>>24836733 pb

I have have a prototype that brings a solution that is virtually tamper proof and gives a receipt of your ballot that you own. Not even paper ballots can do that. Matter of fact, no solution in the world does that. If you do not comprehend what this is doing, then ask questions. Essentially this video creates a ballot with two candidates, think of it as a form on a webpage on a website. The form can only be created by someone with the proper credentials and writes the code of the webpage with the embedded form. You can host it on any secure site, preferably state or federal website. Once a user fills out the form, it does not save the webpage nor the form data of your information as simple text that has to be reposted with separate fields in a database for each entry, instead it encrypts and hashes the data only and returns the private encrypted hash to the user. Think the opposite of what any current election system does, where one server holds a private key containing millions of votes. If that server was ever compromised by any means, you get access to millions of votes. Instead the user gets the private key as if they are the security authority, and that data when sent back to the authorized webpage takes that encrypted hash and fills out the form returning the users original ballot that can be changed, depending on policies that are created for that webpage. You could have policies that allow a user to change their vote every hour, which would technically function as a recall system, or every four years, but when a change occurs a secondary application that counts would detect the change and display the new results where in an hour or every 4 years. In reality, it is not a webpage but a web application that dynamically creates a singular ballot form as only one source of truth. You only need one counter and ballot application to handle one billion votes per day on a proper machine or cluster. In reality, to get even more technical, it is a function as a service. We are not creating a web form every time someone access the site, we are calling a single function for a ballot cast, a return ballot, or a counting service. Low overhead, one source of truth in every case. If a user left their computer unlocked at a Starbucks and someone accessed that encrypted private key hash and changed their vote, it could only affect 1 vote out of millions, which is negligible, compared to one compromised election server that has millions of votes on it. Hope that make things clear, I swapped a monolithic security model and placed enterprise security into the hands of every voter, and that is they way it should be.