Anonymous ID: 71814b Jan. 3, 2020, 8:13 a.m. No.7702487   🗄️.is 🔗kun

>>7702383 ty baker!!

 

>>7702425 still waiting, better be super saucy, cause we've seen most of the shit (Israeli security firm placed tactical nuke, offshore nuke used to generate tsunami, stuxnet - later used to ramp up NSA, etc.). If you've got it, drop it, or get off the fucking pot.

Anonymous ID: 71814b Jan. 3, 2020, 8:22 a.m. No.7702575   🗄️.is 🔗kun   >>2647

>>7702431 anon, can you repost in entirety here, so the notable, if included by baker, is clean and not crossing breads for the phonefags?

Also, suggest you include this in your bun:

>>7702398 (PB)

Anonymous ID: 71814b Jan. 3, 2020, 8:30 a.m. No.7702625   🗄️.is 🔗kun   >>2663 >>2812

>>7702450 research it anon, super easy. first link for 'stuxnet fukushima'. 2-minute dig here…

 

https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/03/17/where-fukushima-meets-stuxnet-the-growing-threat-of-cyber-war/

article only 6 days after event. Pretty quick, eh?

"The Japanese nuclear crisis, though still unfolding, may, in a way, already be yesterday’s news. For a peek at tomorrow’s, review the testimony of General Keith Alexander, head of U.S. Cyber Command. Testifying before Congress this week and seeking support to pump up his agency budget, the general argued that all future conflicts would involve cyber warfare tactics and that the U.S. was ill-equipped to defend itself against them.

 

Alexander said, "We are finding that we do not have the capacity to do everything we need to accomplish. To put it bluntly, we are very thin, and a crisis would quickly stress our cyber forces. … This is not a hypothetical danger."

 

Then, look at what that was used for…

https://www.wired.com/2013/06/general-keith-alexander-cyberwar/

Inside Fort Meade, Maryland, a top-secret city bustles. Tens of thousands of people move through more than 50 buildings—the city has its own post office, fire department, and police force. But as if designed by Kafka, it sits among a forest of trees, surrounded by electrified fences and heavily armed guards, protected by antitank barriers, monitored by sensitive motion detectors, and watched by rotating cameras. To block any telltale electromagnetic signals from escaping, the inner walls of the buildings are wrapped in protective copper shielding and the one-way windows are embedded with a fine copper mesh.

 

This is the undisputed domain of General Keith Alexander, a man few even in Washington would likely recognize. Never before has anyone in America’s intelligence sphere come close to his degree of power, the number of people under his command, the expanse of his rule, the length of his reign, or the depth of his secrecy. A four-star Army general, his authority extends across three domains: He is director of the world’s largest intelligence service, the National Security Agency; chief of the Central Security Service; and commander of the US Cyber Command. As such, he has his own secret military, presiding over the Navy’s 10th Fleet, the 24th Air Force, and the Second Army.

 

Alexander runs the nation’s cyberwar efforts, an empire he has built over the past eight years by insisting that the US’s inherent vulnerability to digital attacks requires him to amass more and more authority over the data zipping around the globe. In his telling, the threat is so mind-bogglingly huge that the nation has little option but to eventually put the entire civilian Internet under his protection, requiring tweets and emails to pass through his filters, and putting the kill switch under the government’s forefinger. “What we see is an increasing level of activity on the networks,” he said at a recent security conference in Canada. “I am concerned that this is going to break a threshold where the private sector can no longer handle it and the government is going to have to step in.”

 

In its tightly controlled public relations, the NSA has focused attention on the threat of cyberattack against the US—the vulnerability of critical infrastructure like power plants and water systems, the susceptibility of the military’s command and control structure, the dependence of the economy on the Internet’s smooth functioning. Defense against these threats was the paramount mission trumpeted by NSA brass at congressional hearings and hashed over at security conferences.

 

But there is a flip side to this equation that is rarely mentioned: The military has for years been developing offensive capabilities, giving it the power not just to defend the US but to assail its foes. Using so-called cyber-kinetic attacks, Alexander and his forces now have the capability to physically destroy an adversary’s equipment and infrastructure, and potentially even to kill. Alexander—who declined to be interviewed for this article—has concluded that such cyberweapons are as crucial to 21st-century warfare as nuclear arms were in the 20th.

Anonymous ID: 71814b Jan. 3, 2020, 8:35 a.m. No.7702668   🗄️.is 🔗kun

>>7702468

>Trump orders more troops to Middle East

Been thinking that we need a quick, big troop buildup, then, we bring them home at just the right time, coordinated to support the National Guard as full disclosure is unleashed within US to ensure coverage is ready immediately.

Anonymous ID: 71814b Jan. 3, 2020, 9:06 a.m. No.7702909   🗄️.is 🔗kun

>>7702812

Flaws in US General Electric Reactors: Japan Starts Up After Fukushima by John Robles

Japan has restarted its first nuclear reactor since the country shut down all of its reactors amid safety concerns after the Fukushima disaster. On Sunday the Kansai Electric Power Company restarted the no. 3 unit at the Ohi nuclear power plant. With the No.4 unit scheduled to go back on-line later in July.

