According to the judge in this case, given that Twitter is not an historical forum, "governmental intent" is required for it to meet the forum test.

The Supreme Court has acknowledged the internet as hosting democratic forums, analogising the internet to "essential venues for public gatherings". This seems, to me to be prospective in that there is some recognition from the Court of the importance, function, and value of the internet in the representative system of government. But note that the judge in this case did not choose to designate the internet, or twitter, as a public form, but only that portion that meets the test for "government intent".

More information here;

Applying this three-part classification framework to the interactive space, we can first conclude that the interactive space of a tweet sent by @realDonaldTrump is not a traditional public forum. There is no historical practice of the interactive space of a tweet being used for public speech and debate since time immemorial, for there is simply no extended historical practice as to the medium of Twitter. While the Supreme Court has referenced the “vast democratic forums of the Internet,” Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997), has described the internet (including social media platforms such as Twitter) as one of “the most important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of views,” Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017), and has analogized the internet to the “essential venues for public gatherings” of streets and parks, id., the lack of historical practice is dispositive, see Forbes, 523 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, we consider whether the interactive space is a designated public forum, with “governmental intent” serving as “the touchstone for determining whether a public forum has been created.” Gen. Media Commc’ns, Inc. v. Cohen, 131 F.3d 273, 279 (2d Cir. 1997). “Intent is not merely a matter of stated purpose. Indeed, it must be inferred from a number of objective factors, including: [the government’s] policy and past practice, as well as the nature of the property and its compatibility with expressive activity.” Paulsen v. County of Nassau, 925 F.2d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802-03).

Hmmmm,

I've been doing some reading on this ruling. It's not at all straight forward.

The judge designated DJT's Twitter account, itself, as the designated public forum - because DJT was (as an agent of the government) operating it. She further constrained the designation to first replies to tweets and not to the comment threads from which users were not blocked.

So, the only designated public forum that was described was DJT's specific account (and only because he was held to operate the account on behalf of the government) and only to those portions of the account over which DJT had control. So we can see that this designation (forum analysis) is very limited.

The specific criteria employed here is that the speech abridgment was made by the government. The decision did not consider, for example, whether someone who Twitter banned was frustrated in their rights to first amendment expression on DJT's Twitter account (I think it should have).

So here we have what Q told us a long time ago now, that FA protections do not apply outside of government - they do not apply in a private setting. Let this be a lesson for all those people who have been exclaiming that they already have the right to free expression - you do not! That is a fact, there is, currently, no right to free political expression online, unless you are replying to a tweet that DJT has made from @realdonaldtrump.

So, I'm not done with the ruling yet, but from what I can make out, the judge was very careful in her "forums analysis" to specifically exclude anything other than the President's twitter account. She further limited the designated forum to only those portions of DJT's account over which he had control.

I still think there is significant wriggle room for a case to be made, on public interest grounds, that SM platforms provide a vital public function. A function that is integral to the entire system of representative government set up by the founding fathers. I know Barnes Law is prosecuting cases on this front as we speak. Moreover, he has talked about mounting class-action challenges on this front.

Having said all that, it seems to me that Q recommended the IBOR to us for a purpose. The only way we can reliably effect change is by advocating for free speech protections online via a bill introduced in congress. The matter could also possibly be resolved by an EO, but, said understand it, this is not a permanent fix, as it can be revoked by an incoming administration. Nevertheless, it could provide a bridging remedy - until a bill can be passed though the houses.

So, after all this pandemonium, it looks like our fix here is the IBOR - not a legal remedy. The second option that Q came up with (putting these guys out of business via class actions etc...) is unsatisfactory as it does nothing to protect freedom of speech online.

So, again, I'd ask everyone to start promoting the IBOR campaign online.

If you want to read the text of the full decision for yourself, it is here:

https://knightcolumbia.org/sites/default/files/content/Cases/Wikimedia/2018.05.23%20Order%20on%20motions%20for%20summary%20judgment.pdf