The technical problem discussed in the ICANN paper Q linked is the problem of DNS information being spoofed.
When I buy a domain name, an
associated IP address gets assigned.
The domain name and its association to a
specific IP address where my data is
actually hosted is transmitted to ICANN
and put into the domain name system (DNS), sort of like putting your name into a phone book with a phone number associated so people can look it up.
If bad people sent a message to ICANN that an IP address assignment has been changed,
they could divert browsers to a false spoof website. From there, they could do malicious things or give false information or harvest visitors' IP addresses or whatever . .. you get the picture.
The technical solution is for DNS-to-IP address information to be cryptographically secured (signed).
This does not solve all problems,
but it addresses one major area that
can be subject to problems.
Hard-coding the IP address of 8ch.net is a good idea. It may help us in the event
the domain name system is compromised
or corrupted or affected by a denial-of-service (DDoS) attack or some other kind of problem in the future.
If the Certificate Authorities (CAs) that grant cryptographic certificates "proving" that an entity is who they say they are, and giving them the ability to cryptographically "prove" their identity, were corrupted or compromised,
then we would have a whole lot of other problems.
This spiderweb goes deep and I'm just scratching the surface here.