I missed the first part. Will it be on tonight?
>a little humor is good for the soul.
Def agree with this. Just not my type of humor, but I will make it. :)
Drive that boat Elder!
He said 19"17" that was for us
I like your tie, Mr. President.
Haha did yall hear that Abdul sound he made…whew!
>our President is hilarious
Former President Donald Trump's niece, Mary Trump, reacts to the announcement that the former President and Donald Trump Jr. will provide pay-per-view commentary for a boxing match at a Florida casino on the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 terror attacks.
https://www.msn.com/en-us/lifestyle/mind-and-soul/disgraceful-former-president-trumps-niece-reacts-to-what-hes-doing-on-9-11/vp-AAOeR03?ocid=uxbndlbing
White House signals new COVID-19 measures coming for unvaccinated Americans
Yellen warns of likely October debt cliff and incoming 'irreparable…
Murders, money and mystery swirl around prominent Murdaugh…
President Biden will announce on Thursday new steps in his administration's COVID-19 response that involves testing, mandates, and school measures depending on a person's vaccination status, the White House said.
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/politics/white-house-signals-new-covid-19-measures-coming-for-unvaccinated-americans/ar-AAOeCJR?ocid=msedgntp
Man wanted for murder in Greensboro and Charlotte, considered armed and dangerous
Grace Holland 1 hr ago
The FBI said Wednesday it is joining the search for an armed and dangerous suspect wanted in two murders–one in Greensboro and another in Charlotte.
CMPD Captain Joel McNelly said in a press conference Tuesday that the victims do not seem to have any personal connections to Moore. Instead, investigators believe these crimes are connected because they all happened very close to Norfolk Southern railroad lines.
"We believe that he may frequently travel by rail so we communities along rail lines north and south of Charlotte to pay particular attention to those areas. All of the rail companies in those areas have been notified," McNelly said.
Police also said he might have cut his hair shorter than the photos that have been released. Investigators said he has ties to Greensboro and Winston-Salem.
The FBI said he could be traveling to South Carolina or Virginia. He is considered very dangerous and if you see him, you should call 911.
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/crime/man-wanted-for-murder-in-greensboro-and-charlotte-considered-armed-and-dangerous/ar-AAOf3nD?ocid=msedgntp
'Zero Hour': Intercepted Communications Signaled an Imminent Terrorist Attack
Murders, money and mystery swirl around prominent Murdaugh…
State to remove 12-ton Robert E. Lee statue this week
In this series, Newsweek maps the road to 9/11 as it happened 20 years ago, day by day.
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/zero-hour-intercepted-communications-signaled-an-imminent-terrorist-attack/ar-AAOdiyw?ocid=msedgntp
On September 8 the National Security Agency (NSA), the nation's signals-intelligence organization, intercepted its first communications indicating a possible imminent impending terrorist attack. Between September 8th and 11th, the NSA would intercept telephone calls and other transmissions, but neither translate them into English nor disseminate them.
Going back as early as August 27, allied signals agencies would intercept other communications indicating the gathering storm. On that day, an al Qaeda member in Madrid says over a telephone, "In our lessons we have entered the field of aviation. We've even cut the throat of the bird." NSA would later determine that a more accurate translation of the last sentence is probably, "We are even going to cut the eagle's throat," which they take to be a reference to the impending attacks on America.
On September 10, the NSA reportedly intercepted two communications between monitored individuals with terrorist connections. One says: "The match is about to begin," and the other that "Tomorrow is zero hour."
Former Senator Bob Graham later wrote in his book "Intelligence Matters" that one communication from Afghanistan says that "the big match" was scheduled for the next day. The other referred to the next day as "zero hour."
The NSA historian James Bamford writes, "… NSA's vacuum cleaner swept in two more messages culled from the day's electronic haystack. The first contained the phrase 'The match begins tomorrow,' and the second said 'Tomorrow is zero hour.' But even though they came from suspected al Qaeda locations in Afghanistan, no one would translate them until September 12."
In excusing its sloth and lack of focus, the intelligence community will later argue that the warnings did not provide any indication of where, when, or what activities might occur. The lack of attention to known al Qaeda communications from Afghanistan is startling given that, between May and July, the NSA reported at least 33 separate communications suggesting a possibly imminent terrorist attack.
