MTG - During War You Don’t Stay HomeWith Bannon last night in CT
18:26
https://rumble.com/embed/v52gui5/?pub=4
Supreme Court decisions announced live.
TODAY AT THE COURT
At 10 a.m. EDT, the court expects to issue the final opinions in argued cases from the current term.They are not up yet at 10:27 a.m
LIVE
Announcement of opinions for Monday, July 1
By SCOTUSblog on July 1 at 8:23 a.m.
We will be live blogging as the court releases the remaining opinions in argued cases from the current term.
• In Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors, the court holds that a claim under the Administrative Procedure Act to challenge an agency action first comes into being when the plaintiff is injured by final agency action.
Click here for a list of FAQs about opinion announcements.
This is the link where the SC posts opinions:
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/slipopinion/23
https://www.scotusblog.com/
It seems they posted the Immunity Opinion already, but not sure, see attached
They Held that the President has absolute immunity, the syllabus has Jackson's dissent at the end.
==Held: Under our constitutional structure of separated powers, the nature
of Presidential power entitles a former President to absolute immunity
from criminal prosecution for actions within his conclusive and preclusive constitutional authority. And he is entitled to at least presumptive immunity from prosecution for all his official acts. There is no
immunity for unofficial acts.== Pp. 5–43.
(a) This case is the first criminal prosecution in our Nation’s history of a former President for actions taken during his Presidency. Determining whether and under what circumstances such a prosecution may proceed requires careful assessment of the scope of Presidential power under the Constitution. The nature of that power requires that a former President have some immunity from criminal prosecution for official acts during his tenure in office.At least with respect to the President’s exercise of his core constitutional powers, this immunity must be absolute. As for his remaining official actions, he is entitled to at least presumptive immunity.Pp. 5–15.
(1) Article II of the Constitution vests “executive Power” in “a President of the United States of America.” §1, cl. 1.The President has duties of “unrivaled gravity and breadth.” Trump v. Vance, 591 U. S. 786, 800. His authority to act necessarily “stem[s] either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 585. In the latter case, the President’s authority is sometimes “conclusive and preclusive.” Id., at 638 (Jackson, J., concurring). When the President exercises such authority, Congress cannot act on, and courts cannot examine, the President’s actions. It follows that an Act of Congress—either a specific one targeted at the President or a generally applicable one—may not criminalize the President’s actions within his exclusive constitutional power.Neither may the courts adjudicate a criminal prosecution that examines such Presidential actions. The Court thus concludes that the President is absolutely immune from criminal prosecution for conduct within his exclusive sphere of constitutional authority. Pp. 6–9.
(2)Not all of the President’s official acts fall within his “conclusive and preclusive” authority. The reasons that justify the President’s absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for acts within the scope of his exclusive constitutional authority do not extend to conduct in areas where his authority is shared with Congress. To determine the President’s immunity in this context, the Court looks primarily to the Framers’ design of the Presidency within the separation of powers, precedent on Presidential immunity in the civil context, and criminal cases where a President resisted prosecutorial demands for documents. P. 9.
(i) The Framers designed the Presidency to provide for a “vigorous” and “energetic” Executive. The Federalist No. 70, pp. 471–472 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). They vested the President with “supervisory and policy responsibilities of utmost discretion and sensitivity.” Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 731, 750. Appreciating the “unique risks” that arise when the President’s energies are diverted by proceedings that might render him “unduly cautious in the discharge of his official duties,” the Court has recognized Presidential immunities and privileges “rooted in the constitutional tradition of the separation of powers and supported by our history.” Id., at 749, 751, 752, n. 32. In Fitzgerald, for instance, the Court concluded that a formerPresident is entitled to absolute immunity from “damages liability for acts within the ‘outer perimeter’ of his official responsibility.” Id., at 756. The Court’s “dominant concern” was to avoid “diversion of the President’s attention during the decision making process caused by needless worry as to the possibility of damages actions stemming from any particular official decision.” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U. S. 681, 694, n. 19. By contrast, when prosecutors have sought evidence from the President, the Court has consistently rejected Presidential claims of absolute immunity. During the treason trial of former Vice President Aaron Burr, for instance, Chief Justice Marshall rejected President Thomas Jefferson’s claim that the President could not be subjected to a subpoena. Marshall simultaneously recognized, however, the existence of a “privilege” to withhold certain “official paper[s].” United States v. Burr, 25 F.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
TRUMP v. UNITED STATES
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 23–939. Argued April 25, 2024—Decided July 1, 2024
A federal grand jury indicted former President Donald J. Trump on four counts for conduct that occurred during his Presidency following the November 2020 election. The indictment alleged that after losing that election, Trump conspired to overturn it by spreading knowingly false claims of election fraud to obstruct the collecting, counting, and certifying of the election results. Trump moved to dismiss the indictment based on Presidential immunity, arguing that a President has absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for actions performed within the outer perimeter of his official responsibilities, and that the indictment’s allegations fell within the core of his official duties. The District Court denied Trump’s motion to dismiss, holding that former Presidents do not possess federal criminal immunity for any acts. The D. C. Circuit affirmed. Both the District Court and the D. C. Circuit declined to decide whether the indicted conduct involved official acts.
Held: Under our constitutional structure of separated powers, the nature of Presidential power entitles a former President to absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for actions within his conclusive and preclusive constitutional authority. And he is entitled to at least presumptive immunity from prosecution for all his official acts. There is no immunity for unofficial acts. Pp. 5–43.
