the purpose of affecting the political process in the United States. The IC element will comply with the guidance applicable to NSA regarding the application of this prohibition. Questions about whether a particular activity falls within this prohibition will be resolved in consultation with the element’s legal counsel and the General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) (and the DoD’s Office of the General Counsel in the case of a DoD IC element).
If the above language had been implemented in early 2016 when originally scheduled, surveillance requests and/or unmasking requests of the Trump Campaign would have been less likely to be granted.
Dissemination of this information to the Obama White House would have been made more difficult or prohibited.