RCSD
Reconnaissance-Strike-Defense Complex
Other observers take a broader, more functionally-oriented view, fo- cused on generalized capabilities flowing from the “Information Revolution”: the integration of advanced sensors, C4I, brilliant weapons, and simulation—i.e., the fusion of long-range fires and in- formation as the core of this RMA. Many view these new technical capabilities as allowing the United States to move towards a “cybernetic” approach or to implement the Reconnaissance-Strike Complex (RSC) concept (first conceived by Ogarkov), or its newer in- carnation, the Reconnaissance-Strike-Defense Complex (RSDC).42 In their view, this would allow the United States to destroy almost any target on the battlefield instantly (as long as it yields a usable signa- ture). Some others have focused more on sensors and communica- tions capabilities and defined this RMA as “Information Domi- nance”; and the terms “Information Warfare” or “Information-Based Warfare” are being widely used. All these views take a bottom-up perspective, flowing from either the key technology components or their integration into complex systems; and they lead perhaps to too narrow an assessment of this RMA either as merely bits and pieces or as only clever technology evolution. These views, moreover, fail to capture the essence of revolutionary impacts, and almost certainly misstate the historical lessons of RMAs in general, and for this RMA in particular (discussed below).
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https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR880/MR880.ch5.pdf