(a) This case is the first criminal prosecution in our Nation’s history of a former President for actions taken during his Presidency. Determining whether and under what circumstances such a prosecution may proceed requires careful assessment of the scope of Presidential power under the Constitution.The nature of that power requires that a former President have some immunity from criminal prosecution for official acts during his tenure in office. At least with respect to the President’s exercise of his core constitutional powers, this immunity must be absolute. As for his remaining official actions, he is entitled to at least presumptive immunity. Pp. 5–15. (1) Article II of the Constitution vests “executive Power” in “a President of the United States of America.” §1, cl.
1. The President has duties of “unrivaled gravity and breadth.” Trump v. Vance, 591 U. S. 786, 800. His authority to act necessarily “stem[s] either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 585. In the latter case, the President’s authority is sometimes “conclusive and preclusive.” Id., at 638 (Jackson, J., concurring). When the President exercises such authority, Congress cannot act on, and courts cannot examine, the President’s actions. It follows that an Act of Congress—either a specific one targeted at the President or a generally applicable one—may not criminalize the President’s actions within his exclusive constitutional power. Neither may the courts adjudicate a criminal prosecution that examines such Presidential actions. The Court thus concludes that the President is absolutely immune from criminal prosecution for conduct within his exclusive sphere of constitutional authority. Pp. 6–9. (2)
Not all of the President’s official acts fall within his “conclusive and preclusive” authority. The reasons that justify the President’s absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for acts within the scope of his exclusive constitutional authority do not extend to conduct in areas where his authority is shared with Congress. To determine the President’s immunity in this context, the Court looks primarily to the Framers’ design of the Presidency within the separation of powers, precedent on Presidential immunity in the civil context, and criminal cases where a President resisted prosecutorial demands for documents.
PDF Attached!
The SC held in favor of the plaintiff, v the Federal Reserve System(No deference on this and against Administrative Procedure Act== (I suspect there will be a lot of these now.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
==CORNER POST, INC. v. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM==
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
No. 22–1008. Argued February 20, 2024—Decided July 1, 2024
Since it opened for business in 2018, petitioner Corner Post, like most
merchants, has accepted debit cards as a form of payment. Debit card
transactions require merchants to pay an “interchange fee” to the bank
that issued the card. The fee amount is set by the payment networks
(such as Visa and MasterCard) that process the transaction. In 2010
Congress tasked the Federal Reserve Board with making sure that interchange fees were “reasonable and proportional to the cost incurred
by the issuer with respect to the transaction.” 15 U. S. C. §1693o–
2(a)(3)(A). Discharging this duty, in 2011 the Board published Regulation II, which sets a maximum interchange fee of $0.21 per transaction plus .05% of the transaction’s value.
In 2021, Corner Post joined a suit brought against the Board under
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The complaint challenged
Regulation II on the ground that it allows higher interchange fees than
the statute permits. The District Court dismissed the suit as timebarred under 28 U. S. C. §2401(a), the default six-year statute of limitations applicable to suits against the United States. The Eighth Circuit affirmed.
==Held: An APA claim does not accrue for purposes of §2401(a)’s 6-year
statute of limitations until the plaintiff is injured by final agency action== Pp. 4–23.
(a) The APA grants Corner Post a cause of action subject to certain
conditions, see 5 U. S. C. §702 and §704, and 28 U. S. C. §2401(a) delineates the time period in which Corner Post may assert its claim.
Section 702 authorizes persons injured by agency action to obtain judicial review by suing the United States or one of its agencies, officers, or employees. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 140–
-
The Court has explained that §702 “requir[es] a litigant to show,
at the outset of the case, that he is injured in fact by agency action.”
Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514 U. S. 122, 127. A litigant therefore
cannot bring an APA claim unless and until she suffers an injury.
While §702 equips injured parties with a cause of action, §704 provides
that judicial review is available in most cases only for “final agency
action.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U. S. 154, 177–178. Reading §702 and
§704 together, a plaintiff may bring an APA claim only after she is
injured by final agency action.
To determine whether Corner Post’s APA claim is timely, the Court
must interpret §2401(a), which provides that civil actions against the
United States “shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six
years after the right of action first accrues.” The Board says an APA
claim “accrues” under §2401(a) when agency action is “final” for purposes of §704; the claim can accrue for purposes of the statute of limitations even before the plaintiff suffers an injury. The Court disagrees.
A right of action “accrues” when the plaintiff has a “complete and present cause of action,” which is when she has the right to “file suit and
obtain relief.” Green v. Brennan, 578 U. S. 547, 554. Because an APA
plaintiff may not file suit and obtain relief until she suffers an injury
from final agency action, the statute of limitations does not begin to
run until she is injured. Pp. 4–6.
(b) Congress enacted §2401(a) in 1948, two years after it enacted the
APA. Section 2401(a)’s predecessor was the statute-of-limitations provision for the Little Tucker Act, which provided for district court jurisdiction over certain claims against the United States. When Congress
revised and recodified the Judicial Code in 1948, it converted the Little
Tucker Act’s statute of limitations into §2401(a)’s general statute of
limitations for all suits against the Government. But Congress continued to start the statute of limitations period when the right “accrues.”
Compare 36 Stat. 1093 (“after the right accrued for which the claim is
made”) with §2401(a) (“after the right of action first accrues”).
“Accrue” had a well-settled meaning
Doc attached
Save this link, all The Supreme Court Opinions are posted here, going back years, this is so handy to have
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/slipopinion/23
YES, I wouldn't know how though