>>8650510 last bread

>Urban Outbreak 2019

Link to the Naval War College Digital Library and the paper by Mr. Davies referenced in the article:

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/civmilresponse-program-sims-uo-2019/

Urban Outbreak 2019 Pandemic Response: Select Research & Game Findings (published 4/01/2020)

This document is a summary of 16 key research and game findings focused specifically on the characteristics of civil-military response to a pandemic scenario. The numbered bullets below correspond to more detailed explanations of findings presented later in the document. While these findings are in no way definitive or complete, they are a sampling of relevant guidance based on research, gaming and expert opinion. It is our hope that these 16 findings will contribute to improving civilian and military effectiveness in humanitarian assistance and disaster response operations

Urban Outbreak 2019 Pre-Analytic “Quick Look”

From 17-18 September 2019, the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS) - National Center for Disaster Medicine and Public Health (NCDMPH) and the United States Naval War College (NWC) conducted a game at Johns Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Lab (JHU-APL) in Laurel, Maryland. Titled “Urban Outbreak 2019,” this two-day, three-move analytic game was internally developed by the NWC’s Humanitarian Response Program (HRP) and emerged as an output from their 2018 Civilian-Military Humanitarian Response Workshop.

>>8650898

>>8650510 last bread

Urban Outbreak 2019

Naval War College "Urban Outbreak 2019" wargame scenerio document is a 14 page pdf by Mr Davies. Appendix III provides a summary of the war game results and copied below. (published 4/01/2020)

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=civmilresponse-program-sims-uo-2019

Appendix III

Urban Challenges and Areas of Inquiry in Urban Outbreak 2019 Scenario

Round One: Outbreak

• Concept of employing informal public health providers in the response

• Concept of informal governance/security for access or mobility for

vulnerable populations in key dense urban areas

• Establishing role of private security

• Determining differential access to resources based on social strata and

location

• Assessment data from rural mountainous region

• Self-interested government officials and private sector actors

• Prostitution as a vector

• False information/suspicion concerning the outbreak and response

Round Two: Cascading Failures

• Loss of power, utilities, dockworkers, security, etc.

• Failure of existing medical system

• All other medical services severely affected

• Logistical capacity stretched for outbreak response purposes at the

expense of all else

• Hoarding, theft, and black market becomes extremely lucrative

• Increased international military role

• Challenges for responder security and ROE for military

• Ambiguous role of the national government

• Role of informal transit for response

• Flight of populations

• Quarantine/roadblocks

• Mortuary affairs

• PPE and medical demand

Round Three: Cleanup Wish List

• Pre-transition change in priorities

• Engineering, heavy lift or logistics from international military before

transition begins/departure

• Reviving broken livelihoods

• Mortuary affairs

• Refuse in urban areas

• Security - rise of gangs and religious groups

• Badly damaged infrastructure

• Hobbled workforce

• Extreme needs associated with fractured health system (public health

emergencies associated with those failures)

>>8651060

Many state departments of health and healthcare corporations (hospital management) were Failures at virus response and public health oversight.

State DOH's and Healthcare Corp Fails: December thru February:

did not review and update their epidemic plans

did not train on contagion procedures

did not educate agencies/public at risk or US ports of entry

did not inventory supplies needed for a viral epidemic

did not order supplies such as ventilators and masks

did not cooridinate with other states and agencies in preparation ofcase spikes

did not update their flu season websites beyond a few CDC resources

did not provide oversight of emergency reposnse agency at the state/county/local levels.

Congress FAILED to pass appropriations by the fiscal year and almost 3 months late

Congress cut $660 Million from CDC line items 'immunization' and from 'public health response.'

Congress placed 'political games' and 'shenanigans' above public service and public health.

In contrast:

President Trump signed EO 13887 in September 2019 to make flu season a CDC priority - because Congress FAILED to pass appropriations.

Some hospitals and working staff did perform training and plan review.