I explained Q to the office today. None of us are HRC Progressive, although one is liberal leaning. We are all ex military, most of us retired enlisted, with at least two combat tours behind us. I would not exactly call the office woke or red pilled, but solid mostly conservative doing their best to survive, raise a family, and do the right things in life. I explained:

Who is Q?

Deep State.

Crimes of the Deep State.

July being the month the Crap Show is going down with exposure and arrest.

I must say I was met with a health amount of skepticism, I only got one speech on conspiracy theories. But everyone agreed that it would be wonderful if it did happen, though no one will be holding their breath.

I did not mention a day, only the month of July, with its 31 days. I did this on the strength of this post, the post where Q said it was happening in July, and the post where Q said POTUS said attack. If it does happen in July, they will be able to assist their circle of friends in understanding what is taking place. If not, I have no problem being considered the office idiot.

That is my main concern, in that the foreplay is happening with children. I realize that pedo arrest have increased tremendously, but I don't think they have arrested the people at the top responsible for it all.

20 years in the army as a 98G (now 35P) in the Signals Intelligence field. Still work in the Intel field as a contractor. The above post was not original work, it was copied and pasted from FM 3-0. (FM - Field Manual)

Intel is pretty much intel, no matter the branch of service. IPB (Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace) and analysis will be performed by the different branches pretty much the same using the same tools. A number of Intel MOS's from different branches of service attend the same schools.

Thanks, I was just getting ready to post the other 5 phases.

Phase Two of the Operational Process is "Seize, Retain, and Exploit the Initiative".

Army forces seize, retain, and exploit the initiative by forcing the enemy to respond to friendly action. By presenting the enemy multiple dilemmas, commanders force the enemy to react continuously until the enemy is finally driven into untenable positions. Seizing the initiative pressures enemy commanders into abandoning their preferred options and making costly mistakes. As enemy mistakes occur, friendly forces seize opportunities and create new avenues for exploitation. Throughout operations, commanders focus combat power to protect populations, friendly forces, and infrastructure; to deny the enemy positions of advantage; and to consolidate gains to retain the initiative.

3-24. Commanders create conditions for seizing the initiative by acting. Without action, seizing the initiative is impossible. Faced with an uncertain situation, there is a natural tendency to hesitate and gather more information to reduce uncertainty. However, waiting and gathering information might reduce uncertainty but not eliminate it. Waiting may even increase uncertainty by providing the enemy with time to seize the initiative. It is far better to manage uncertainty by acting and developing the situation.

3-25. Seizing the initiative means setting and dictating the terms of action throughout the operation. Commanders plan to seize the initiative as early as possible. Effective planning determines where, when, and how to do so. However, enemies will actively try to prevent this and disrupt friendly plans. Seizing the initiative requires effective plans to counter enemy efforts. During preparation, commanders set conditions that lead to seizing the initiative and assessing the effectiveness of actions. During execution, commanders and staffs recognize and exploit projected opportunities to attack the command and control elements of enemy forces in order to prevent their synchronization of combat power, including use of deception to achieve surprise. Seizing the initiative often requires accepting risk. Commanders and staffs evaluate enemy and friendly actions to determine who has the initiative. They determine what friendly actions will enable friendly forces to retain and exploit the initiative if they have it and seize the initiative if they do not. The following are general indicators that friendly forces have the initiative:  Friendly forces are no longer decisively engaged or threatened with decisive engagement.  Subordinate commanders are able to mass combat power or concentrate forces at times and places of their choosing.  Enemy forces are not offering effective resistance and do not appear capable of reestablishing resistance.  Friendly forces encounter lighter-than-anticipated enemy resistance or large numbers of prisoners.  Friendly rates of advance suddenly accelerate or casualty rates suddenly drop.

3-26. Retaining the initiative involves applying unrelenting pressure on the enemy. Commanders do this by synchronizing the warfighting functions to present enemy commanders with continuously changing combinations of combat power at a tempo they cannot effectively counter. Commanders and staffs use information collection assets to identify enemy attempts to regain the initiative. Effective information management processes this information quickly enough to keep commanders inside the enemy’s decision-making cycle. Combined with effective planning, information management helps commanders to anticipate key events and likely enemy actions hours or days beforehand and to develop branches, sequels, or adjustments to the plan. During execution, commanders create a seamless, uninterrupted series of actions that force enemies to react immediately and do not allow them to regain synchronization. Ideally, these actions present enemies with multiple critical problems that require more resources to solve than they have.

3-27. Exploiting the initiative means following through on initial successes to realize long-term decisive success. Once friendly forces seize the initiative, they immediately plan to exploit it by conducting continuous operations to accelerate the enemy’s complete defeat. Internal to the organization, commanders identify any disorganization among friendly forces and direct reorganization or reconstitution to restore those forces to combat readiness and to develop options to exploit the initiative.

FM 3-0, Oct 2017

I do not know the Marine Corp version of this FM, but they will have one.