The Intelligence Community thought at the time that one of them might have constituted a signal to proceed with terrorist operations. None of these intercepts provided specific information on the attack, but they were widely (and quickly) disseminated within the intelligence communications and drove the highest alerts of 2001, particularly around July 4. In fact, on June 22, CIA director George Tenet is said to be "nearly frantic" over imminent threats based upon recent intercept. All of which makes NSA's lackadaisical approach around September even more puzzling.
Warning signs of 9/11 detailed
Dan Mihalopoulos, Tribune staff reporter. Tribune staff reporter Bryan A. Keogh contributed to this report
CHICAGO TRIBUNE
July 25th, 2003
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2003-07-25-0307250212-story.html
The FBI had much more information about individuals linked to the Sept. 11 hijackers than it has previously acknowledged and officials missed key opportunities to apprehend two of the hijackers, a long-awaited report by the House and Senate Intelligence committees concluded Thursday.
Despite the FBI's prior claims that it did not know anyone with connections to the hijackers, the 19 terrorists had a "web of contacts" in the United States that included 14 people who were investigated by the bureau for links to terrorism before the attacks, according to the inquiry.
Those previously undisclosed findings were part of a 900-page report that sharply criticized the lack of communication between the FBI and CIA. It was heavily censoredvast portions relating to Saudi Arabia's activities and President Bush's daily briefings were excisedbut nonetheless offered detailed accounts of clues that critics say might have allowed law-enforcement officials to thwart the attacks.
"The attacks of Sept. 11 could have been prevented if the right combination of skill, cooperation, creativity and some good luck had been brought to task," said Sen. Bob Graham of Florida, a former chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee and a Democratic presidential candidate. "We should have known that potential terrorists were living among us."
Still, the landmark report did not pinpoint any specific failure of an agency or individual as being responsible for the attack.
The findings lay the groundwork for an independent commission that is to issue a more comprehensive report next year.
Some members of Congress called Thursday for legislation to implement reforms in the nation's intelligence operation called for in the report. One much debated proposal is for the creation of a Cabinet-level national intelligence chief.
The joint inquiry unearthed a remarkably specific and long list of intelligence reports predicting that the terrorists would attempt to hit U.S. targets with planes.
Warnings since 1998
As early as the summer of 1998, sources told intelligence agencies that Osama bin Laden had plans to attack public places in New York and Washington.
And a 1998 intelligence report stated that a source said, "Plans to hijack U.S. aircraft proceeding well." According to that memo, two individuals "had successfully evaded checkpoints in a dry run at a N.Y. airport."
A CIA report revealed that Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the alleged mastermind of the Sept. 11 plot who was arrested in March in Pakistan, had visited the U.S. as recently as May 2001 and dispatched recruits to join Al Qaeda cells already established in the U.S.
In the aftermath of the attacks, the FBI viewed the terrorists as loners who generally avoided contact with others. Yet five hijackers Mohamed Atta, Hani Hanjour, Marwan Al-Shehhi, Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdharhad contact with 14 people investigated by FBI agents conducting anti-terror probes, the inquiry found.
Four of those 14 were under active FBI scrutiny while the hijackers lived in the U.S.
FBI Director Robert Mueller told congressional investigators in June 2002 that the hijackers "contacted no known terrorist sympathizers." Confronted with evidence to the contrary at a closed appearance before the panel in October, Mueller said he "had no intent to mislead" the committee, according to the report.
On Thursday Mueller issued a statement calling the report "a snapshot" of the bureau before the attacks, but "the picture of the FBI today shows a changed organization."
Mueller, who took over the bureau just days before the attacks, said communication between the FBI and CIA has improved dramatically since Sept. 11, 2001.
The "best chance to unravel the Sept. 11 plot," the report asserts, was lost because the CIA failed to tell the FBI that two San Diego men who would become hijackers were suspected terrorists.
Alhazmi and Almihdhar were spotted attending an Al Qaeda meeting in Malaysia in January 2000 and later had contact with an unnamed FBI informant in San Diego.
If the CIA had informed the FBI that the men were suspected terrorists, the FBI agent who handled the informant said he believes the bureau would have investigated them thoroughly and "would have then uncovered the hijackers' future plans."
