https://twitter.com/boston25/status/1040378140328124417?s=09
Used to know a program that with one button and any of your friends ip adresses you could play whatever you want through their speakers and make their floppy drives spin.
wouldn't even know anything was up on their end til it happened.
and that was almost 20 years ago.
I guarantee it's possible.
(scanner) fire department releasing all mutual aid companies?
Industrial control systems (ICSs) are critical to the operation of a modern society. ICSs were designed to be reliable and safe, rather than cybersecure, and to ensure safe operations within specific known engineered states.
These systems carefully manage transitions to control risk between operational states that are defined to protect against random occurring failures of a component or a few components. However, focused cyberattacks such as Stuxnet or Aurora that can push a system into known dangerous states are not commonly expected in the normal operation of ICSs. This essay identifies a number of very critical issues that threat analysts, policymakers, and critical infrastructure protection personnel need to understand and address. That is, how cyber compromise of ICSs or physical system design features can cause physical damage to hardware and/or physical processes.
Hackers view exploits that can damage physical processes as the holy grail of cyberwarfare. Any device that can cause catastrophic damage through remote operation of cybercomponents could be a target for compromise. The more high risk components that can be compromised in an ICS, the greater the risk to the operator and value to the attacker.
https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/Passcode-Voices/2017/0324/Industrial-control-systems-The-holy-grail-of-cyberwar