Executive Order 6102 ; signed on April 5, 1933, by President Franklin D. Roosevelt
By virtue of the authority vested in me by Section 5 (b) of the Act of October 6, 1917, as amended by Section 2 of the Act of March 9, 1933, entitled "An Act to provide relief in the existing national emergency in banking, and for other purposes,"
Section 1. For the purposes of this regulation, the term "hoarding" means the withdrawal and withholding of gold coin, gold bullion or gold certificates from the recognized and customary channels of trade. The term "person" means any individual, partnership, association or corporation.
Section 2. All persons are hereby required to deliver on or before May 1, 1933, to a Federal Reserve Bank or a branch or agency thereof or to any member bank of the Federal Reserve System all gold coin, gold bullion and gold certificates now owned by them or coming into their ownership on or before April 28, 1933,
U.S. Supreme Court
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)
A case in which the Court overturned its prior decision in Swift v. Tyson and held that Federal Court went beyond its appropriate role in Erie, not Swift.
The 1842 Supreme Court decision in Swift v. Tyson ruled that federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction should apply federal common law to non-statutory causes of action. …
Justice Louis Dembitz Brandeis decided that it was time to depart from the rule in Swift and seek greater uniformity in how the law is applied. Arguing that the Swift decision went beyond the boundaries of the appropriate constitutional role for the judicial branch, Brandeis wrote that federal courts are not entitled to create their own common law for issues that properly fall within state law. …
he felt that applying state substantive law would lead to more predictable outcomes for litigants and greater efficiency for courts. Thus, the Court concluded that in diversity jurisdiction cases, courts should apply substantive state law and federal procedural law unless there is a conflict between substantive state and federal law.
Justices Pierce Butler and Clark McReynolds dissented. Butler pointed out that neither party had raised a constitutional question in the case, and therefore the Court had decided it on inappropriate grounds. He felt that the Court went beyond its appropriate role in Erie, not Swift.