Question for Q regarding Signal

Dear Q,

Regarding the recent revelation by Andy Ngo that Antifa thugs used Signal for their comms, could you provide a clarification to us?

Is Signal a strong mean of protecting their COMMs, or are they screwed because of it?

All I can remember you gave us on the subject, is drop 633, where you REFed an exchange between anons:

https://8ch.net/qresearch/res/180880.html#181050

>Picture of Signal's homepage, with Snowden's face on it

https://8ch.net/qresearch/res/180880.html#181023

>From the last thread - anon posted that SIGNAL is owned by The Freedom of the Press Foundation

>THIS IS THE CHAT APP THE FISA CONSPIRATORS USED FOR COMMS

I thought it meant the Cabal actors were using it, or that Snowden was signaling them hard to use it because it is strong.

But now I am wondering if you meant otherwise. Could you clarify (IF possible)?

Info I could gather on the topic:

The various leaks by traitor Snowden were saying that RedPhone (other Marlinspike project) was considered a serious problem for intelligence agencies, and also that the only way to bypass Signal was to exploit the phone around it.

It only has 6 CVEs, none of which allows for remote execution. The 2 most serious ones (but not that serious) were DOS (CVE-2019-17192, CVE-2018-16132), 3 others were specific to Signal-Desktop and rather mild (CVE-2019-9970, CVE-2018-14023, CVE-2018-11101), and the last one was very weak (CVE-2018-9840).

https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor_id-17912/Signal.html

I know that they mention the endorsement of Snowden on their website, but it is also endorsed by Bruce Schneier and Matt Green.

Is Schneier not trustworthy? Did they post Snowden's endorsement b/c they do not know better, or the 'Freedom of the Press' told them to?

And the 'Freedom of the Press' ORG only got involved with them in 2018. Were they OK up to them, but comped since?

The crypto specialists that analyzed the open source code said it was greatly done.

The only potential problem I see is their use of SGX enclaves attestation, if that part is essential to the overall security architecture, given the recent developments on that front.

So:

Was it a ploy by the cabal to make everyone use it to spy on them?

Or was it a 'signal' to the cabal actors they should use it to avoid the white hats' SURV (excluding OFC other means of pawning their phones – e.g. Keystone implant, etc.)?

Thanks

>>9426374

Related sshots

sauce:

https://slate.com/technology/2017/03/wikileaks-says-the-cia-can-bypass-signal-what-does-that-mean.html

https://twitter.com/snowden/status/986277159252750336

https://twitter.com/snowden/status/661313394906161152

https://twitter.com/snowden/status/1175457923255951364

https://twitter.com/MrAndyNgo/status/1267479754136928256

>>9426505

Well, one of the good things about Signal, at least as I assumed up to now, it's that they designed it to be user-proof.

I would be disappointed to learn that they are comped.

There are ways to have a harder to hack phone, or a quite hard to hack computer. For those that can set up something like that, if Signal is well done, it could be a powerful tool, for those that are also well trained in OPSEC.

But I agree with you regarding the majority of Antifa tools that think they are safe because they're using Signal on their easy to hack Android or iOS phones. If Signal is OK in itself, that would give them a false sense of confidence while they are pawned in other ways, even maybe making them neglect their OPSEC. Which they have probably acquired through a low quality crash course, thinking they are part of an "elite" group. It is never wise to underestimate your enemy though, some of them could be doing it right.

Nevertheless, what Q gave us on this is ambiguous, so that is why I am asking. I would be curious to know, if that's the kind of info they can give us. Maybe they were deliberately ambiguous to lead them into thinking it would (falsely) protect them in their operations. I hope one day they will be able to tell us.

I will take a look at your videos. Thank you for the links.

>>9426812

Another "Knight" order, another case of "symbolism will be their downfall"?

Nice digs you guys.

>>9426829

I did not miss your point. I was saying it is possible to have a runtime environment that is difficult to compromised.

Think computer with only open source firmware, older CPUs that do require binary blobs signed by the manufacturer to boot, ME or AMD equivalent properly disabled, HEADS+TPM for a good root of trust, an HSM to have the computer authentify itself to you, coreboot, linked chained of cryptographic verification during the boot sequence, QubesOS, proper segmentation in QubesOS, use of various QubesVM to properly tunnel your comms, and much more.

If you know how to do it, you can do even better than that with separation microkernels and proper customized software partitions architecture, hardware network diodes, hardware fail-safe, etc. Why not even use somewhat formally proved microkernels such as SEL4?

But, granted, you would need to know what you are doing.

>>9426829

And agreed on the HUMINT comment.

>>9426898

I used to think the huge number of cellphone disconnections could be the result of a large number of deaths. But now I rather wonder if this could just indicate an attempt at preventing anyone from Wuhan or the Hubei province to leak information about what was really happening at the beginning of the crisis, to first delay as much as possible the beginning of the reaction in the Western countries, and then to give the impression the virus was going to be absolutely catastrophic, and have everyone be scared as hell. In other words, a part of a colossal PSYOP.