..

The BWR was developed in the U.S. by the Idaho National Laboratory and General Electric in the mid-1950s.

 

The particular model used at Fukushima had inherent design flaws in the containment structure from the outset and engineers predicted the exact scenario that happened at Fukushima.

 

The General Electric Corporation began constructing the Mark-1 BWR reactors in the 1960s, claiming that they were cheaper and easier to build in part because they used a smaller and less expensive containment structure, and this is where the main problems lie.

 

A fact sheet published from the anti-nuclear advocacy group Nuclear Information and Resource Service, which is available on the internet, details problems with the design and states that in 1972 an Atomic Energy Commission member, Dr. Stephen Hanuaer, recommended that this type of system be discontinued.

 

More questions arose about the design in the mid-1980s, after Nuclear Regulatory Commission official Harold Denton stated that the Mark-1 reactors had; “…a 90 percent probability of bursting should the fuel rods overheat and melt in an accident.”

 

Thirty-five years ago, while reviewing the design for the Mark-1, Nuclear Engineers Dale G. Bridenbaugh and two of his colleagues at General Electric were pressured into okaying the designs for the Mark-1 and were forced to resign after becoming convinced that the Mark 1 was so flawed it could lead to a catastrophe.

 

The key issue in this piece is, and there is very little detailed information out there on the subject, how many of Japan’s nuclear power plants run the G-E BWR Mark-1 reactors. All of the Fukushima reactors used the Mark 1 containment system while the sixth had the upgraded to Mark 2 system.

 

Below is a list of all Japanese ВRW reactors.

 

Reactor Location Type Containment Rating Status Operator

 

Fukushima I-1 Futaba, Fukushima BWR 439 Meltdown/exploded March 2011 TEPCO

 

Fukushima I-2 BWR Mark I 760 Meltdown March 2011 TEPCO

 

Fukushima I-3 BWR Mark I 760 Meltdown/exploded March 2011 TEPCO

 

Fukushima I-4 BWR Mark I 760 Meltdown/exploded March 2011 TEPCO

 

Fukushima I-5 BWR Mark I 760 Operational April 18, 1978 TEPCO

 

Fukushima I-6 BWR Mark II 1067 Operational October 1979 TEPCO

 

Fukushima II-1 BWR Mark II 1067 Operational April 1982 TEPCO

 

Fukushima II-2 BWR Mark II A 1067 Operational February 1984 TEPCO

 

Fukushima II-3 BWR Mark II A 1067 Operational June 1985 TEPCO

 

Fukushima II-4 BWR Mark II A 1067 Operational August 1987 TEPCO

 

Genkai-1 PWR 529 Operational October 1975 Kyūshū Electric

 

Hamaoka-1 BWR 515 Operational March 1976 Chūbu Electric

 

Hamaoka-2 BWR 806 Operational November 1978 Chūbu Electric

 

Hamaoka-3 BWR-5 1056 Operational August 1987 Chūbu Electric

 

Hamaoka-4 BWR-5 1092 Operational September 1993 Chūbu Electric

 

Higashidōri-1 BWR 1067 Operational December 2005 Tōhoku Electric

 

Kashiwazaki-Kariwa-1 BWR 1067 Operational September 1985 TEPCO

 

Kashiwazaki-Kariwa-2 BWR 1067 Operational September 1990 TEPCO

 

Kashiwazaki-Kariwa-3 BWR 1067 Operational August 1993 TEPCO

 

Kashiwazaki-Kariwa-4 BWR 1067 Operational August 1994 TEPCO

 

Kashiwazaki-Kariwa-5 BWR 1067 Operational April 1990 TEPCO

 

Onagawa-1 BWR 498 Operational June 1984 Tōhoku Electric

 

Onagawa-2 BWR 796 Operational July 1995 Tōhoku Electric

 

Onagawa-3 BWR 798 Operational January 2002 Tōhoku Electric

 

Shika-1 BWR 505 Operational July 1993 RIKUDEN

 

Tōkai-2 BWR 1056 Operational November 1978 JAPC

 

Tsuruga-1 BWR 341 Operational March 1970 JAPC

 

JPDR-II BWR 13 1963–1982

 

Maybe it is time that all of these reactors were upgraded or shut down. Most have been on-line since the 1970s, and it is doubtful they become safer with time.

Anonymous ID: 71814b Jan. 3, 2020, 9:22 a.m. No.7703037   🗄️.is 🔗kun

>>7702944 chekked double dubs

>Your small and shallow….piss off, pissant.

It would be "You're small and shallow…"

or

"YOU ARE small and shallow…"

pick youR attack, I don't give a fuck.

You'Re just showing you. just. caNt. lurn!

Fucking retarded.