EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Leadership and law enforcement failures within the U.S. Capitol left the complex
vulnerable on January 6, 2021. The Democrat-led investigation in the House of
Representatives, however, has disregarded those institutional failings that exposed
the Capitol to violence that day.
The Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs and the Senate
Committee on Rules and Administration conducted a bipartisan investigation in the
months after the attack. On June 8, 2021, the committees released their findings in a
joint staff report (hereinafter, Senate Report). This report supplements the Senate
Report and provides findings from the perspective of the House of Representatives
regarding those areas of inquiry that the Democrat-led investigation has thus far
ignored, specifically answering the important question of why the Capitol was left so
unprepared. This report is based on documents and communications obtained from
key witnesses, and interviews with U.S. Capitol Police leaders and rank-and-file
officers.
Many of the witnesses who spoke to investigators are U.S. Capitol Police (USCP)
sources. Some of the sources are current USCP officers and others are former
officers. Several of the sources who sat for interviews are USCP intelligence analysts
within the Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division. Additionally,
investigators interviewed the Chief of the U.S. Capitol Police Tom Manger, the House
Sergeant at Arms William Walker, and the Assistant Director of the Intelligence and
Interagency Coordination Division Julie Farnam.
This report goes to great lengths to protect the identities of the line officers and
analysts who participated in interviews. Sources who cooperated with this
investigation described retaliation by USCP leadership for their participation in this
investigation and other investigations into the events of January 6, 2021. Additionally,
the Staff Director for the House Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, David Buckley, has a track record of acting in a
retaliatory manner against whistleblowers. For those reasons, this report uses “USCP
source” to cite or otherwise refer to conversations with USCP employees who are not
in leadership positions. 2
1
2
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
There are several reasons the Capitol was left unprepared on January 6, 2021,
including internal politics and unnecessary bureaucracy. Prior to that day, the U.S.
Capitol Police (USCP) had obtained sufficient information from an array of channels
to anticipate and prepare for the violence that occurred. However, officers on the
front lines and analysts in USCP’s intelligence division were undermined by the
misplaced priorities of their leadership. Those problems were exacerbated by the
House Sergeant at Arms, who was distracted from giving full attention to the threat
environment prior to January 6, 2021 by several other upcoming events.
Specifically, the leader of the USCP Intelligence and Interagency Coordination
Division failed to warn USCP leadership and line officers about the threat of violence,
despite the fact that IICD analysts gathered intelligence that clearly indicated a need
for a hardened security posture. In fact, IICD’s leader—Julie Farnam—spent the weeks
leading up to January 6, 2021 attempting to overhaul the division, including by
reassigning expert intelligence analysts to new roles and creating new processes for
synthesizing threat data. Information about planned protests and threats of violence
were siloed and not properly analyzed and disseminated during this key period
because of Farnam’s misplaced priorities. One IICD analyst testified to investigators:
“That unit was disbanded by her almost on day one. We, at the time of January 6, we
were not doing proactive searches of social media like we had been before. We were
strictly reactive and responding to requests for information.” This is also substantiated
by USCP’s own internal after-action report that was drafted in June of 2021.
Similarly, then-House Sergeant at Arms Paul Irving—who served on the Capitol Police
Board by virtue of his position—succumbed to political pressures from the Office of
Speaker Pelosi and House Democrat leadership leading up to January 6, 2021. He
coordinated closely with the Speaker and her staff and left Republicans out of
important discussions related to security. As a critical member of the Capitol Police
Board, the House Sergeant at Arms had an obligation to all Members, staff, and USCP
officers to keep them safe by consulting stakeholders without partisan preference
https://justthenews.com/government/congress/capitol-reax-aviation-terror-threat-day-jan-6-riot-foretold-lax-security-texts
REPORT
https://justthenews.com/sites/default/files/2022-12/FINAL HouseGOPReport of Jan. 6 Investigation.pdf