"It would have made a huge difference," the agent said. "We would have given them the full court press."
Alhazmi and Almihdhar were placed on a State Department watch list only weeks before the attacks.
FBI and Treasury Department financial crime officials told investigators that they could have tracked them down through credit card and bank information in August 2001, but they were not asked to do so.
The Bush administration objected to the joint committee's effort to interview the informant, and the FBI wanted the informant to receive immunity from prosecution, a source involved in the inquiry said. The committee blanched at granting immunity to "someone who may be implicated" in the Sept. 11 attacks, the source said.
Almihdhar and Alhazmi also reportedly received substantial help in San Diego from several men known to the FBI, including a Saudi man named Omar Al-Bayoumi. Documents cited in the report allege that Al-Bayoumi was connected to "terrorist elements" and had "access to seemingly unlimited funding from Saudi Arabia."
Fifteen of the 19 hijackers were Saudis.
But the report, in the declassified form made public Thursday, raised far more questions about Saudi ties to the hijackers than it answered. The publicly disclosed report deleted 27 of 28 pages in the section devoted to foreign support for the Sept. 11 terrorists.
`Sources of foreign support'
The single page that was not censored states that the inquiry found "information suggesting specific sources of foreign support for some of the Sept. 11 hijackers while they were in the United States."
The joint committee also reported that U.S. intelligence officials have information on the sources of that support–though further investigation "could reveal legitimate and innocent explanations for these associations."
The report quoted unidentified U.S. government officials who complained that Saudi Arabia's government did not help in terror investigations.
"A high-level U.S. government officer cited greater Saudi cooperation when asked how the Sept. 11 attacks might have been prevented," according to the report.
The Saudi government reacted angrily Thursday.
"The idea that the Saudi government funded, organized or even knew about Sept. 11 is malicious and blatantly false," said Saudi Arabia's ambassador to the U.S., Prince Bandar bin Sultan, in a statement.
"Saudi Arabia has nothing to hide," he added. The committee completed the report in December 2002 after holding hearings. Since then, it has engaged in a line-by-line battle with government officials who insisted that much of the report could not be released due to concerns that the information could endanger national security.
An FBI official said the bureau pushed to keep much of the document classified because some information in the report could compromise the agency's ongoing efforts to combat terrorism.
"Those pages will not be blank forever," said Rep. Porter Goss (R-Fla.), chairman of the House Intelligence Committee. "As soon as the actions that are necessary to deal with those issues are completed, those pages will be filled out."
Families of Sept. 11 victims heralded the report.
"We really hope that this will be a stepping stone for the independent commission," said Kristen Breitweiser, whose husband, Ronald, died in the World Trade Center. "There are so many questions that need to be answered."
Report details warning signs, failures
The House and Senate Intelligence committees released on Thursday their long-awaited report on the Sept.11, 2001, terror attacks. Among its conclusions were:
KEY FINDINGS
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The intelligence community had plenty of useful information about Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, but not enough to identify the time, place and nature of the attacks.
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Despite knowing since 1998 that bin Laden could strike within the United States, in the months leading up to the attacks most in the intelligence community thought strikes would come against U.S. interests abroad.
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The intelligence community knew of the potential for a terrorist attack using aircraft as weapons as far back as 1994 but failed to respond accordingly.
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The intelligence community failed to use the information it had to determine the bigger picture. Some of this information is listed below.
MISSED SIGNALS
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The CIA was aware in early 2000 that terror suspects and future hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi might try to enter the country but failed to put their names on a watch list at that time.
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An FBI informant in San Diego who had become acquainted with Almihdhar and Alhazmi and had met future hijacker Hani Hanjour, told the agency about them, but the agency failed to act because it had not been told they were a threat.
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An FBI agent in Phoenix sent a note to headquarters on July 10, 2001, warning that bin Laden may have sent terrorists to the U.S. for flight training, but the memo was ignored.
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After the arrest of suspected terrorist Zacarias Moussaoui in August 2001, FBI agents misunderstood their right to search his belongings, wasting valuable investigative time.
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From Sept. 8-10, 2001, the National Security Agency intercepted communications possibly related to the Sept. 11 attacks but did not translate them until later.
Source: House and Senate Intelligence committees
Chicago Tribune