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The 2016 pre-election report also stated that the OIG would continue to examine allegations that
Department and FBI employees improperly disclosed non-public information, particularly during the
April/May and October 2016 time periods. We also noted that the OIG had identified social interactions
between FBI employees and reporters that might have violated FBI policy and Department ethics rules, and
that the OIG would separately report on these individual misconduct investigations, as they were concluded,
consistent with the Inspector General Act of 1978 (IG Act), other applicable federal statutes, and OIG policy.1
Since issuing the 2016 pre-election report, the OIG has conducted substantial additional
investigative work concerning these allegations and, consistent with the IG Act, publicly disclosed findings of
misconduct related to three individual investigations involving then senior FBI officials. First, on October 16,
2018, the OIG released a summary of findings of misconduct by an FBI Official for Accepting Gifts From
Members of the Media and for Lack of Candor. Second, on May 29, 2019, the OIG released a summary of
findings of misconduct by an FBI Deputy Assistant Director for Unauthorized Contacts with the Media,
Disclosing Law Enforcement and Other Sensitive Information to the Media, and Accepting a Gift from the
Media. And, third, July 20, 2021, the OIG released a summary of misconduct by a former senior FBI official
who had numerous unauthorized contacts with members of the media between January and November
2016, which included unauthorized social engagements involving drinks, lunches, and dinners in violation of
FBI policy.
In addition, during the OIGβs broader investigation into unauthorized disclosures, the OIG
determined that dozens of other FBI employees had contact with certain members of the news media who
had reported on non-public information about ongoing criminal investigations during the relevant time
periods in 2016. We determined this information from reviewing FBI records and through forensic
examination of FBI electronic devices, as described below. A limited number of those FBI records, such as
text messages, revealed the substance of those communications, most often when the employee involved
was assigned to a public affairs role and the content reflected an official exchange. However, most of those
FBI recordsβsuch as telephone logsβdid not reflect the substance of the communication, but only the fact
of the contact between the two telephone numbers. Because this was a non-criminal administrative
misconduct review, there was no legal basis to seek a court order to compel Internet service providers to
produce to the OIG the content of any personal email communications for these FBI employees.
Additionally, consistent with OIG practice, the OIG did not seek to compel reporters, or the reportersβ
telephone or Internet service providers, to produce call or email logs or other records.2 For the reasons
provided below, the OIG is referring six of these employees to the FBI for it to determine whether their
media contacts warrant disciplinary or other corrective action.
However, the number of employees in communication with
these reporters still remained substantial, making it exceedingly difficult, absent an admission, to determine
whether any of these FBI employees had in fact disclosed non-public information. Thus, these leads did not
ultimately result in the identification of the source(s) of the alleged unauthorized disclosures of non-public
information described in the 2016 pre-election report. Accordingly, with the issuance of this report and the
July 20, 2021 summary of misconduct findings, the OIG has completed its investigations related to the
improper disclosures of non-public information described in the 2016 pre-election report.