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=Navy MQ-4 Triton Flying Operational Missions From Guam==
Almost three months after arriving in Guam, a pair of MQ-4C Triton autonomous, unmanned aircraft have integrated into fleet operations and training flights and stretched the Navy’s maritime domain awareness across the Indo-Pacific, according to the Navy.
The Navy is counting on the Triton, which can operate at greater than 50,000-foot altitudes and at the 2,000-mile-plus range, to provide an unmanned platform for persistent, maritime intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities and work alongside its manned fleet of reconnaissance and surveillance patrol aircraft. The Tritons with Unmanned Patrol Squadron 19 – the Navy’s first unmanned aircraft squadron – arrived in Guam in late January to support CTF-72, which oversees the patrol, reconnaissance and surveillance force in the U.S. 7th Fleet region.
“Bringing Triton forward creates a complex problem set for our adversaries,” Cmdr. Michael Minervini, VUP-19’s commanding officer, said in a statement.
“Our ability to provide persistent ISR to fleet and combatant commanders is unmatched in naval aviation.”
Along with supporting current operations for several Indo-Pacific-based task forces, one Triton drone recently joined in a “close formation” taxiing along with more than a dozen manned aircraft prior to takeoff at Anderson Air Force Base, Commander Task Force 72 officials said.
The radar and sensors-packed Triton drones have been operating from Anderson AFB to provide, according to the Navy, an “early operational capability (EOC) to further develop the concept of operations and fleet learning associated with operating a high-altitude, long-endurance system in the maritime domain.” Tritons’ onboard sensors and radar can track ships at sea, match tracks with automated identification systems and relay that information to shore-side bases or nearby aircraft, for example.
While the Tritons fly from Guam, the “Big Red” squadron of 300 personnel isn’t based in Guam. A group of VUP-19 aircrew and maintainers are forward-deployed to Guam, but squadron officials and mission operators are based at VUP-19’s home at Naval Air Station Jacksonville, Fla., and a permanent detachment including maintenance personnel reside at NAS Point Mugu, Calif.
CTF-72 has been working with the squadron “to provide Indo-Pacific focused expertise to each crew prior to executing their missions,” the Navy said.
“It’s been a long road to get to 7th Fleet, but it’s an exciting time to show off what our sophisticated sensor suite can do,” Naval Aircrewman (Operator) 1st Class Ryan Gray, VUP-19’s operations lead petty officer, said in the CTF-72 story. “Our operators have been training rigorously to hone their expertise and they are the best at what they do. We are chomping at the bit to support the combatant commanders and maintain an overwatch posture to provide persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.”
The Guam deployment, originally planned for late 2018, was delayed after a Triton crashed during operational testing in California in September 2018. The Navy received the first delivery of the MQ-4C in 2017.
The Triton can fly for more than 24-hours at a time, at altitudes higher than 10 miles, with an operational range of 8,200 nautical miles, according to manufacturer North Grumman. The Navy’s program of record would field 68 aircraft.
https://news.usni.org/2020/05/12/navy-mq-4-triton-flying-operational-missions-from-guam
Welcome to the New Era of Chinese Government Disinformation
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has long sought to influence the media and information space in other countries, and the effort has intensified over the past decade. Much of the activity is overt — diplomats publishing op-eds or state-run news outlets generating propaganda. While some covert tactics were also documented, for many years there was no significant evidence that Chinese actors were engaging in aggressive disinformation campaigns like the one pursued by Russia on global social media platforms ahead of the 2016 U.S. elections. That has now changed.
Over the past month alone, a series of exposés demonstrated that pro-Beijing actors are carrying out a whole range of covert activities in multiple countries and languages. The campaigns aim to spread proven falsehoods, sow societal discord and panic, manipulate perceptions of public opinion, or undermine the democratic process.
Evidence revealed last year indicated that some Chinese-language campaigns had begun on platforms like Twitter as early as April 2017, but the latest round of incidents and investigations points to a more definitive shift in Chinese influence operations. It remains to be seen how foreign governments, technology companies, global internet users, and even the CCP’s own propaganda apparatus will adapt to the challenges presented by this change. Whatever their response, it is clear that a new era of disinformation has dawned.
Since March, coordinated and covert attempts by China-linked actors to manipulate information — particularly regarding COVID-19 — have been detected in countries including the United States, Argentina, Serbia, Italy, and Taiwan, with the relevant content often delivered in local languages.
Moreover, in a departure from Beijing’s more traditional censorship and propaganda campaigns, the narratives being promoted are not necessarily focused on advancing positive views and suppressing negative views of China.
For example, in an analysis of China-related Twitter posts disseminated in Serbia between March 9 and April 9 by automated “bot” accounts, the Digital Forensics Center found that the messages praised China for supplying aid during the coronavirus pandemic (much like a similar effort in Italy). But the posts also amplified criticism of the European Union for supposedly failing to do the same, despite the fact that the bloc actually provided millions of euros in assistance.
Elsewhere, disinformation attempts have tried to sow discord within other countries. In Argentina, a Chinese agent hired a local intermediary to approach editors from at least three news outlets in early April, according to the Falun Dafa Information Center. The broker allegedly offered to pay approximately $300 if they published a prewritten article in Spanish that smeared the Falun Gong spiritual group, which is persecuted in China, including by suggesting local citizens who practice Falun Gong could pose a threat to public health in Argentina. All of the approached outlets reportedly rejected the offer.
In other cases, the manipulated content shared had no connection to China at all. In a campaign in the United States reported by the New York Times, text and social media messages amplified by China-linked accounts in mid-March carried false warnings about a nationwide lockdown and troop deployments to prevent looting and rioting. The campaign was an apparent attempt to incite public panic and increase distrust in the U.S. government.
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute documented another recent example in which coordinated campaigns by nationalistic Chinese netizens — whose precise links to the Chinese state remain uncertain — attempted to harm Taiwan’s international reputation and its relationship with the United States. A network of 65 Twitter accounts that had previously posted in mainland-style Simplified Chinese abruptly switched to Traditional Chinese characters, thereby impersonating Taiwanese citizens. They then posted messages expressing apologies to the Ethiopian-born director general of the World Health Organization, lending false credence to allegations he voiced that racist slurs were directed against him from Taiwan. In April, some of the accounts also jumped on an existing Iranian-linked Twitter campaign calling for California’s secession from the United States, trying to give the impression that Taiwanese users supported California’s independence. (This effort was likely undermined by their referring to the island as “Taiwan (CHN).”)
https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/welcome-to-the-new-era-of-chinese-government-disinformation/