General Tukhachevsky's order of the day, 2 July 1920, read: "To the West! Over the corpse of White Poland lies the road to worldwide conflagration. March on Vilno, Minsk, Warsaw!" and "onward to Berlin over the corpse of Poland!"
Piłsudski's plan called for Polish forces to withdraw across the Vistula River and to defend the bridgeheads at Warsaw and on the Wieprz River while some 25% of the available divisions concentrated to the south for a strategic counteroffensive. The plan next required two armies under General Józef Haller, facing Soviet frontal attack on Warsaw from the east, to hold their entrenched positions at all costs. At the same time, an army under General Władysław Sikorski was to strike north from outside Warsaw, cutting off Soviet forces that sought to envelope the Polish capital from that direction. The most important role, however, was assigned to a relatively small, approximately 20,000-man, newly assembled "Reserve Army" (also known as the "Strike Group", "Grupa Uderzeniowa"), comprising the most determined, battle-hardened Polish units that were commanded personally by Piłsudski. Their task was to spearhead a lightning northward offensive, from the Vistula-Wieprz triangle south of Warsaw, through a weak spot that had been identified by Polish intelligence between the Soviet Western and Southwestern Fronts. That offensive would separate the Soviet Western Front from its reserves and disorganize its movements. Eventually, the gap between Sikorski's army and the "Strike Group" would close near the East Prussian border, bringing about the destruction of the encircled Soviet forces.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Radzymin_%281920%29
The plan for the battle was straightforward for both sides. The Russians wanted to break through the Polish defences to Warsaw, while the Polish aim was to defend the area long enough for a two-pronged counteroffensive from the south, led by General Józef Piłsudski, and north, led by General Władysław Sikorski, to outflank the attacking forces.
At the time, Piłsudski's plan was criticized, and only the desperate situation of the Polish forces persuaded other commanders to go along with it. Although based on reliable intelligence, including decrypted Soviet radio communications, the plan was termed "amateurish" by high-ranking army officers and military experts, quick to point out Piłsudski's lack of formal military education. After a copy of the plan fell into Soviet hands, Western Front commander Mikhail Tukhachevsky thought it to be a ruse and disregarded it. Days later, the Soviets paid dearly during the Battle of Warsaw, the overconfident Red Army suffered one of their worst defeats.